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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f  t h i s  t h e s is  is to  i n v e s t i g a t e  the d i s t i n c t i o n  
A r i s t o t l e  makes between being ' i n '  a su b je c t  and being ' s a i d  o f  a sub­
j e c t »  Th is  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  w i l l  be focused on what A r i s t o t l e  means when 
he says t h a t  something is ' I n '  a s u b j e c t ;  f o r  convenience t h i s  w i l l  be 
r e f e r r e d  to  as A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence .  This is only one 
approach t o  A r i s t o t l e ' s  ph i lo so p h y;  t h e r e  are many o t h e r s .  An approach  
to  A r i s t o t l e ' s  ph i losophy by way o f  h is  d o c t r in e  o f  inherence has the  
m e r i t  o f  be ing small  enough t o  be d e a l t  w i t h  in a th e s is  o f  t h i s  s i z e  
and s t i l l  be c e n t r a l  to  A r i s t o t l e ' s  phi losophy as a whole.  A r i s t o t l e  
needs the n o t ion  o f  inherence to  e x p l a i n  the way in which non-substances  
depend on substances .  He needs t h i s  s o r t  o f  dependence r e l a t i o n  i f  sub­
stance Is to  be the focus o f  h is  sc ience  o f  being qua being.
Thus t h i s  t h e s i s ,  as an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r in e  of  
in h erence ,  is p r i m a r i l y  an i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  a c r u c i a l  concept in A r i s ­
t o t l e ' s  ph i losophy as i t  is lo c a ted  in the C a t e g o r i e s „ S e c o n d a r i l y ,  i t  
is an e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  pa r ts  o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  ph i losophy which are i n t e g r a l  
to  h is  no t io n  o f  inherence .  As such, t h i s  th e s is  is an at tempt to  e x p la in  
A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence using his te rm in o lo g y .  Th is  is done 
w i t h  the r e c o g n i t io n  t h a t  t h i s  te rm ino lo g y  is not always c l e a r ,  a l though  
at tempts  a re  made a t  t imes to c l a r i f y  c r u c i a l  concepts.  This manner o f  
approach has the d isadvantage  o f  l e a v in g  some c r u c i a l  concepts u n c l a r i f i e d .
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I t  has the advantage o f  r e l a t i n g  what A r i s t o t l e  is saying about inherence  
t o  some o f  these c r u c i a l  concepts ,  w i t h  the  r e s u l t  t h a t  these concepts  
may be more e a s i l y  approached.  I t  has the a d d i t i o n a l  advantage o f  e x h i b ­
i t i n g  the  way in which A r i s t o t l e  uses h is  words, making A r i s t o t l e ' s  
phi losophy as a whole more a c c e s s i b l e .  Th is  is in keeping w i th  the  
l i m i t e d  compass o f  t h i s  t h e s i s .  Approaching A r i s t o t l e  in t h i s  way opens 
o t h e r  to p ic s  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w i t h  the  goal o f  o b t a in i n g  a b e t t e r  under­
stand in g  o f  the  way in which A r i s t o t l e  understood the w o r ld .  As A r i s ­
t o t l e  becomes more f u l l y  comprehended, i t  is in c r e a s i n g l y  poss ib le  to  
use h is  in s ig h t s  In d e a l i n g  w i t h  contemporary p h i lo s o p h ic a l  q u es t io ns .
What t h i s  th e s is  w i l l  a t tem pt  to  accomplish may be in d ic a te d  by 
b r i e f l y  in t ro d u c in g  the d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence .  In s t a t i n g  t h i s  d o c t r in e  
A r i s t o t l e  se ts  f o r t h  two c o n d i t io n s  f o r  something to  inhere in something 
e l s e :  ( l )  the in h e re n t  is not  a p a r t  o f  t h a t  in which i t  in h e re s ,  and
(2 ) the in h eren t  is in s e p a r a b le  from t h a t  in which i t  inheres.  Both of  
these c o n d i t io n s  a re  n e g a t i v e ;  t h a t  i s ,  they  e x p la in  what  the r e l a t i o n  
of  inherence is n o t .  I t  is not  a w h o l e / p a r t  r e l a t i o n ,  and i t  is not  a 
r e l a t i o n  o f  s e p a ra b le s .  Th is  t h e s i s  at tempts  to  e x p la i n  what A r i s t o t l e  
meant by these two c o n d i t i o n s .  E x p la in in g  t h i s  e n t a i l s  an examinat ion  
o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  substance and an e x p la n a t io n  o f  his d o c t r in e  
o f  inherence as i t  r e l a t e s  to  his d o c t r i n e  o f  substance.  This i s ,  then ,  
an account o f  the f u n c t io n  which A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence p e r ­
forms In h is  ph i losophy and a d is cuss io n  o f  the  manner in which t h i s  
d o c t r i n e  enables  A r i s t o t l e  t o  overcome what he took to  be the problems 
which h is  account faced .
However,  such an account Is not  complete.  A r i s t o t l e  is e x p l a i n ­
ing inherence  by a s s e r t i n g  i t s  d i f f e r e n c e  from two o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s .
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But d i f f e r e n c e  is a two term r e l a t i o n .  As his account stands ,  o n ly  one 
term o f  the  r e l a t i o n  is c l e a r ;  i t  is c l e a r  what the r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence  
is  n o t .  And i t  is r e l a t i v e l y  c l e a r  how t h i s  r e l a t i o n  func t io ns  in A r i s ­
t o t l e ' s  p h i losophy .  But i t  is not  c l e a r  what k ind o f  a r e l a t i o n  inherence  
i s .  A r i s t o t l e  h i m s e l f ,  in f a c t ,  never faces t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  and t h i s  p e r ­
haps accounts f o r  the f a c t  t h a t  he on ly  e x p l i c i t l y  discusses t h i s  r e l a ­
t i o n  in the C a t e g o r i e s .
In accordance w i t h  t h i s  manner o f  d e a l in g  w i t h  A r i s t o t l e ,  t h i s  
th e s is  has the  f o l l o w i n g  o u t l i n e .  The present  c h a p t e r ,  the i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  
is a b r i e f  account o f  the approach to  A r i s t o t l e  taken in t h i s  th e s is  
fo l lo w ed  by a b r i e f  o u t l i n e  o f  the t h e s i s .  Chapter  I I sets out the  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  c a t e g o r ie s  which w i l l  be o f f e r e d .  I t  is 
one read ing o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  the  c a t e g o r ie s  which has a c e r t a i n  
p l a u s i b i l i t y ,  w h i l e  a t  the  same t ime demonst ra t ing A r i s t o t l e ' s  re levance  
to  c u r r e n t  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  q u e s t io n s .  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  the c a t e ­
go r ies  serves as an i n t r o d u c t i o n  to  h is  phi losophy as a whole as w e l l  as 
an in t r o d u c t i o n  to the  C a t e g o r i e s , the  work in which A r i s t o t l e  discusses  
h is  d o c t r i n e  o f  in herence .  Thus the second chapte r  provides a general  
in t r o d u c t i o n  t o  A r i s t o t l e ' s  ph i lo sophy and an in t r o d u c t io n  to  the ques­
t i o n  o f  inherence .
The p a r t i c u l a r  focus o f  t h i s  ch ap te r  is A r i s t o t l e ' s  science o f  
being qua b e ing .  By employ ing h is  c a te g o r ie s  A r i s t o t l e  was ab le  to  l i s t  
the  kinds o f  being in the  w o r l d .  Since A r i s t o t l e  recognized no genus of  
b e in g ,  he a ss er te d  t h a t  i t  was substance which had being p r i m a r i l y ,  
w h i l e  a l l  o t h e r  k inds o f  beings had t h e i r  being on ly  by re fe ren c e  to  
substance .  Thus A r i s t o t l e ' s  sc ience  o f  being qua being is the science  
o f  the being o f  substance.
Chapter  I I I  expands t h i s  account by examining the  two c r u c ia l  
n ot io ns  in such a s c ie nc e :  substance and p r i o r i t y .  I f  the c e n t r a l  r e f e r ­
ence o f  being which is the fou n d at io n  o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  science  o f  being qua 
being is substance ,  then substance must in some sense be p r i o r .  T h i s ,  o f  
course ,  e n t a i l s  t h a t  non-substances must be p o s t e r i o r  and,  hence, in some 
way dependent on substance .
Chapter  IV is a s ta tem ent  o f  the co n d i t io n s  under which a non­
substance may be sa id  to  inhere in a substance.  I t  cons is ts  in drawing  
out the i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  the two co n d i t io n s  f o r  inherence as s ta ted  in the  
C a t e g o r i e s . This n e c e s s i t a t e s  a d iscu ss ion  o f  p r i o r i t y  and substance and,  
a c c o r d i n g l y ,  develops the  d iscuss io ns  in Chapters I I  and I I I .
Chapter  V is an exam in at io n  o f  the cogency o f  o t h e r  commentators'  
accounts o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence .  This is p a r t l y  an a r b i ­
t r a t i o n  o f  the  debates o f  those commentators whose views are examined,  
and p a r t l y  a r e in fo rce m en t  o f  the  account o f  inherence suggested in Chap­
t e r  IV.
Chapter  VI w i l l  be the co n c lu s io n .  I t  sums up the c e n t r a l  po in ts  
made throughout the t h e s is  and o f f e r s  some suggest ions as to how an 
account o f  the  d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence opens f u r t h e r  to p ic s  f o r  con s id era ­
t i o n .  In keeping w i t h  the  e x p l o r a t o r y  na ture  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  the con­
c lu s io n  suggests some ways o f  c a r r y i n g  on the ta s k  o f  understanding A r i s -  
t o t 1e ‘ s view o f  the w o r ld .
CHAPTER I I
THE FUNCTION OF THE CATEGORIES IN ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY
A r i s t o t l e ' s  most complete t r e a tm e n t  o f  his d o c t r in e  o f  the  c a t e ­
g o r ie s  occurs in the C a t e g o r i e s . According to  Chapter  4 o f  the Cate ­
g o r ie s  t h e re  are  ten c a t e g o r i e s :  substance ,  q u a n t i t y ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  a 
r e l a t i v e ,  when,  where ,  b e i n g - i n - a - p o s i t i o n , hav in g ,  do in g ,  and be in g-  
a f f e c t e d . '  A r i s t o t l e  a ls o  l i s t s  these ten  ca te g o r ie s  in the T o p ic s . (T.  
A 9 .  103b 2 2 - 2 4 ) 2  Elsewhere A r i s t o t l e  l i s t s  sometimes e i g h t  (M. 4  7. 
I O I 7& 25 ;  P. E 1. 225b 5;  A.Po.  A 22.  190a 31 ) ,  sometimes s i x  (E.N.  A 4.  
1096® 2 3 ) ,  and sometimes f o u r  c a t e g o r i e s  (P. A 7. 190^ 3 1 ) .  Other  
re fe rence s  t o  l i s t s  o f  c a t e g o r i e s  a re  fo l lo w e d  by the phrase
A r i s t o t l e ,  C a teg o r ies  4.  1® 2 5 - 2 6 ,  t r a n s .  J . L .  A c k r i l l .
^Except where o th e r w is e  i n d i c a t e d ,  re ferences  to A r i s t o t l e ' s  
works w i l l  be inc luded in the  t e x t .  They w i l l  r e f e r  to  The Bas i c Works 
o f  A r i s t o t l e , ed.  Richard  McKeon (New York:  Random House, 1941) .  The
works o f  A r i s t o t l e  in t h i s  volume w i l l  be a b b re v ia te d  as f o l lo w s :
C. -  C a teg o r iae
D . I . -  De I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e
A.Po.  -  A n a l y t i c a  P o s t e r i o r a
T. -  Topica
P. -  Physica
E.N.  -  E t h ic a  Nicomachea
D.A. -  De Anima
M. -  Metaphysica  
Po. -  De Poet ica
Thus (T.  a 7= 103b 22 -2 4 )  r e f e r s  to  the t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  the Topi ca in The 
Basic Works o f  A r i s t o t l e , ed.  Richard  McKeon as c i t e d  above. The r e f e r ­
ence is to  Book A, Chapter  5 page 103^,  l i n e s  22 to  24.  The p a g in a t io n  
is In accordance w i t h  t h a t  o f  the s tandard  B e r l i n  e d i t i o n .
_5_
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i n d i e a t i n g  t h a t  these l i s t s  a re  not  c o m p le t e . '  Having enumerated the  
c a te g o r ie s  in Chapter  4 ,  A r i s t o t l e  discusses  the var ious  c a te g o r ie s  in 
Chapters 5 through 9.
A r i s t o t l e  in t roduces  h is  l i s t  o f  c a te g o r ie s  as a l i s t  o f  " th ing s
2
sa id  w i t h o u t  any c o m b in a t io n . "  What he means by t h i s  is not completely  
c l e a r . 3 From h is  examples ,  however,  i t  would seem t h a t  he intends his  
l i s t  to  be o f  th in gs  named in such a way t h a t  they are not  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by t h e i r  names; i . e . ,  h is  l i s t  is o f  the kinds o f  th ings  which may be 
in t roduced i n t o  sentences as s u b j e c t s ,  p r o v id in g  t h a t  the sentences are  
s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e  sentences .  Th is  is i l l u m i n a t e d  s l i g h t l y  by a passage 
in the T o p i c s . (T.  A 9 .  103^ 2 0 - 1 0 4 3  2) According to  A r i s t o t l e ,  a man 
may s t a t e  the  w h a t - i s  { t t  ^6xt. ) ,  sometimes t r a n s l a t e d  essence,  o f  some­
t h i n g  which is placed  in f r o n t  o f  him.  Thus i f  a horse is placed in 
f r o n t  o f  him,  he s t a t e s  the w h a t - i s  o f  the  horse and in so doing s i g n i ­
f i e s  a substance.  I f  a w h i t e  c o l o r  is  placed in f r o n t  o f  him, he s ta te s  
the w h a t - i s  o f  the c o lo r  and in so doing s i g n i f i e s  a q u a l i t y  o r  q u a l i f i ­
c a t i o n .  Thus A r i s t o t l e  seems to  ta k e  " t h i n g s  sa id  w i t h o u t  any combina­
t i o n "  to  r e f e r  to  th in g s  which have a d e te rm in a te  c h a ra c t e r  o r  n a t u r e ,  
and which can be s i g n i f i e d  by s t a t i n g  what  t h a t  d e te rm in a te  c h a r a c t e r  o r  
n a t u r e  i s .
Elsewhere in the Topi cs (T .  A 5) A r i s t o t l e  considers  the r e l a ­
t io n s  which hold between the s u b j e c t  and p r e d ic a t e  o f  a s u b je c t - p r e d i c a t e
h . M .  Bochensk i , A n c ien t  Formal Logic  (Amsterdam: N o r t h - H o l 1 and
P u b l is h in g  Company, 1963) , p. 3^h.
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  C a tego r ies  4.  1^ 25 ,  t r a n s .  J . L .  A c k r i l l .
3j „L. A c k r i l l ,  A r i s t o t l e ' s  C a te g o r ies  and De I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e  
(Oxford:  Clarendon P re ss ,  1 9 6 3 ) ,  pp.  7 3 -7 4 .
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sentence .  He f i n d s  t h a t  t h e r e  are f o u r  o f  these r e l a t i o n s :  d e f i n i t i o n ,
p r o p e r t y ,  genus,  and a c c i d e n t .  Of these o n ly  the d e f i n i t i o n  y i e l d s  the  
w h a t - i s  o f  some p a r t i c u l a r .  And i t  is the  d e f i n i t i o n  which i d e n t i f i e s  
the p a r t i c u l a r .  Sentences in which some o f  the o t h e r  s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e  
r e l a t i o n s  hold serve to  c h a r a c t e r i z e  the  p a r t i c u l a r .  In such a c h a r a c t e r ­
i z a t i o n  a s u b je c t  in the  c a teg o ry  o f  substance may be in d ic a te d  and i t  
may have something from some o t h e r  ca tegory  p r e d ic a t e d  o f  i t .  An example 
o f  t h i s  would be the  sen ten c e ,  "Socra te s  is  w h i t e . "  Here the sentence  
is composed o f  express io ns  s i g n i f y i n g  th in gs  in two d i f f e r e n t  c a t e g o r ie s .
A d e f i n i t i o n ,  however,  s i g n i f i e s  in o n ly  one c a t e g o r y ,  o r  s i g n i f i e s  only  
one type o f  t h i n g .  I t  is these  ty p e s ,  composed o f  th ings  having essences,  
which A r i s t o t l e  is l i s t i n g  in h is  t a b l e  o f  ca te g o r ie s  and which may be 
i n d i c a t e d  " w i t h o u t  any c o m b in a t io n . "
I f  " t h i n g s  sa id  w i t h o u t  any combinat ion"  is  regarded as i n d i ­
c a t in g  the types o f  essenced t h i n g s ,  the  c a te g o r ie s  become less an account  
o f  express ions and more an account o f  the kinds o f  th ings  which are d es ig ­
nated by those e x p r e s s io n s .  A r i s t o t l e  is then c l a s s i f y i n g  types o f  e x i s t -  
ents  on the b as is  o f  the way in which those types o f  e x i s t e n t s  are spoken 
o f .  Th is  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  f i t s  the contex t  o f  the C ategor ie s  q u i t e  w e l l .  
Throughout the f i r s t  f i v e  chapters  o f  the C ategories  A r i s t o t l e  is d is c u s ­
s in g  names and those th in g s  t o  which the names a p p ly .  He is a ls o  d i s t i n ­
g u is h in g  types o f  e x i s t a n t s  on the  basis  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  ev idence .  Thus 
in Chapter  1 A r i s t o t l e  is c l a s s i f y i n g  th in g s  according to  whether o r  not  
they  have the  same names. In Chapter  2 he is c l a s s i f y i n g  th ings on the  
b as is  o f  whether  o r  not  t h e i r  names may be ' s a id  o f  a s u b jec t  o r  the  
q u a l i t y  named may be s a id  to  be ' i n '  a s u b j e c t .  In Chapter  3 A r i s t o t l e  
discusses the r e l a t i o n s  between th in gs  on the basis o f  the r e l a t i o n s  which
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hold between the names o f  those th in g s  used as p r e d i c a t e s .  F i n a l l y  in 
Chapter  5 A r i s t o t l e  d iscusses  substance as t h a t  which is p r i m a r i l y  c a l l e d  
substance .  In the f i r s t  f i v e  chapters  o f  the Categor ies A r i s t o t l e  is 
t h e r e f o r e  c l a s s i f y i n g  th in g s  by means o f  the d i s t i n c t i o n s  which occur in 
the ways in which those th ing s  are  spoken o f .
This is in harmony w i t h  what  Chapter  4 says as w e l l .  A r i s t o t l e  
opens t h i s  c h ap te r  by s t a t i n g ,  "Of th in g s  sa id  w i t h o u t  any combinat ion,  
each s i g n i f i e s  e i t h e r  substance or  q u a n t i t y  or  . . . The th ings  said
so s i g n i f y  because the  l i s t  o f  c a t e g o r i e s  is a l i s t  o f  the  kinds o f  th ings  
t h a t  are in the w o r ld .  Expressions which are "w i th o u t  any combinat ion"  
s i g n i f y  these types o f  e x i s t e n t s  and in so doing make i t  p o ss ib le  to  
t a l k  about  them. In e f f e c t ,  th e n ,  by t a l k i n g  about the d i f f e r e n t  kinds  
o f  names which a re  g iven  to  t h i n g s ,  A r i s t o t l e  is a lso  a b le  to  c l a s s i f y  
the  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  e x i s t a n t s  in the  w o r ld .  Some ph i losophers^  have 
argued t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is here c l a s s i f y i n g  some s o r t  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  exp res ­
s io n .  However,  t h i s  view is m is le a d in g .  He i s ,  c e r t a i n l y ,  in p a r t  
c l a s s i f y i n g  l i n g u i s t i c  i tem s,  but  o n ly  as he a lso  c l a s s i f i e s  the types 
o f  e x i s t a n t s .  I f  he were merely  concern ing h im s e l f  w i t h  l i n g u i s t i c  
e x p r e s s io n s ,  he would have n o t i c e d  t h a t  his  c a te g o r ie s  are performing  
two se p a r a te  fu n c t io n s  as seen in Book H, Chapter 2 o f  the Metaphys ics.3  
The f a c t  t h a t  he never cons idered  any r e l a t i o n  between words and things  
t o  which they r e f e r  i n d ic a t e s  t h a t  he d id  not  hold a view o f  language 
which would r e q u i r e  such a r e l a t i o n  to  be e s t a b l i s h e d .  Th is  in turn
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  C a teg o r ie s  4.  1^ 2 5 - 2 6 ,  t r a n s .  J . L .  A c k r i l l ,
^ G i l b e r t  R y le ,  " C a t e g o r i e s , "  Logic and Language, Second S e r i e s , 
edo Anthony Flew (Garden C i t y ,  New York:  Doubleday & C o . ,  1 965 ) ,  p. 282,
3 I n f r a , pp. 11- 12 ,
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in d lc a t e s  t h a t  he d id  not  c l a s s i f y  words which s i g n i f y  qua s i g n i f y i n g  in 
t h i s  way.
Given t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  " w i t h o u t  any combinat ion" the l a s t  
few l i n e s  o f  Chapter  k f a l l  i n t o  p l a c e .  Here A r i s t o t l e  s ta te s  t h a t  these  
th in g s  sa id  " w i t h o u t  any combin at ion" a re  n e i t h e r  t r u e  nor f a l s e .  I t  is  
w i t h  a combinat ion o f  these express ions  t h a t  a f f i r m a t i o n s  are produced.  
Thus in an a f f i r m a t i o n  not  o n ly  is some term in d ic a te d  o r  in t roduced ,  i t  
is c h a r a c t e r i z e d  as w e l l .  In s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e  sentences t h is  c h a r a c t e r i ­
z a t i o n  may occur  in any o f  f o u r  forms: p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  d e f i n i t i o n ,  p r e d i ­
c a t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y ,  p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  genus,  or  p r e d i c a t io n  o f  a c c id e n t .
In o t h e r  sentence forms t h i s  may occur  in d i f f e r e n t  ways. But the p o in t  
is t h a t  i f  t h e r e  is a s u b je c t  i n d i c a t e d ,  and i f  the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  is 
in f a c t  a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  t h a t  s u b j e c t ,  then the  a f f i r m a t i o n  is t r u e .  
Thus not  on ly  are the c a t e g o r ie s  a l i s t  o f  th ings  in the w o r ld ,  they are  
a l s o  a l i s t  o f  the c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  a f f i r m a t i o n s .  A f f i r m a t io n s  are t h e r e ­
f o r e  composed o f  names which i n d i c a t e  the  types o f  e x i s t e n t s  in the w or ld .  
And i f  the s t r u c t u r e  o f  the sentence which is composed o f  those names is 
the  same as the  t h in g  in q u e s t i o n ,  the  sentence is t r u e .
For these reasons,  t h e n ,  A r i s t o t l e  is using his l i s t  o f  ca te g o r ie s  
in the  C ategor ies  t o  enumerate the  types o f  e x i s t e n t s  in the w o r ld ,  and 
hence,  the kinds o f  express ions used to  t a l k  o f  these types o f  e x i s t e n t s .  
This  l i s t  is n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  mere ly  a l i s t  o f  e x p ress ion s ,  nor is i t  a 
l i s t  o f  k inds o f  t h i n g s .  I t  performs both fu n c t io n s  a t  the same t im e .  
A r i s t o t l e ,  o f  cou rse ,  did not  d i s t i n g u i s h  these fu n c t io n s  nor t r e a t  them 
as d i f f e r e n t .
As might  be ex pe c ted ,  A r i s t o t l e  in some places  t r e a t s  h is  l i s t  
o f  c a t e g o r ie s  as a l i s t  o f  k inds o f  l i n g u i s t i c  express ions and the kinds
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o f  th in gs  to  which such express io ns  a re  a p p l i e d .  Consider the change 
apparent  in A r i s t o t l e ' s  c a t e g o r ie s  in the  M etaphys ics . Here he t r e a t s  
his  l i s t  o f  c a t e g o r ie s  as per form in g  a d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t i o n .  A r i s t o t l e  
s t a t e s ,  "The kinds o f  e s s e n t i a l  be ing  a re  p r e c i s e l y  those in d ic a t e d  by 
the  f i g u r e s  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n ;  f o r  the  senses o f  'b e in g '  are j u s t  as many 
as these f i g u r e s . "  (M. A  7. 1017® 2 3 - 2 4 )  The word ' e s s e n t i a l '  in the  
above passage is the Greek word Ross somet imes t r a n s l a t e s
t h i s  qs ' i n  v i r t u e  o f  i t s  own n a t u r e ' . ^  Th is  passage,  then ,  p l a i n l y  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  the c a t e g o r i e s  c l a s s i f y  the senses o f  'b e i n g '  ( to  o v ) 
when 'b e in g '  is used in say in g  what some " t h in g " ^  i s .  Thus A r i s t o t l e  
is using the " t h i n g "  whose " n a t u r e " ^  is being given using the verb  
ewoLi to  g iv e  a p a r t i c u l a r  sense to  the verb .  I f  the th in g  in quest ion  
i s ,  say ,  w h i t e ,  ' g l v K L ' used to  i n d i c a t e  i t s  " n a t u r e "  w i l l  be placed in 
the ca tegory  o f  q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  i f  the " t h i n g "  i s ,  say,  man, 'E iv«iL' 
used to  i n d i c a t e  i t s  " n a t u r e "  w i l l  be placed in the  ca tegory  o f  substance.  
In t h i s  way A r i s t o t l e  regards the  t a b l e  o f  c a t e g o r ie s  as an enumerat ion  
o f  the d i f f e r e n t  senses o f  being and,  hence,  the  d i f f e r e n t  kinds o f  being  
which make up the w o r ld .  Thus A r i s t o t l e  is using the c a te g o r ie s  f o r  what  
modern p h i losophers  might  f e e l  to  be two purposes.  He is c l a s s i f y i n g  the  
senses in which 'êCvovc' is used and he is enumerat ing the d i f f e r e n t  kinds 
o f  being in the w o r ld .
E . g . , M, r  1. 1003® 21.
^The Greek word f o r  what  w i l l  here be in d ic a te d  by the express ion  
' " t h i n g " '  is  t o Sk o r  which means l i t e r a l l y  ' t h i s ' .  A r i s t o t l e  uses
t h i s  word in a v a r i e t y  o f  ways.  In view o f  the inconvenience o f  ' t h i s '  
as a t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t o Sc , the  express ion  ' " t h i n g " '  w i l l  be used.
 ̂ ^The Greek word here  i n d ic a t e d  by the express ion " ' n a t u r e ' "  is 
To(v fc which is l i t e r a l l y  t r a n s l a t e d  ' w h a t ' .  ' " N a t u r e " ' is used f o r  con­
venience as above.
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Keeping these two passages in mind, a few conclusions may be drawn.  
A r i s t o t l e  is using h is  c a t e g o r ie s  to per form what modern phi losophers  
would take  to  be two d i s t i n c t  f u n c t i o n s ,  each o f  which is composed o f  two 
r e l a t e d  f u n c t i o n s .  F i r s t  he is using the c a te g o r ie s  to  l i s t  the types 
o f  e x i s t e n t s  and the express ions  which serve  to  in d i c a t e  these types .
A
Second he is using the c a t e g o r ie s  to  l i s t  the senses o f  -t o  and, hence,  
the  kinds o f  being t h a t  t h e re  a re  in the  w o r ld .  But w h i l e  modern p h i l o ­
sophers would c o n s id e r  these to  be d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t i o n s ,  these two general  
fu n c t io n s  are not  d i f f e r e n t  f o r  A r i s t o t l e .  This becomes e v id e n t  upon an 
exam in at io n  o f  BookH , Chapter  2 o f  the Metaphysi  c s .
E a r ly  in t h i s  c h ap te r  A r i s t o t l e  concerns h im s e l f  w i th  the  d i f f e r ­
en t  senses o f  ' i s '  { i t t c ) . A c c o r d in g ly ,  some p a r t i c u l a r  def ined  by i t s  
m a t t e r  is a t h r e s h o ld  "because i t  l i e s  in such and such a p o s i t i o n ,  and 
i t s  being means i t s  l y i n g  in t h a t  p o s i t i o n  . . . . "  (M. H 2.  1042^ 25 -26 )  
in t h i s  passage the " n a t u r e "  o f  a th r e s h o ld  d e f in e s  the sense o f  
used in s t a t i n g  t h i s  " n a t u r e . "  L a t e r  in t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  however,  A r i s t o t l e  
seems t o  look a t  t h i s  d i f f e r e n t l y ;  he d e f in es  a ' t h r e s h o l d '  as '"wood or  
stone in such and such a p o s i t i o n . ' "  (M, H 2.  1043^ 7) Here,  then ,  
A r i s t o t l e  is using the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a th res ho ld  to  d e f i n e ,  not  the sense 
o f  Ê6CC , the being o f  a t h r e s h o l d ,  but the  sense o f  ' t h r e s h o l d ' .  Modern 
p h i losophers  would regard A r i s t o t l e  as having missed a d i s t i n c t i o n  in 
such a t r e a tm e n t  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  ' t h r e s h o l d ' .  From t h e i r  p o in t  o f  
view A r i s t o t l e ' s  reasoning seems to  be c i r c u l a r .  He seems to be saying  
t h a t  the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h re s h o ld  d e f in e s  the kind o f  being which t h a t  
th r e s h o ld  has and in so doing d e f in e s  ' t h r e s h o l d ' , w h i l e  he a lso  seems to  
be saying t h a t  a t h re s h o ld  is  d e f in e d  by using a c e r t a i n  sense o f  .
Th is  shows t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  does not  d i s t i n g u i s h  the mode o f  being which a
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th i n g  has from i t s  e x i s t e n c e  as a t h i n g .  However, A r i s t o t l e  does not  
note  any d i f f e r e n c e  in the  way in which he is using h is  d é f i n i  t o r y  phrase.  
He passes w i t h o u t  d i f f i c u l t y  f rom using "wood in such and such a p o s i t i o n "  
t o  g iv e  sense to  ib-cu to  using i t  to  g iv e  sense to  ' t h r e s h o l d ' . '
In summary, A r i s t o t l e ' s  t a l k  about the  ca te g o r ie s  in d i f f e r e n t  
places  suggests he is using the c a t e g o r ie s  to  perform two d i f f e r e n t  func­
t i o n s .  However, the ease w i t h  which he passes between them suggests t h a t  
he probab ly  did  not  reco g n iz e  them as d i f f e r e n t .  Thus A r i s t o t l e ' s  c a t e ­
g o r ie s  rep resen t  the answers to  what  modern ph i losophers would consider  
to  be two s e p a r a te  q u e s t io n s :  "What is?" t h a t  i s ,  what are the d i f f e r e n t
types o f  e x i s t e n t s ?  and "How is what is?"  or  what is the kind o f  being  
which each type o f  e x i s t e n t  has?
But the  c a t e g o r ie s  do not  re p re s e n t  A r i s t o t l e ' s  on ly  c o n s id era ­
t i o n  o f  the  senses o f  , The c a t e g o r ie s  are in f a c t  only intended
as a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  the " e s s e n t i a l "  ««J-ttx. )  kinds o f  being or  o f
the natures o f  the  kinds o f  be ing t h a t  t h e r e  a r e .  But t h i s  is on ly  one 
o f  the ways in which ' eiVc^L ' is used. A r i s t o t l e  provides two d i f f e r e n t  
l i s t s  in c o n s id e r in g  the v a r io u s  senses o f  t h i s  ve rb .  The f i r s t  o f  these  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  is a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  kinds o f  s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e  
sentences and has a l r e a d y  been d iscussed .  The second c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  is 
found in the  Metaphysics (M. A  7 ) ;  here  A r i s t o t l e  considers  f o u r  ways in 
which th in gs  may be s a id  to  be.  Th is  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  d is t in g u is h e s  
" e s s e n t i a l "  ck6-r«. ) being from the o t h e r  senses o f  being .
In the f i r s t  sense " ' b e i n g '  and ' i s '  mean t h a t  a statement  is
i Q . E . L .  Owen, " A r i s t o t l e  on the Snares o f  Onto lo g y ,"  New Essays 
on P l a t o  and A r i s t o t l e ,  ed.  R. Bambrough (London: Rout ledge & Kegan
P a u l , 1 9 6 5 ) ,  pp. 7 9 -80 .
V
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t r u e . "  (M. à  7» 1017® 32)  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  'n o t  be ing '  means t h a t  a s t a t e ­
ment is f a l s e .  Obvious ly  A r i s t o t l e  is here p o in t in g  to  the ' i s '  o f  
a s s e r t i o n  o r  judgment.  To use h is  example,  to  say "Socrates  is musica l"  
is to  say t h a t  i t  is t r u e  t h a t  Socrates is m us ic a l .  Hence, A r i s t o t l e  
regards sta tements  about f a c t s  and statements a s s e r t i n g  the t r u t h  o f  
those f a c t s  as m u tu a l ly  e n t a i l i n g .  ( D . l .  9 .  18® 40-^4)^
'K
In the  second sense ' ' is  used to  in d i c a t e  p o t e n t i a l i t y
o r  a c t u a l i t y .  Th is  may be e xp la in e d  using A r i s t o t l e ' s  example o f  the  
corn:  "we say o f  t h a t  which is not  y e t  r i p e  t h a t  i t  is c o r n . "  (M. A 7.
1017^ 8) A r i s t o t l e ' s  p o in t  is t h a t  something may be corn in e i t h e r  o f  
two ways; i t  may be corn p o t e n t i a l l y  in the case o f  the unripened e a r ,  
o r  i t  may a c t u a l l y  be corn in the case o f  the f u l l y  r ipened e a r .  Cer­
t a i n l y  o f  these two the  f i r s t  is the most d i f f i c u l t  to  understand.  The 
p o i n t  seems to  be t h a t  the unripened e a r  is corn in i t s  to -be -ness  f o r  
i t  w i l l  be corn o r  i t  is s t r i v i n g  to  be corn.  In t h i s  passage,  however,  
A r i s t o t l e  does admit  t h a t  "when a th i n g  is p o t e n t i a l  and when i t  is not  
y e t  p o t e n t i a l  must be e x p la in e d  e ls e w h e r e . "  (M. A 7. 1017^ 9)
The o t h e r  two senses o f  ' c o n t r a s t  w i t h  one another  and
are  presented  in t h a t  way by A r i s t o t l e .  A t h in g  may be sa id  to be 
e i t h e r  " i n  an a c c id e n t a l  sense" (<«.7%. or  "by t h e i r  own
n a t u re "  { ^ < ■ = < 6 '  ̂ (M. A 7. 1017® 7 - 8 )  A r i s t o t l e  considers a c c id e n ta l  
being f i r s t  and cons id ers  t h r e e  ways in which something is said t o  be in 
an a c c id e n t a l  sense.
"Thus when one t h i n g  is sa id  in an a c c id e n ta l  sense to  be an o th er ,  
t h i s  is e i t h e r  because both belong to  the same t h i n g ,  and t h i s  i s , 
o r  because t h a t  to  which the  a t t r i b u t e  belongs i s , o r  because the  
s u b je c t  which has as an a t t r i b u t e  t h a t  o f  which i t  is i t s e l f  p r e d i ­
ca te d ,  i t s e l f  i s . "  (M. A 7.  10173 20 - 2 3 )
TBochenski ,  og_. c i t . ,  p.  31
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A r î s t o t l e ' s  example o f  the f i r s t  case i s ,  "he who is p a le  is m u s ic a l . "
(M„ A  7» 1017® 15) The p a le  is  musical  in an a c c id e n ta l  sense because 
both the  p a le  and the musical  belong to  the man who i s . "The man is 
m usica l"  (M. A 7- 1017^ 14) is the example given o f  the second case;  the  
p o i n t  here Is t h a t  musical  is an ac c id e n t  o f  man s in ce  the musical  
belongs to man and man i s . The f i n a l  example i s ,  " th e  musical is a man."
(M. a  7.  1017® 16) In t h i s  sentence the musical is an acc ident  o f  man
because the s u b j e c t ,  man, which i s ,  is p r e d ic a te d  o f  musica l .
What is common t o  a l l  o f  these cases is t h a t  some a t t r i b u t e
belongs to  a s u b je c t  which i s ;  a l l  a t t r i b u t e s  depend f o r  t h e i r  being on
the be ing o f  the s u b j e c t .  T h i s ,  o f  course ,  leads to the  f o u r t h  use o f
‘£.lvoc(_ ' in t h a t  the n a tu re  o f  any p a r t i c u l a r  is given by s t a t i n g  the  
being o f  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  Th is  use o f  '&Lv»<c ' serves to
i d e n t i f y  the p a r t i c u l a r  o r  t e l l  what  i t  i s .  The s u b je c t  o f  a p r e d i c a ­
t i o n  is n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a Lockean "something I know not  w h a t , "  but  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  t h i n g ,  a " n a t u r e " ; i t  is co r respond in g ly  in d ic a te d  by g iv in g  
i t s  genus and d i f f e r e n t i a .  ' is  then used a c c i d e n t a l l y  when i t
serves to  s t a t e  t h a t  some " n a t u r e "  belongs to something which i t  i s .
The s u b je c t  o f  a sentence then serves to  i d e n t i f y  the " n a tu r e "  and t h i s  
" n a t u r e "  is sa id  to  be something a c c i d e n t i a l l y  in t h a t  the  such and such
which i t  is sa id  to  be a t ta c h e s  to  i t .  T h is  example f i t s  the second
case o n l y ,  but  i t  can e a s i l y  be extended to  the o t h e r  cases as w e l l . '
These c o n s id e r a t io n s  lead d i r e c t l y  to  A r i s t o t l e ' s  f o u r t h  sense 
o f  'e.iTvoi.L', the sense in which th in gs  a re  sa id  to  be in v i r t u e  o f  
t h e i r  own na tures  ( . A r i s t o t l e  e x p la in s  t h i s  sense by saying
^G.E.M. Anscombe and P .T .  Geach, Three  Phi losophers (Oxford:  
Basi l  B l a c k w e l l ,  1 9 6 1 ) ,  pp. 2 1 - 2 3 .
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t h a t  i t  is the  sense ana lyzed  by the t a b l e  o f  c a t e g o r i e s .  I t  is t h i s  
sense o f  the  verb which g ivés  the  " n a t u r e "  o f  each o f  these .  C e r t a i n l y  
t h e r e  are problems in s t a t i n g  the c o n d i t io n s  under which something is 
d e f in e d  and is  not  having some a c c id e n t  p re d ic a te d  o f  i t .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
A r i s t o t l e  does not  discuss  t h i s  qu es t io n  here .  In t h i s  sec t io n  o f  the  
Metaphysics he is content  t o  say t h a t  th in gs  sa id  to  be in v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  
own natures  o f f e r  the being o f  the t h i n g ,  w h i l e  acc idents  have being o n ly  
i f  t h a t  o f  which the a c c id e n t  is s a id  t o  be is in v i r t u e  o f  i t s  own n a t u r e .
Of course ,  even though the a c c id e n t a l  and the  " e s s e n t i a l "  use of  
tcvc^c are e x c l u s i v e ,  i t  does not  f o l l o w  t h a t  the f i r s t  two senses are  
e x c l u s i v e  as w e l l .  Something may be sa id  to  be in v i r t u e  o f  i t s  na ture  
and t h i s  w i l l  be t r u e ,  and the  something w i l l  be e i t h e r  a c t u a l l y  o r  poten­
t i a l l y .  Whether the a c c id e n t a l  use o f  being inc ludes a p o t e n t i a l  use is 
a more d i f f i c u l t  q u es t io n  and need not  be discussed h ere .  The s i g n i f i ­
cant  issue f o r  p rese n t  purposes is t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is using h is  t a b l e  o f  
c a t e g o r ie s  to  l i s t  the  d i f f e r e n t  ways in which some " t h in g "  is in v i r t u e  
o f  i t s  own n a t u r e ,  and t h a t  a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  senses o f  
*ÊLVoi.(_ ' used in t h i s  way exc ludes  an a c c id e n t a l  use o f  the v e rb .
Given then t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is using ' in a v a r i e t y  o f  senses,
which a re  c l a s s i f i e d  by the  t a b l e  o f  c a t e g o r i e s ,  i t  can be seen t h a t  d i f ­
f e r e n t  ways o f  being are c a l l e d  by the same name. This int roduces the  
d o c t r i n e  o f  e q u i v o c a t i o n .  A r i s t o t l e  in t roduces  t h i s  in the C a t e g o r i e s .
(C. 1. 1® 1 -6 )  His p o in t  in t h a t  work is t h a t  two th ings  may be c a l l e d  
by the same name and have d i f f e r e n t  d e f i n i t i o n s .  His word f o r  such th ings
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is which is t r a n s l a t e d  e i t h e r  as e q u i v o c a l ,  homonymous,^ o r
ambiguous.3 I t  r e f e r s  t o  the  th in g s  which are c a l l e d  by the same name; 
i t  does not  r e f e r  to  the name which is used to  r e f e r  to  two or  more d i f ­
f e r e n t l y  d e f in e d  t h i n g s ,  a l though i t s  use may be extended from th ings  to  
words.^  Thus i f  A r i s t o t l e  is  to  have d i f f e r e n t  k inds o f  being he needs 
to  employ some form o f  h is  d o c t r i n e  o f  e q u i v o c i t y .  This leads ,  once 
a g a i n ,  to the c a t e g o r i e s .
The p a r t i c u l a r s  in the  d i f f e r e n t  c a te g o r ie s  are in d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
Thus what is s a id  to  be i l l u m i n a t e s  the sense o r  way in which i t  i s ;  q u a l ­
i t i e s  have being d i f f e r e n t l y  than substances .  Red i s ,  but  i t  is not  in 
the way in which man i s ;  each has a d i f f e r e n t  kind o f  being.  As mentioned,  
A r i s t o t l e  uses the  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h a t  which is ( the e x i s t e n t )  to  g ive  
sense to  the way in which i t  i s .  But A r i s t o t l e  is a ls o  aware t h a t  each 
th i n g  which is does not  have i t s  being in a d i f f e r e n t  way from a l l  o t h e r  
t h in g s .  I f  t h i s  were the  case ,  then would be used in an i n d e f i ­
n i t e l y  la rg e  number o f  senses. in t h a t  case i t  would not have a d e f i n i t e
meaning but an i n d e f i n i t e  one. According to  A r i s t o t l e ,  however,  an 
i n d e f i n i t e  meaning is no meaning a t  a l l ,  and A r i s t o t l e  is c e r t a i n l y  aware 
t h a t  'ELV^c'  has a meaning. (M. f  4 .  1006^ 29 -^11)  This being the case,  
the senses in which the word is  used must be l i m i t e d ,  and i f  t h i s  is the
case,  th e re  must be a c e r t a i n  number o f  ways in which th ings a r e .  T h is ,
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  Ca tegor ies  1. 1^ 1, t r a n s .  Harold P. Cooke. 
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  C a teg o r ies  1. 1^ 1,  t r a n s .  J . L .  A c k r i l l .
3owen, oĝ . c i t . ,  p. 74.
^Joseph Owens, The D o c t r in e  o f  Being in the A r i s t o t e l i a n  Meta­
phys ics (2nd ed.  rev .  Toronto :  The P o n t i f i c a l  I n s t i t u t e  o f  Mediaeval
S t u d i e s , 1951 ) ,  p . 120.
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o f  course ,  e n t a i l s  t h a t  t h e r e  be a c e r t a i n  number o f  types o f  th in g s .  
A r i s t o t l e ' s  method f o r  d e te rm in in g  what these types o f  th ings  are is 
h in te d  a t  in the Topi c s . (T. A 9.  10}^ 2 9 -4 0 )  He seems t o  have a r r i v e d  
a t  t h i s  by n o t i c i n g  the  ways in which the q u e s t io n ,  "What is t h i s  which 
is b e fo re  me?" is answered. The d i f f e r e n t  sor ts  o f  answers to t h i s  
q u est ion  p rov ide  the  l i s t  o f  c a t e g o r i e s .  The c a t e g o r i e s ,  among o the r  
t h i n g s ,  then serve to  l i m i t  the  senses o f  ‘ i tvotc '  and hence the kinds 
o f  being t h a t  compose the  w o r l d . '
But in l i m i t i n g  the senses o f  t h i s  c r u c i a l  ve rb ,  the c a te g o r ie s  
a ls o  l i m i t  i t s  use in another  way. Each t h in g  which i s ,  is an o b je c t  o f  
some s o r t ,  these s o r ts  being c l a s s i f i e d  by the c a t e g o r i e s .  To say t h a t  
"red  i s , "  f o r  example,  is to  say t h a t  " red  is a c o lo r  o f  a c e r t a i n  i n t e n ­
s i t y , "  where ' r e d '  is understood to  i n d i c a t e  some p a r t i c u l a r  red ,^  Thus 
A r i s t o t l e  is using '£.LVokt' as a s e t  o f  p r e d i c a t e s ;  each use of  t h i s  verb 
in vo lv es  an a l l o c a t i o n  to  the  c a t e g o r i e s .  This makes his use o f  'CLvoM. ' 
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom the use o f  ' t o  e x i s t ' .  ' E x i s t e n c e '  is s imply not  
always a p r e d i c a t e  and some ph i losophers  have held t h a t  i t  is never a 
p r e d i c a t e ,  on the  o t h e r  hand, is always a p r e d i c a t e ;  A r i s t o t l e
never uses is  as " p a r a s i t i c  upon a l l  p r e d i c a t e s , "3 nor does he seem
'Owen, o£_, c i t e, pp. 76 -78 .
^The r e l a t i o n  between s ta tements about p a r t i c u l a r s  and statements  
about uni v e r s a is  has been considered  by Owen in " A r i s t o t l e  on the Snares 
o f  Ontology"  as c i t e d  above. To say t h a t  " i c e  e x i s t s "  is to  say t h a t  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  p ie c e  o f  ice  is f ro z en  w a t e r ,  and to  say " i c e  is no longer  
f ro z e n "  is to  deny i t .  With p a r t i c u l a r s  t h i s  makes sense. But i f  t h i s  
same p a raphras in g  o f  s ta tem ents  concerning u n iv e r s e ls  is employed,  the  
d e n ia l  o f  a statemen t  l i k e  " i c e  e x i s t s "  becomes s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  A r i s ­
t o t l e  handles t h i s  by making u n iv e rs a l  sta tements  depend on p a r t i c u l a r  
s ta tem e nts .  Thus to say in genera l  t h a t  " i c e  e x i s t s "  is to  say t h a t  th e re  
is a t  l e a s t  one p a r t i c u l a r  p ie ce  o f  f ro zen  w a t e r .  To deny t h i s  is to say 
t h a t  t h e r e  is no such p a r t i c u l a r .
3owen, ££_. c i t . ,  p.  84.
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aware t h a t  i t  can be so used.^ A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  being is always 
an account o f  being such and such. T h is  has important  consequences f o r  
h is  Metaphys i c s .
A r i s t o t l e  Is i n t e n t  upon e s t a b l i s h i n g  a science o f  being qua 
being ( ra  (éÇ ) , w h i l e  a t  the  same t ime regard ing  a science  o f  being
as genus im possib le .  A r i s t o t l e  was convinced t h a t  th e r e  was no such 
genus o f  be in g .  And even when he s t a r t s  con s id e r ing  h is  own science  
o f  being in Book Gamma o f  the Metaphys i c s , he does not  make i t  a sc ience  
o f  the genus o f  b e in g ,  even though the sc ience is i t s e l f  g e n e r i c a l l y  one.  
(M. r  2 .  1003^ 22)  Rather i t  is  a sc ience  o f  be ing-ness  (oueea.) or  
substance.
Given A r i s t o t l e ' s  use o f  he q u i t e  p r o p e r ly  ru les  out
any c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  a genus o f  b e in g;  t h e r e  is s imply not a k ind o f
t h in g  which a l l  o t h e r  t h in g s  a r e .  His argument a g a in s t  such a p o s i t io n
has been s u c c i n c t l y  s t a t e d  by I .M .  Bochenski as f o l lo w s :
(1) f o r  a l l  A: i f  A is a genus,  t h e r e  is a B which is i t s  d i f f e r e n c e ;
(2 ) f o r  a l l  A and B: i f  B is the d i f f e r e n c e  o f  A, then A is not  the
genus o f  B. Suppose now t h a t  t h e r e  is an a l l - e m b r a c in g  genus V; then ,
f o r  a l l  A, V would be a genus o f  A [by d e f i n i t i o n ] ;  b u t ,  as V is a 
genus, i t  must have some d i f f e r e n c e s ,  say B [by ( l ) ] ;  now V cannot
be a genus o f  B [by ( 2 ) ] ;  consequently V is not the a l l - e m b ra c in g  
genus and we get  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n . 3
' o f  co u rse ,  he does have a n o t io n  o f  e x is te n c e  included in his  
use o f  ' e c v ^ u ' .  Thus sometimes he uses to  mean e x i s t e n c e ,  but  he
does not  note t h a t  t h i s  is a d i f f e r e n t  s o r t  o f  use and would be ab le  to  
e x p l a i n  such a use in some general  way using h is  not ion  o f  being as a 
p r e d i c a t e .  In t h i s  t h e s is  when i t  is apparent  t h a t  the use c a l l e d  f o r  is 
a use o f  ÉuCv«*-i. s i g n i f y i n g  ' e x i s t e n c e ' ,  the word ' e x i s t '  w i l l  be used as 
meaning the same as t h a t  meant by the use o f  in q u es t io n .  L ik e ­
w i s e ,  when i t  is c l e a r  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is t a l k i n g  about th ings which e x i s t ,  
the word ' e x i s t e n t '  w i l l  be used as has been the p r a c t i c e .
2 | b i d . , pp. 78- 8 7 .
3Bochenski , ojp. c i t . ,  p. 34.
- 1 9 -
What t h i s  argument does,  o f  c ourse ,  is to  r e j e c t  a sc ience  o f  the  ge ne r ic  
sense o f  being when such a sense is o n ly  considered as a p r e d i c a t e .  I t  
does not  harm a science  o f  being  which views being as n o n - p r e d i c a t i v e ,  
al though t h i s  was c e r t a i n l y  not  A r i s t o t l e ' s  v iew.^
His sc ience  o f  being cannot t h e r e f o r e  be a science o f  the genus 
o f  b e in g ,  and A r i s t o t l e  is fo rced  t o  g iv e  some e x p la n a t io n  as to  how i t  
can be a sc ience  o f  a body o f  knowledge a t  a l l .  This issue Is focused  
on A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  e q u i v o c a t i o n .  According to  A r i s t o t l e  th e r e  
are  t h r e e  kinds  o f  e q u i v o c a t i o n .  The f i r s t  is o f  l i t t l e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  
im p o r ta n c e .2 Th is  is a c c id e n t a l  e q u iv o c a t io n  which is ex p la in ed  q u i t e  
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y  in the  opening c h ap te r  o f  the C a t e g o r ie s . (C. 1. 1®
1-6 )  In t h i s  case two th in g s  are  equ ivoca l  In t h a t  they have the same 
name but  they  a re  d e f in e d  d i f f e r e n t l y .  A r i s t o t l e ' s  example o f  i t  here  
is animal  (/"uuov ) ; a p i c t u r e  o f  an animal is c a l l e d  'a n i m a l '  and a man 
o r  any o t h e r  beast  is c a l l e d  ' a n i m a l ' .  But the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a p i c t u r e ,  
even i f  t h a t  p i c t u r e  is o f  an a n im a l ,  is not  the same as the d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  a beast  o f  some s o r t .  I t  j u s t  so happens t h a t  they are c a l l e d  by 
the same name.
There a re  two o t h e r  ways,  however,  in which th ings may be s i m i ­
l a r l y  expressed a l though they do not  have the  same d e f i n i t i o n ;  these  
two kinds o f  e q u iv o c a t io n  a re  o f  more p h i lo s o p h ic a l  importance.  The 
f i r s t  o f  these kinds o f  e q u iv o c a t io n  is ana logy .  A r i s t o t l e  d e f in es
I r .G.  C o l l in gwood,  among o t h e r s ,  has a t t r i b u t e d  t h i s  view to  
A r i s t o t l e .  Vide An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford :  Clarendon Press,
1 9 4 0 ) ,  p. 41.
^However,  as G .E .L .  Owen p o in ts  o u t ,  A r i s t o t l e  may have used t h i s  
s o r t  o f  no t io n  in a t t a c k i n g  the  P l a t o n i s t s .  Vide "Logic  and Metaphysics  
in Some E a r l i e r  Works o f  A r i s t o t l e , "  in P l a t o  and A r i s t o t l e  in the Mid 
Fourth Century (Goeteborg:  Almquist  and W i k s e l 1 , 1 957 ) ,  p. 174.
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the analogous as f o l l o w s :
. . . f o r  p r o p o r t i o n  (o^v<,<.Xoy'ov') is not  a p ro p er ty  o f  numerical  
q u a n t i t y  o n l y ,  but  o f  q u a n t i t y  in g e n e r a l ,  p ro p o r t io n  (<^v4,Xoyov ) 
being e q u a l i t y  o f  r a t i o s ,  and i n v o l v in g  f o u r  terms a t  l e a s t .
Thus the  j u s t  in v o lve s  f o u r  terms a t  l e a s t ,  and the r a t i o  
between the f i r s t  p a i r  o f  terms is the same as t h a t  between the  
second pai r .^
But A r i s t o t l e  a ls o  uses analogy in o t h e r  ways; f o r  example, he considers
i t  to  p lay  a r o l e  in metaphor:
Metaphor co n s is ts  in g i v i n g  the th in g  a name t h a t  belongs to  
something e l s e ;  the  t r a n s f e r e n c e  being e i t h e r  from genus to  
s p e c i e s ,  o r  f rom spec ies to  genus,  o r  from species to  s p ec ies ,  
o r  on grounds o f  ana lo gy .  . . . That  from analogy is poss ib le  
whenever t h e r e  a re  f o u r  terms so r e l a t e d  t h a t  the second (B) is 
t o  the f i r s t  ( A ) ,  as the  f o u r t h  (D) to  the t h i r d  (C) .  . . .
(Po. 21,  1457b 7 -1 8 )
These two quotes show t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  f in d s  analogy to  be used in d i f f e r e n t  
ways; they a ls o  show t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  f in d s  analogy t o  have fo ur  terms.
These f o u r  terms serve  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  analogy from the l a s t  kind o f  e q u iv ­
o c a t i o n ,  t h a t  by r e f e r e n c e  {rrpos  fcv ) .
The k in d  o f  e q u iv o c a t io n  which A r i s t o t l e  c a l l s  "by re fe rence "
{rrpos i-v ) is i n t e g r a l  to  A r i s t o t l e ' s  concept ion o f  a science o f  being.  
Things are equivoca l  in t h i s  way because they  a re  sa id  to  be something
because they a re  " r e l a t e d  t o  one c e n t r a l  p o i n t ,  one d e f i n i t e  k ind o f
t h i n g ,  and [each]  is not  s a id  to  'be '  by mere a m b i g u i t y . "  (M. T 2.  1003^
33- 34 ) "A mbig ui ty" in the  quote is the  Greek word which is
the word t r a n s l a t e d  by tequivocat ion'  in the C a t e g o r i e s . A r i s t o t l e ' s  po in t  
in say ing  t h i s  is t h a t  th in g s  are  sometimes c a l l e d  by the  same name by 
a c c id e n t  as discussed above;  but  they may a ls o  be c a l l e d  by the same name 
because they are  r e l a t e d  to  one c e n t r a l  p o i n t .  Some commentators have
1 A r i s t o t l e ,  Nicomachean E t h i c s ,  E 3.  1131^ 3 0 -^ 4 ,  t r a n s .  H.Rackh am.
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r e f e r r e d  to  t h i s  c e n t r a l  p o i n t  as the " f o c a l  meaning" o f  the term.^ This
is perhaps s l i g h t l y  m is le a d in g  s in ce  A r i s t o t l e  is t a l k i n g  not  so much
about meaning as about the  th i n g  and not  the  meaning which is f o c a l ,  or
c e n t r a l .  The phrase " f o c a l  meaning" does,  however,  imply t h a t  t h e r e  is
a c e n t r a l  p o i n t  which accounts f o r  o t h e r  th in gs  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  p o in t
being c a l l e d  by the same name. A r i s t o t l e  i l l u s t r a t e s  what he means by
t h i s  in Book Gamma o f  the M e ta p h y s ic s :
Ev ery th in g  which is h e a l t h y  is r e l a t e d  to  h e a l t h ,  one th in g  in the  
sense t h a t  i t  p reserves  h e a l t h ,  an o th er  in the sense t h a t  i t  pro­
duces i t ,  an o the r  in the sense t h a t  i t  is a symptom o f  h e a l t h ,  an­
o t h e r  because i t  is capab le  o f  i t .  (M, T 2.  1003^ 34 -  1)
A r i s t o t l e ' s  p o in t  is t h i s :  H e a l th  is a balance  o f  the hot  and cold elements
in the body. (P. H 7. 246^ 5) But many th in gs  are c a l l e d  h e a l th y  and t h i s
is because they a re  a l l  r e l a t e d  to  t h i s  balance  o f  e lements .  But each is
r e l a t e d  in a d i f f e r e n t  way, hence A r i s t o t l e ' s  phrase ' c e n t r a l  r e f e r e n c e ' .
I t  is c l e a r  here t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is t a l k i n g  about t h i n g s ,  but  i t  is a lso  
c l e a r  t h a t  he is t a k i n g  h is  ev idence  from the way in which things are spo­
ken o f .  "Focal meaning" is then a d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  what modern phi losophers  
would take A r i s t o t l e  to  be d o in g .  Th is  use,  however, is apt  to  suggest  
t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is on ly  concerned w i t h  words and not  t h i n g s ,  but t h a t  is 
p a t e n t l y  f a l s e .
Having given an example o f  the  way in which a l l  h e a l th y  th ings
a re  r e l a t e d  to  h e a l t h ,  A r i s t o t l e  compares t h i s  to  the way in which a l l
th in g s  t h a t  a r e ,  a re  r e l a t e d  t o  one c e n t r a l  k ind o f  be ing:
So, to o ,  t h e r e  a re  many senses in which a t h in g  is s a id  to  be,  but  
they  a l l  r e f e r  t o  one s t a r t i n g - p o i n t ;  some th in gs  a re  sa id  to  be 
because they  a re  substances ,  o th e rs  because they are a f f e c t i o n s  o f  
substance ,  o th e rs  because they  a re  a process towards substance,  or
tG .E . L .  Owen, "L o g ic  and Metaphysics in Some E a r l i e r  Works o f  
A r i s t o t l e , "  o£.  c i t . ,  p. 175.
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d e s t r u c t i o n s  o r  p r i v a t i o n s  o r  q u a l i t i e s  o f  substance,  o r  p ro d u c t ive  
o r  g e n e r a t i v e  o f  su bstance ,  o r  o f  th in g s  which are r e l a t i v e  to  
substance ,  or  n egat ions  o f  one o f  these th in gs  or  o f  substance  
i t s e l f .  (M. r  2 .  1003b 6 - 1 0 )
The s t a r t i n g - p o i n t  to which A r i s t o t l e  is here r e f e r r i n g  i s ,  o f  course ,  
substance (o u e,L )  ; t h i s  might l i t e r a l l y  be t r a n s l a t e d  as being-ness  
al th ough t h e r e  a re  reasons why such a t r a n s l a t i o n  might  be m is le a d in g ,  
given  the  way in which A r i s t o t l e  uses ' o u a v * ' . '  The l i t e r a l  t r a n s l a ­
t i o n ,  a l though i t  w i l l  not  be used h e r e ,  needs to  be mentioned since  
i t  b r in gs  out  the r e l a t i o n  between ' and ' o u o / L ' as a r e l a t i o n  be­
tween a p a r t i c i p l e  and the  noun d e r i v e d  from the p a r t i c i p l e .  This  
r e l a t i o n  is not  p l a i n  when g iven  the  E ng l ish  words 'b e in g '  and ' s u b s t a n c e ' .  
What A r i s t o t l e  is l i t e r a l l y  s a y in g ,  t h e n ,  is t h a t  the s t a r t i n g  p o in t  in 
v i r t u e  o f  which a l l  beings a re  sa id  t o  be is substance o r  be in g-ness .
The examples A r i s t o t l e  g ives  in e x p l a in in g  how a l l  senses o f  
being r e f e r  t o  one s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  a re  o f  two k inds.  Seen in one way,  
th in g s  in the  examples may be sa id  to be e i t h e r  a c t u a l l y  o r  p o t e n t i a l l y .  
Seen in another  way, some o f  the examples may be sa id  to  be because they  
are  in one o f  the va r io u s  c a t e g o r i e s ;  these th ings are sa id  to be a c t u ­
a l l y ,  The o n ly  th in g s  sa id  to  be p o t e n t i a l l y  a re  substances.  The con­
t r a s t  between these then comes in the  category  o f  substance.  Otherwise ,  
the examples a re  drawn from the  va r io u s  c a te g o r ie s  or  th in gs  which would 
be in one o f  the va r io u s  c a t e g o r i e s .  Th is  is the  case w i t h  the l a s t  
example,  t h a t  o f  n e g a t io n ;  A r i s t o t l e  c l e a r l y  po in ts  out  t h a t  non-being is 
a ls o  c l a s s i f i e d  by the  c a t e g o r i e s .  (M. N 2.  1089^ 15-18)  Thus the  c a t e ­
g o r ie s  here f u n c t i o n ,  as in o t h e r  p l a c e s ,  to  c l a s s i f y  the d i f f e r e n t  kinds  
o f  th in g s  t h a t  a re  ( i . e . ,  the types o f  e x i s t e n t s )  and the d i f f e r e n t  ways
' Owens, o£.  c i t . ,  pp. 139-140 .
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t h a t  they a re  ( I . e . ,  d i f f e r e n t  modes o f  being  which they h ave ) .  Substance  
is more complex than the  o t h e r  c a t e g o r ie s  s in ce  th ings  may be substance  
e i t h e r  p o t e n t i a l l y  o r  a c t u a l l y .  But the o t h e r  c a te g o r ie s  very s t r a i g h t ­
fo r w a r d ly  c l a s s i f y  what  i s .  A r i s t o t l e ' s  p o i n t ,  then ,  is t h a t  a l l  th ings  
which a re  in the  c a t e g o r i e s ,  a re  because they r e f e r  to  substance or  depend 
on substan ce .  Having e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  substance is t h a t  in v i r t u e  o f  
which o t h e r  th in g s  a re  sa id  t o  b e ,  A r i s t o t l e  is not  ab le  to a s s e r t  t h a t  
his  sc ience  o f  being w i l l  be a study o f  the  causes and p r i n c i p l e s  o f  sub­
s tan ce .  (M. r  2.  1003^ 2 1 - 2 3 ) Thus i t  is o n ly  by using a not ion  o f
e q u iv o c a t io n  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is a b le  to  s e t  h is  science o f  being on i t s
f e e t .  C o r res p o nd in g ly ,  t h i s  s o r t  o f  e q u iv o c a t io n  is o f  c e n t r a l  impor­
tance in the c a t e g o r i e s .
The c a t e g o r i e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  occupy a key p o s i t i o n  in A r i s t o t l e ' s  
metaphysics .  In c l a s s i f y i n g  the  types o f  e x i s t e n t s  and t h e i r  re s p e c t iv e  
modes o f  b e in g ,  the c a t e g o r ie s  a l lo w  A r i s t o t l e  to t r e a t  ' as e q u iv ­
ocal  TTpoi 'iLv . E v ery th in g  which is sa id  t o  be is sa id  to  be by re fe rence
to  substance which is in the pr im ary  sense.  Th is  could perhaps be 
expressed by say ing  t h a t  each o f  the  o t h e r  c a te g o r ie s  is a ca tegory o f  
the m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  o f  substance .  Thus,  q u a l i t i e s  are  q u a l i t i e s  o f  sub­
s ta n c e s ,  being a f f e c t e d  is be ing  a f f e c t e d  o f  substance,  e t c .  Each o f  
these c a t e g o r ie s  is composed o f  t h in g s  each o f  which is sa id  to  be because 
i t  has t o  do in some way w i t h  substance .  But i t  is impor tant  to  note th a t  
in doing t h i s  A r i s t o t l e  is doing n e i t h e r  l i n g u i s t i c  nor n o n - 1 i n g u i s t i c  
p h i losophy ,  A r i s t o t l e  never  considers a theory  o f  meaning nor does he con­
s i d e r  t h a t  t h e r e  is a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  problem here .  Some modern commenta­
to rs  have sa id  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  regards language as m i r r o r i n g  the w o r ld ,  but
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t h i s  is I n c o r r e c t  o r  m is le a d in g .^  A r i s t o t l e  does not regard the world  
and language as two d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s ,  and he never at tempts to  d iscover  
any r e l a t i o n  between them. R a th er ,  he seems to  co ns ider  the  word 'man'
as p a r t  o f  t h a t  which i t  denotes or  as a p a r t  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  man.
Th is  does not  mean, o f  co u rse ,  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is unaware o f  the d i f f e r ­
ence between words and t h i n g s .  But i t  does mean t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  regards
the w o r ld  as i n t e l l i g i b l e  through the manner which men have o f  speaking  
o f  the  w o r ld .  He d o e s n ' t  seem to  c o ns id er  language understood as about  
something as a d i f f e r e n t  e n t i t y  f rom t h a t  which i t  is about .  This  
accounts f o r  the way in which A r i s t o t l e  s h i f t s  e a s i l y  between l i n g u i s t i c  
c o n s id e r a t io n s  and n o n - l i n g u i s t i c  o r  p a r t i a l l y  n o n - 1 i n g u i s t i c  ones.
Read in t h i s  s p i r i t  A r i s t o t l e  has importance f o r  contemporary  
ph i lo so p hy .  A r i s t o t l e  is not  a n a iv e  r e a l i s t  r e i f y i n g  a se t  o f  o b je c ts  
which he is i n v e s t i g a t i n g ,  but  r a t h e r  a s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t h i n k e r  who is 
i n v e s t i g a t i n g  what is to  be understood as composing the w o r ld .  A r i s t o t l e ' s  
thought now "emerges less as an account o f  the essence o f  th ings which a 
bad h i s t o r i c a l  t r a d i t i o n  has encouraged us to  f in d " ^  than as a way o f  
understanding  what  i t  is  f o r  men to  be in the wor ld  and what men under­
stand t h a t  w or ld  to  be. Viewed in t h i s  l i g h t  A r i s t o t l e  is o f  contempo­
r a r y  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
 ̂ I b i d . , pp. 129- 131.
^DoM. Mackinnon,  " A r i s t o t l e ' s  Concept ion o f  Substance,"  Bambrough, 
op . c i t . , p. 111.
CHAPTER I I I
THE PRIORITY OF SUBSTANCE
A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  the c a t e g o r i e s  i s ,  consequent ly ,  the  
fou n dat io n  o f  h is  sc ience  o f  being qua b e in g .  I t  enables him to  a sse r t  
t h a t  substance is in the  pr im ary  sense and is the c e n t r a l  re fe re n c e  f o r  
a l l  o t h e r  k inds o f  be in g .  Thus h is  sc ience  o f  being qua being is not  a 
study o f  a g e n e r ic  sense o f  be in g .  However, i f  he is to  have a metaphy­
s ic s  focused on the being o f  su bstance ,  i t  is e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  substance  
in some sense be p r i o r .  There  must be an asymmetr ical  dependence between 
substance and the o t h e r  c a t e g o r i e s .  Thus an account o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  
sc ience  o f  be ing  qua being  must account f o r  the manner in which substance  
is p r i o r  and a ls o  account f o r  the dependence o f  the  o t h e r  c a te g o r ie s  upon 
substance.  The purpose o f  t h i s  ch a p te r  is to  show how A r i s t o t l e  handles  
the p r i o r i t y  o f  substance.  T h is  is conceived as a p r e l im i n a r y  to the  
manner in which he handles the dependence o f  the o t h e r  c a te g o r ies  upon 
substance using the  r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence .  As A r i s t o t l e  on ly  discusses  
the inherence c o n d i t io n  s p e c i f i c a l l y  in the c a t e g o r i e s ,  an account o f  
substance which is  p r e l i m i n a r y  to  an account o f  inherence must a ls o  
r e l a t e  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d iscuss io ns  o f  substance in the Categ ories  and in 
the M e ta p h ys ics , where A r i s t o t l e  in t roduces  his sc ience  o f  being qua being .  
To f a c i l i t a t e  the  d is cu ss io n  o f  substance in the present  c h a p te r ,  
the f o l l o w i n g  d i s t i n c t i o n  can be made. An event  may be spoken o f  as e i t h e r  
r e c u r r a b le  o r  n o n r e c u r r a b le  depending on the c r i t e r i a  used to  i d e n t i f y  t h a t
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e v e n t .  I f  the c r i t e r i a  used to  i d e n t i f y  the  event  are the comparat ive  
r e l a t i o n s ,  s i m i l a r i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e ,  then the same event  may occur many 
t imes s in c e  i t  w i l l  be the  same type o f  e v e n t .  On the o th e r  hand, i f  the  
c r i t e r i a  are the r e l a t i o n s  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e  used in the con­
t e x t  o f  space and t i m e ,  then d i f f e r e n t  events can occur on ly  once. For 
example,  a b i l l i a r d  b a l l  may s t r i k e  another  b i l l i a r d  b a l l  many t im es;  i . e . ,  
the  even t  which is the  same in terms o f  the  comparat ive  r e l a t i o n s  may 
occur many t im e s ,  but  a p a r t i c u l a r  case o f  one b i l l i a r d  b a l l  s t r i k i n g  
an o the r  b i l l i a r d  b a l l ,  the red b a l l  s t r i k i n g  the  w h i t e  b a l l  on a p a r t i ­
c u l a r  t a b l e  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ,  can occur on ly  once. To say t h a t  a 
non-substance is n o n re c u r r a b le  i s ,  th e n ,  to  say t h a t  i t  is in a p a r t i c u l a r  
p la ce  d u r in g  a p a r t i c u l a r  t ime and t h a t  even i f  i t  is o f ,  say,  a q u a l i t y ,  
the same kind as another q u a l i t y  which is in a d i f f e r e n t  p la c e ,  i t  may be 
d is t in g u i s h e d  from t h a t  q u a l i t y  by i t s  s p a t i a l  and temporal p la ce .
Th is  d i s t i n c t i o n  w i l l  be usefu l  in g iv in g  an account o f  pr imary  
substan ce ,  s in c e  A r i s t o t l e  views pr im ary  substance (as t h a t  term is used 
in the C a t e g o r i e s ) as something which is because i t  is changeable.  This  
view is a r t i c u l a t e d  in the Physics where A r i s t o t l e ' s  purpose is to  d i s ­
cuss n a tu re  ) .  Nature  may be understood in th ree  ways in l i g h t  o f
the d i s t i n c t i o n s  which A r i s t o t l e  makes in Book B o f  the Rhysi c s . Here 
A r i s t o t l e  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  senses in which nature  may be 
t aken .  In the f i r s t  sense n a t u r e  is " t h e  immediate substratum o f  things  
which have in themselves a p r i n c i p l e  o f  motion o r  change."  (P. B 1. 193^ 
28- 2 9 ) A l t e r n a t i v e l y  n a tu re  may be understood as " th e  shape or  form 
which is s p e c i f i e d  in the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the t h i n g , "  (P. B 1, 193^ 30-31 )  
o r  i t  may be understood as t h a t  which is " e x h i b i t e d  in the process o f  
growth by which i t s  n a tu re  is a t t a i n e d . "  (P. B 1. 193^ 13-14)  But w h i l e
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n a tu r e  may be understood in these t h r e e  senses ,  I t  is the job o f  the phy­
s i c i s t  to  be concerned w i t h  n a t u re  in o n ly  one way. "The p h y s ic i s t  is 
concerned o n ly  w i t h  th in g s  whose forms are  separab le  ' indeed,
but  do not  e x i s t  a p a r t  f rom m a t t e r . "  (P. B 2.  194^ 13-14 )  In terms o f  
the t h r e e  senses o f  n a t u r e ,  the p h y s i c i s t  is then concerned w i t h  the f i r s t  
and t h i r d  senses p r i m a r i l y  and w i t h  the second sense on ly  as i t  is a req­
u i s i t e  f o r  unders tand in g  e i t h e r  o f  the  o t h e r  two senses.  For in the  
second sense o f  n a t u r e ,  n a tu r e  as form, n a tu re  is con cep tu a l ly  separab le  
s in ce  the form is c o n c e p t u a l ly  sep a r a b le  from m a t t e r .  The p h y s i c i s t ,  then ,  
is concerned w i t h  change s in c e  both o f  the o t h e r  two senses o f  n a tu re  have 
to  do w i t h  change,  the  f i r s t  w i t h  motion and change, the t h i r d  w i t h  growth.  
M a t t e r ,  o f  course ,  is something which A r i s t o t l e  uses to  account f o r  change 
by making the  m a t t e r  the  p o t e n t i a l  w h i l e  the form is the a c t u a l .  (D.A. B 1. 
412^ 10) So in say in g  t h a t  the  p h y s i c i s t ' s  su b je c t  m a t te r  is the form as 
not c o n c e p t u a l ly  separa ted  from the m a t t e r ,  A r i s t o t l e  is in e f f e c t  saying  
t h a t  the p h y s i c i s t  s tu d ie s  th in g s  as changing and these th ings are  con­
c r e t e  i n d i v i d u a l s  composed o f  both form and m a t t e r .  Th is  serves to mark 
physics  o f f  f rom f i r s t  phi lo sophy which s tu d ie s  the being and essence o f  
the  c o n c e p t u a l ly  s e p a rab le  form. (P, B 2.  194^ 14-15)
In the C ateg or ies  A r i s t o t l e  is a ls o  concerned w i t h  the concrete  
i n d i v i d u a l  which he t h e re  r e f e r s  to  as the pr imary substance.  (C. 5 .  2^ 11) 
I t  is t h i s  same co n cre te  i n d i v i d u a l  w i t h  which A r i s t o t l e  is concerned in 
the Physics al though  he does not  a n a lyz e  I t  as pr imary  substance,  but  
r a t h e r  as form and not  s ep ara b le  from i t s  m a t t e r .  Hence in both the Phys-  
ics and the C a teg o r ies  A r i s t o t l e  is concerned w i t h  the concrete i n d i v i d u a l ,
'C o rn fo rd  t r a n s l a t e s  x^ujpc&ro^ here  as " c o n c e p tu a l ly  s eparab le"  
in Phys i c s , A 2 .  194^ 14, T r a n s .  C o rn fo r d ,  i n f r a , pp. 32 -33n .
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a 1though h is  account o f  I t  in the  Physics is more complete than t h a t  given  
in the C a t e g o r i e s . E x t r a p o l a t i n g  from the  Physics to  the C a t e g o r i e s , then ,  
i t  would seem t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is concerned in the  Categor ies  wi th the con­
c r e t e  i n d i v i d u a l  which he understands as being a p a r t  o f  a changing order  
o f  n a t u r e ,  and a p a r t  o f  t h a t  o r d e r  as changeable.  As a p a r t  o f  t h i s  o r d e r ,  
the pr imary substance is something which is i d e n t i f i e d  in terms o f  the  
s p a t i a l  and temporal  f ramework o f  o r d i n a r y  e xp e r ie n c e ,  and which is then 
a f a c t o r  in the  o c c u r r in g  o f  n a t u r e .
I f  p r imary  substance is to  be understood,  however,  i t  must not  be 
mere ly  understood as something which is  n o n r e c u r r a b le ;  were t h i s  the  case,  
the w or ld  would be f i l l e d  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l s  and th e re  would be no knowledge.  
So in o r d e r  to  have knowledge A r i s t o t l e  a l s o  needs to  have something which  
may hold t r u e  o f  many t h i n g s ;  he needs a u n i v e r s a l ,  o r  something which  
occurs but  which is r e c u r r a b l e .  He a ls o  must have t h i s  u n iv e rs a l  as some­
th i n g  present  in the  i n d i v i d u a l  r a t h e r  than s epara te  from i t  as he takes  
P l a t o  to  have argued.  His approach to  t h i s  q u e s t io n ,  a c c o r d in g ly ,  is a 
c r i  t i c i sm o f  P l a t o .
I t  is  f rom t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h a t  the t h in g  must be the same as 
i t s  essence ,  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  a t t a c k s  P l a t o .  The view which he a t t r i b u t e s  
to  P l a t o  is the view t h a t  a t h i n g  is  not  the same as i t s  essence, and i t  
is the same as what  i t  is o n ly  because i t  p a r t i c i p a t e s  in the form o f  
what i t  i s .  A r i s t o t l e ' s  argument then runs as f o l l o w s .  The i n i t i a l  
assumption o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  argument is t h a t  the law o f  the Excluded Middle  
a p p l i e s  to the q u es t io n  w i t h  which he is d e a l in g .  Thus i t  is e i t h e r  t ru e  
o r  i t  is f a l s e  t h a t  a th in g  is the same as i t s  essence. I n i t i a l l y  A r i s ­
t o t l e  makes what  he cons iders  to  be the  P l a t o n i c  assumption and assumes 
t h a t  a th in g  is not  the same as i t s  essence .  This assumption in e f f e c t
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says t h a t  t h e r ç  a re  th in g s  p r i o r  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  substances;  the things  
A r i s t o t l e  has in mind here  a r e ,  o f  course ,  the P l a t o n i c  Forms or  what he 
takes  these forms to  be. Now i f  the Forms are  p r i o r ,  then they w i l i  
e i t h e r  be severed frpm t h e i r  essences o r  they w i i i  n o t .  (By severed from 
t h e i r  essences A r i s t o t l e  means t h a t  the  Forms w i l l  not  be s e l f - p r e d i c a t i n g . )  
I f  the Forms are  not  severed  from essences,  then the d i f f i c u i t y  known as 
the T h i r d  Man Argument fo l lo w s  im m edia te ly ;  A r i s t o t l e  has discussed t h i s
elsewhere  and does not  b r in g  i t  up h e r e , '  A t t a c k i n g  the o t h e r  horn o f  the
di lemma, A r i s t o t l e  proceeds to  co ns ider  the consequences o f  having the  
th in g  and i t s  essence severe d .  According to  him, the p r i n c i p a i  d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  w i t h  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  a r e  the f o i  lowing:  (1)  I t  w i i l  not  be p o s s ib le
to  have knowledge o f  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and (2) the Forms w i l l  have no being .  
A r i s t o t l e  then g ives  the  f o l l o w i n g  reasons f o r  h o ld in g  these p o s i t i o n s .  
Knowledge is o f  the  essence ,  so i f  the Form is severed from i t s  essence 
t h e re  can be no knowledge o f  the  Form. A r i s t o t l e  a lso  s t a t e s  t h a t  the  
Forms a re  in a l l  cases severed from t h e i r  essences.  Th is  being the case,
i t  must be t r u e  o f  the  Form o f  be in g .  But i f  i t  is t r u e ,  being w i l l  not
be. Accord ing t o  A r i s t o t l e ,  i t  is  a ls o  the case t h a t  the Forms a l l  have 
being o r  they do n o t .  (Modern p h i lo sophers  would say t h a t  the Forms have 
the same o n t o l o g i c a l  s t a t u s . )  Hence, i f  i t  can be shown t h a t  one Form 
does not  have b e in g ,  then no Form has be in g .  Thus the Form which accounts 
f o r  being in p a r t i c u l a r s  w i l l  i t s e l f  not  be ,  and hence the cause o f  being  
is not  a cause o f  b e in g .  These two p o s s ib le  cases in which a th in g  is 
not the same as i t s  essence thus both lead t o  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  In the second 
case ,  in which a t h i n g  is severed  from i t s  essence,  the d i f f i c u l t y  is a
' c f .  M, A 9 .  99Qb 17-991® 8.
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con t r a d  i e t  î on, To say t h a t  a t h in g  is not  the sapie as i t s  essence then  
leads t o  e i t h e r  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  or  a f a i l u r e  to  e x p l a i n  what i t  purported  
to  e x p l a i n .  A r i s t o t l e  r e j e c t s  both o f  these a l t e r n a t i v e s  and concludes  
t h a t  a t h in g  is the  same as i t s  essence.  (M. Z 6 . 1031^ 18-^28)
Having e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  a t h in g  is the same as i t s  essence,  A r i s ­
t o t l e  co nt inues  in Book Z o f  the  Metaphysics to  i n v e s t i g a t e  the  n a tu r e  o f  
essences.  He concludes t h a t  the  essence o f  something,  i t s  t o  r t f - ^ v  ,
I s  the  form and t h a t  t h e  form which is the substance o f  a th in g  is the  
cause o f  i t s  b e in g .  (M. Z 17. 104l^ 33) Thus the  being o f  the form,
which is the  substance ,  is the p r imary  kind o f  b e in g ,  and i t  is t h i s  
which the sc ience  o f  being  qua being must s tudy .  Consequently ,  a house 
is a house and not  b r i c k s  and s to n e s ,  because the m a t te r  is a c t u a l i z e d  
by the form. (M, Z 17, 104l® 10) Thus the form c o n s t i t u t e s  the d e t e r ­
minateness o f  the p a r t i c u l a r ,  and i t  is the form which is the same as 
what a th i n g  i s .  Having e s t a b l i s h e d  t h i s ,  however,  A r i s t o t l e  is in d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s .  Each th in g  is the  same as what  i t  i s ,  but th e re  a re  many 
t h in g s ;  f o r  example ,  t h e r e  a re  many dogs. Thus A r i s t o t l e  seems to  be in 
the p o s i t i o n  o f  say in g  t h a t  the  same t h in g  is in many places a t  the  same 
t im e .  He i s ,  however,  determined  to  make sense o f  h is  p o s i t i o n  and to  do 
so he in t roduces  h is  n o t io n  o f  m a t t e r .
When A r i s t o t l e  says t h a t  two men are the same, l i k e  Gal l i a s  and 
S o c r a t e s ,  t h e y  a re  the same i n s o f a r  as th ey  a re  both men, but they are  
d i f f e r e n t  in s o f a r  as they  have d i f f e r e n t  m a t t e r .  (M. Z 8 . 1034® 7"10)
The scheme A r i s t o t l e  is s e t t i n g  up is  then one o f  the f o l lo w i n g  s o r t .  I t  
is the  form which prov id es  f o r  the  dete rminateness o f  the p a r t i c u l a r ,  and 
the p a r t i c u l a r  is the  same as i t s  essence.  Thus Socrates is a man and 
C a i l l a s  is a man and s ince  they are both men they are the  same, both being
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i d e n t l c a l  to the sajne t h i n g .  However,  I f  they a re  the same, t h e r e  are  
not twQ p a r t i c u l a r s ,  Socra tes  and C a i l l a s ,  but  t h e r e  Is on ly  one t h i n g ,  
the form o f  man. On the o t h e r  hand, both Socrates and C a i l l a s  are  
m a t e r i a l  t h i n g s ,  and as m a t e r i a l  they are two and not  one. M a t te r  gives  
A r i s t o t l e  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  I n d i v i d u a t i o n .  In t h i s  way A r i s t o t l e  avoids  
what he cons iders  t o  be the P l a t o n i c  problem, t h a t  o f  the " s e l f - s u b s  I s t e n t  
Forms."
Of course ,  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account Is s e n s ib le  on ly  I f  he has an 
account o f  the  t h r e e  forms o f  substance.  Substance may be e i t h e r  form 
or  m a t t e r  o r  a combinat ion o f  the  two which Is the  concre te  I n d i v i d u a l .
(M. H 1. 1042^ 25- 33 ) In th e  C a teg o r ie s  and In the  Physics A r i s t o t l e ' s  
discuss ions  o f  substance a re  d is cuss ions  o f  the concrete I n d i v i d u a l ,  
w h i l e  In the  Metaphysics A r i s t o t l e ' s  d iscuss ions  o f  substance a re  p r im a r ­
i l y  d iscuss io ns  o f  form. But he seldom discusses m a t t e r ;  t h i s  Is due to  
h is  view t h a t  " m a t t e r  Is unknowable In I t s e l f . "  (M. Z 10. 1036^ 9)
U s u a l ly  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d iscuss io ns  o f  m a t t e r  o r  remarks on m at te r  are par ts  
o f  l a r g e r  d iscu ss ion s  o f  change. Change, th en .  Is c r u c i a l  In some 
respect  to A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  m a t t e r  and,  hence,  c r u c i a l  f o r  his  
account o f  substance.
When A r i s t o t l e  discusses change, he e x p la in s  change In terms o f  
c o n t r a r i e s ;  f o r  example,  the  w h i t e  changes to  the n o n -w h i te .  (P. A 5. 188^ 
22 - 2 6 ) Such com in g - to -b e  a ls o  always Invo lves  some substratum. (P. A 7. 
190® 33- ^  4) Subst ra tum, p f  course .  Is a ls o  something which can be under­
stood In more than one sense;  I t  may be e i t h e r  the form, the m a t t e r ,  or  
the c oncre te  I n d i v i d u a l .  (M. Z 3. 1028  ̂ 33-  1029® 5) But In the d isc u s ­
sions o f  change I t  Is apparent  t h a t  the sense o f  substratum w i t h  which 
A r i s t o t l e  Is concerned Is m a t t e r ,  f o r  I t  Is the m at te r  t h a t  gives the
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t h i n g  a c a p a b i l i t y  to  be o r  to  not  be and, hence,  to change. (M. Z 7.
10323 15-26 )  Thus in d isc u ss in g  change A r i s t o t l e  b r ings  in m a t t e r ,  
al though  s t r i c t l y  speaking i t  is the p o t e n t i a l  which i s ,  in a sense,
the m a t t e r  which A r i s t o t l e  uses to  account f o r  change.
From t h i s  i t  can be concluded t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  gives his account  
o f  m a t t e r  in terms o f  change; change i t s e l f  he accounts f o r  w i t h  a 
n o t io n  o f  p o t e n t i a l i t y  which i s ,  in a sense,  the m a t t e r .  Since m at te r  
is  unknowable in i t s e l f ,  i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  to  t a l k  about m at te r  is to  t a l k  
about some formed t h in g  as m a t e r i a l .  T h i s ,  in e f f e c t ,  is to t a l k  about  
a concre te  i n d i v i d u a l  as changeable .  Thus,  when A r i s t o t l e  t a l k s  about  
m a t t e r  in the Metaphysics he t a l k s  o f  i t  in terms o f  the m a t te r  f o r  some­
th in g  e l s e ;  i . e . ,  he t a l k s  about i t  as c h an g eab le . '  Of course,  t h i s  is
on ly  one sense o f  m a t t e r .  A r i s t o t l e  t a l k s  o f  m at te r  in o th e r  ways,  f o r
example,  as i n t e l l i g i b l e  r a t h e r  than p e r c e p t i b l e ,  and t h i s  probably does 
not imply change. (M. Z 10. 1036® 10) The important  p o i n t ,  th en ,  is  
t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  accounts f o r  change using a no t ion  o f  m a t te r  as p o t e n t i a l .  
This  is probably  the  pr im ary  sense o f  m a t t e r ;  a t  any r a t e ,  i t  is the one 
c r u c i a l  f o r  t h i s  d is cu ss io n  s in c e  A r i s t o t l e  can t a l k  about m at te r  in 
connect ion  w i t h  e x p e r ie n c e  o n ly  by t a l k i n g  about th ings as m a t e r ia l  and 
these  a re  th in g s  which a re  changeable .
Th is  account o f  m a t t e r ,  in t u r n ,  throws l i g h t  on what A r i s t o t l e  
means when he says t h a t  th ing s  a re  in d iv i d u a t e d  by t h e i r  m a t te r .  This  
is in keeping w i t h  h is  account o f  essences in which he puts fo rward  the  
view t h a t  a th in g  is one as what  i t  i s ,  but  many as m a t e r i a l .  For accord­
ing to  A r i s t o t l e  a substan ce ,  be i t  form o r  concre te  t h i n g ,  is a substance
' E . g . ,  M. 7. 10493 21- 2 3 .
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because i t  conforms to the two c r i t e r i a  A r i s t o t l e  se ts  f o r t h  f o r  substance:  
s e p a r a b i l i t y  p<t>ro \/ )1 and th i s n e s s .  (M. Z 3. 1029^ 2 8 -29 )  But the
c r i t e r i o n  o f  s e p a r a b i l i t y  is e q u i v o c a l .  Thus w i t h  respect  to form, one 
form is c o n c e p t u a l ly  s e p a ra b le  from another  form i f  i t  can be d is t in g u is h e d  
from t h a t  o t h e r  form by means o f  the comparat ive r e l a t i o n s  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  
and d i f f e r e n c e .  On the o t h e r  hand, w i t h  respect  to substance as the con­
c r e t e  t h in g  composed o f  both form and m a t t e r ,  one t h in g  is separab le  from 
another  i f  i t  is r e l a t e d  t o  the o t h e r  t h in g  by the r e l a t i o n s  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  
and d i f f e r e n c e  and is s e p a ra b le  s p a t i a l l y .  To be separab le  s p a t i a l l y  i s ,  
o f  course,  to  be an o b j e c t  in e x p e r i e n c e - - a  p e r c e p t i b l e  substance,  and 
t h i s  f o r  A r i s t o t l e  means to  be changeable.
Summing t h i s  up,  i t  may be sa id  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is advocat ing a
view in which substance may be seen in two ways. Seen in one way,  a
th in g  is what  i t  is  as a p a r t i c u l a r  because o f  the  form. In t h i s  case
two i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  the same i f  they  have the same form and a r e ,  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  not  two but  one.  P a r t i c u l a r i t y  is then accounted f o r  by the ways 
in which forms are  d i f f e r e n t  f rom and s i m i l a r  to  o t h e r  forms. Looking  
a t  substance in the o t h e r  way, two i n d i v i d u a l s  which have the same form 
are  two and not  one i n s o f a r  as they  have d i f f e r e n t  m a t t e r ;  t h a t  i s ,  
because they are p e r c e p t i b l e s  which a re  t h e r e f o r e  changeable.  They are  
i n d iv i d u a t e d  in t h a t  they a re  s p a t i a l l y  s eparab le  from one an o th er .
Such is A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  substance.  I t  is t h i s  account o f  
substance which forms the  core o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  sc ience  o f  being qua being.
1 ^ujpLST-os/ has two d i s t i n c t  senses:  i t  may mean e i t h e r  ' s p a t i ­
a l l y  a p a r t '  o r  i t  may mean ' d i s t i n c t '  o r  ' o f  a d i f f e r e n t  t y p e . '  A r i s ­
t o t l e  uses 6-r-ov in both o f  these senses.  The f i r s t  sense w i l l  be
here in d i c a t e d  as ' s e p a r a b i l i t y ' ,  w h i l e  the second w i l l  be in d ic a t e d  as 
'con ceptua l  s e p a r a b i l i t y ' .  T h is  d i s t i n c t i o n  w i l l  a ls o  be kept when the  
concept  in d ic a t e d  by ' is not  int roduced using a noun.
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But ,  o f  course ,  i f  i t  is to form the c o r e ,  then th e re  must be an asym­
m e t r i c a l  dependence r e l a t i o n  between the category  o f  the substance and 
the o t h e r  c a t e g o r i e s .  In o t h e r  words,  substance must be p r i o r  in some 
sense.  To dete rm in e  the way in which substance is p r i o r ,  A r i s t o t l e ' s  
major d iscuss ions  o f  p r i o r i t y  w i l l  now be considered .
The most complete d iscuss io n  o f  p r i o r i t y  and p o s t e r i o r i t y  is 
found in Book A o f  the M e tap h ys ic s .  ̂ A r i s t o t l e  is c a r e f u l  to p o in t  out  
i n i t i a l l y  t h a t  p r i o r  and p o s t e r i o r  a re  c o n t r a s t i n g  n o t io n s ;  t h a t  i s ,  
something is c a l l e d  p r i o r  w i t h  respect  to  something which is  p o s t e r i o r .  
A r i s t o t l e  then proceeds to  o u t l i n e  the f o u r  major  senses o f  p r i o r ;  
t h e r e  is no i n c l u s i v e  g e n e r ic  sense o f  p r i o r .  In the f i r s t  sense some­
t h in g  is p r i o r  in t h a t  i t  is  n e a r e r  to  some beg inn in g .  I t  is a g ener ic  
sense w i t h  respect  to  the species  senses under i t .  In the f i r s t  species  
sense,  the beginn in g  from which p r i o r i t y  is determined may e i t h e r  be a 
p la c e  f i x e d  by n a tu re  o r  i t  may be a chance o b j e c t .  A r i s t o t l e  provides  
no examples f o r  t h i s  s o r t  o f  p r i o r i t y ,  but  he might have suggested t h a t  
P iraeus  is p r i o r  to  Thebes in t h a t  i t  is n e are r  to  a c e r t a i n  p l a c e ,  say 
Athens.  Another species o f  p r i o r i t y  which A r i s t o t l e  mentions is tem­
pora l  p r i o r i t y ;  t h a t  i s ,  nearness to  a f i x e d  beginning is temporal n e a r ­
ness.  In t h i s  type  o f  p r i o r i t y  t h a t  which is p r i o r  may e i t h e r  be t h a t  
which is neares t  to  the p rese n t  o r  i t  may be t h a t  which is f a r t h e s t  from 
the p r e s e n t .  Thus in one sense the T r o ja n  war is p r i o r  to  the P e rs ia n ,  
i f  p r i o r i t y  is measured in terms o f  t h a t  which is f u r t h e r  from the  p re ­
sent  and in another  sense the Pers ia n  war is p r i o r  to the Tro ja n  war 
s in c e  i t  is n e a r e r  to  the p r e s e n t .  In a f u r t h e r  species sense something
^M. A l l .  1018b 8- l O i g a  14.
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may a ls o  be p r i o r  in movement, making t h a t  which is n ea re r  the f i r s t  
mover p r i o r  w i t h  the  prime mover being a b s o l u t e l y  p r i o r .  In another  
species  sense p r i o r i t y  is determined  by power. Modern phi losophers  
might express t h i s  sense by saying t h a t  t h e r e  is a causal  p r i o r i t y ,  in 
which the e f f e c t  is p o s t e r i o r  to  the cause.  In the f i n a l  species sense 
p r i o r i t y  in terms o f  nearness to  some beginning may a ls o  be determined  
by arrangement.  For example,  in an o r c h e s t ra  the f i r s t  v i o l i n  is p r i o r  
to  the second v i o l i n ,  s in c e  the second v i o l i n  is second because th e re
is a f i r s t  v i o l i n  which is arranged ahead o f  the second v i o l i n .  These
are  the  species senses which f a l l  under the  gen er ic  sense in which some­
th i n g  may be p r i o r  by being n e a re r  to  some beg inn ing .
The second sense o f  p r i o r i t y  which A r i s t o t l e  discusses is p r i ­
o r i t y  o f  knowledge. Things which a re  p r i o r  in knowledge are p r i o r  in 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  d e f i n i t i o n  being o f  the  u n i v e r s a l .  Having sa id  t h i s ,  A r i s ­
t o t l e  fo l lo w s  w i t h  what seems to  be a r a t h e r  p u z z l in g  s ta tement :  t h a t
in d e f i n i t i o n  the a c c i d e n t a l  is  p r i o r  to  the whole.  The puzz le  is t h a t  
A r i s t o t l e  would t a l k  about d e f i n i t i o n  as having a p r i o r i t y  not co­
e x t e n s i v e  w i t h  the  p r i o r i t y  o f  substance .  The substance o f  a t h in g  as 
i t s  form is the essence o f  the t h in g  and i t  is t h i s  which is the d e f i ­
n i t i o n  in words.^ Now, however,  A r i s t o t l e  wants to t a l k  as though the  
d e f i n i t i o n  is not  the essence o f  substance in words.  Th is  would make 
musical p r i o r  to musical  man, a l th ough A r i s t o t l e  a lso  recognizes t h a t  
man is p r i o r  to  musical  in terms o f  the fo u r t h  sense o f  p r i o r .  Here,  
however,  A r i s t o t l e  is using ' d e f i n i t i o n '  in a way d i f f e r e n t  from the way 
he o f t e n  uses i t ;  here he is t a l k i n g  o f  d e f i n i n g  an a c c id e n ta l  o r  actua l
^Chung-Hwan Chen, " A r i s t o t l e ' s  Concept o f  Pr imary Substance in 
Books Z and H o f  the Metaphys i c s P h r o n e s  is I I  (January,  1 9 57 ) ,  p. 56.
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u n i t y  as opposed to  an e s s e n t i a l  u n i t y .  Th is  j u s t i f i e s
the statement  he makes in f o r m u la t in g  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  in another  p la ce :  
t h a t  p r i o r i t y  in d e f i n i t i o n  and p r i o r i t y  in substance are not c o - e x t e n s iv e .  
(M. M 2 .  1077^ I - I O )  For in the  pr im ary  sense o f  d e f i n i t i o n  on ly  sub­
stance  can be d e f i n e d .  (M. Z 5.  103V® 1) Thus A r i s t o t l e ' s  c la im  t h a t  the  
p r i o r i t y  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  and the  p r i o r i t y  o f  substance a re  not co -e x te n s iv e  
is to  be understood in terms o f  a more general  sense o f  ' d e f i n i t i o n '  than 
t h a t  used in Book Z o f  the Metaphysics (M. Z 5.  1031^ 1 ) ,  a sense in which 
a c c i d e n t a l  u n i t i e s  a re  a ls o  d e f i n a b l e .  I t  does not then v i t i a t e  the  c la im  
t h a t  t h i s  essence is the d e f i n i t i o n  in words ( the  pr imary sense o f  d e f i ­
n i t i o n  in Book Z) and t h a t ,  hence,  the  p r i o r i t y  in d e f i n i t i o n  is a lso  a 
p r i o r i t y  in the w o r ld .
The t h i r d  sense o f  p r i o r  is the  p r i o r i t y  o f  a t t r i b u t e s  o f  p r i o r  
t h in g s .  A r i s t o t l e  takes as his example o f  t h i s  s o r t  o f  p r i o r i t y  the
p r i o r i t y  o f  the s t r a i g h t  over  the smooth. S t r a ig h tn e s s  is an a t t r i b u t e
o f  l i n e  w h i l e  smoothness is an a t t r i b u t e  o f  s u r fa c e s ;  s t ra ig h t n e s s  is 
p r i o r  in t h i s  sense to  smoothness because the l i n e  is p r i o r  to  the s u r fac e .  
The l i n e  is p r i o r  to  the s u r fa c e  in the f o u r t h  sense o f  p r i o r i t y  a ls o  in
t h a t  the l i n e  is the l i m i t  o f  the  s u r fa c e .^
The c r u c i a l  sense o f  p r i o r i t y  is the fo u r t h  sense in which things  
are  p r i o r  in terms o f  substance;  t h a t  i s ,  substances can "be" w i th o u t  
o t h e r  th ings  " b e i n g " ,  but those o t h e r  th in gs  cannot "be" w i th o u t  sub­
s tan ce .  Modern p h i losophers  would express t h i s  by saying t h a t  substance  
a lone  is capable  o f  independent e x i s t e n c e ,  w h i l e  non-substances depend 
on substance f o r  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e .  A r i s t o t l e  a lso  notes t h a t  p r i o r i t y  in
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  T o p i c a , Z 6.  lA l^  2 0 - 2 2 ,  t r a n s .  E.S.  F o r s te r .
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t h i s  sense is p r im a ry ;  i t  is  t h i s  kind o f  p r i o r i t y  which is the c e n t r a l  
re fe re n c e  f o r  the  o t h e r  senses o f  p r i o r i t y .  W hi le  discuss ing t h i s  sense 
o f  p r i o r i t y ,  A r i s t o t l e  a d d i t i o n a l l y  observes t h a t  the p a r ts  are p o t e n t i ­
a l l y  p r i o r  t o  the whole al though  they a re  p o s t e r i o r  in a c t u a l i t y .  Actu­
a l i t y ,  o f  co u rse ,  is p r i o r  to  p o t e n t i a l i t y .  (M. 6  8 . 104g^ 4 -5 )  These 
then are the main senses o f  p r i o r i t y ,  the p r i o r i t y  o f  substance being  
the c r u c i a l  one.
I t  is t h i s  sense o f  p r i o r i t y  which is c r u c i a l  in Book Z o f  the  
Metaphysics as w e l l . ^  A r i s t o t l e  s t a t e s  t h a t  substance is p r i o r  in th ree  
ways when he begins h is  search f o r  substance .  Substance is p r i o r  in 
t i m e ,  p r i o r  in d e f i n i t i o n ,  and p r i o r  in knowledge. The exp lan a t io n  
A r i s t o t l e  g ives  o f  " p r i o r i t y  in t i m e , "  is t h a t  substance alone is cap­
a b le  o f  independent " b e i n g , "  w h i l e  o t h e r  th in gs  depend on substance  
f o r  t h e i r  b e i n g . ^  Th is  sense o f  p r i o r  (capable o f  independent being)  
is then the c r u c i a l  f o u r t h  sense o f  p r i o r  mentioned in Metaphysi cs 
Book A , Chapter  11. Substance is a ls o  p r i o r  in d e f i n i t i o n  since the  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  an y th in g  is e i t h e r  a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  substance or  the d e f i ­
n i t i o n  o f  a t h i n g  which depends on substance f o r  i t s  b e in g ,  in which  
case i t  is d e f in e d  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  to  substance .  This sense o f  p r i o r i t y  
presupposes t h a t  substance is p r i o r  in i t s  c a p a c i ty  f o r  independent  
b e in g ,  and hence p r i o r i t y  in d e f i n i t i o n  depends on p r i o r i t y  in t im e.
In the t h i r d  sense A r i s t o t l e  holds t h a t  substance is p r i o r  in o rd er  o f
' m .  Z  1 .  1 0 2 0 3  3 1 - b  1 .
2
That  A r i s t o t l e  should cons id er  the  pr imary  sense o f  p r i o r i t y  
t o  be p r i o r i t y  in t ime seems s t ra n g e .  I t  suggests t h a t  perhaps he is 
t h i n k i n g  o f  the p r i o r i t y  o f  the  prime mover,  a l though he gives no h i n t  
as to  the connect ion which he has in mind between p r i o r i t y  in t ime and 
the  p r i o r i t y  o f  substance.
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know ledge o Th is  is because something is known when i t  is known what i t  
i s ,  and t h i s  means when i t s  " n a t u r e "  which is i t s  substance is known. 
Substance again is understood as p r i o r  in t im e .  Here in the M etaphys ic s , 
t h e n ,  A r i s t o t l e  a ls o  a s s e r ts  t h a t  the c r u c i a l  sense o f  p r i o r i t y  is t h a t  
sense o f  p r i o r i t y  which substance has as an independent be ing,  a l though  
he recognizes t h a t  substance is p r i o r  in o t h e r  ways as w e l l .
A r i s t o t l e  makes a s i m i l a r  c la im  in the C a t e g o r i e s , a l though in 
the C ategor ies  he does not  mention t h i s  c la im  in connect ion w i t h  the  
p r i o r i t y  o f  substance nor when he discusses  p r i o r i t y  does he i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  an y th in g  is p r i o r  in the sense in which he takes substance to  be 
p r i o r  in the M e tap h ys ics .  ̂ He merely a s s e r ts  t h a t  i f  pr imary substances  
were n o t ,  then noth ing  e l s e  could have being e i t h e r .  (C. 5. 2^ 33"^ 7)
Given these  va r io us  d iscuss ions  o f  p r i o r i t y ,  i t  is now apparent  
t h a t  substance is p r i o r  because i t  a lone is capable o f  independent being.  
Other  senses o f  p r i o r i t y  depend on t h i s  sense.  Of course,  t h i s  is not a 
simple  o n t o l o g i c a l  p r i o r i t y  as some might be tempted to  b e l i e v e .  For 
s in ce  the wor ld  is i n t e l l i g i b l e  when taken up in language,  i t  fo l lo w s  
t h a t  the p r i o r i t y  in d e f i n i t i o n  depends on the p r i o r i t y  in being and 
v ic e  ve rsa .  Thus A r i s t o t l e  does not  d i s t i n g u i s h  e p is te m o lo g ic a l  and 
o n t o l o g i c a l  i n q u i r i e s  in the way in which modern phi losophers  might  
want to  d i s t i n g u i s h  them.
Given t h i s ,  i t  remains to  ask why A r i s t o t l e  should hold t h a t  
substance is p r i o r  i n s o f a r  as i t  is capab le  o f  independent be ing.  Of 
c ourse ,  he does need substance to  be p r i o r  in some sense i f  he is to
'Co 12.  14a 2 6 - b  23 .
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have a sc ie nce  o f  being qua be in g ,^  but  i t  would not  have to be p r i o r  in 
e x a c t l y  t h i s  sense.  To show how i t  fu n c t io n s  in A r i s t o t l e ' s  ph i losophy,  
i t  w i l l  be necessary t o  r e t u r n  to  a c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  substance.
A r i s t o t l e  i d e n t i f i e s  pr im ary  substance in d i f f e r e n t  ways in some 
o f  h is  d i f f e r e n t  works.  In the  C ategor ie s  the pr imary  substance is 
c l e a r l y  the co nc re te  i n d i v i d u a l ,  w h i l e  in the Metaphysics i t  is c l e a r l y  
the form. Many scho la rs  have advanced i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  A r i s t o t l e  which  
i n d i c a t e  why t h i s  is  so;^ most o f  these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  however, depend 
on the chronology o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  w r i t i n g s ,  a s u b jec t  f ra u g h t  w i t h  much 
d e b a t e . 3 W ithout  going i n t o  these  s c h o l a r l y  e x p la n a t io n s ,  i t  may be 
s a f e l y  sa id  t h a t  the d o c t r i n e  which A r i s t o t l e  advances in the Categories  
is o n ly  a p a r t  o f  the f u l l e r  account which he advances in the Metaphys i cs = 
However,  t h i s  f a c t  in i t s e l f  does not  prevent  a d iscuss ion  o f  what A r i s ­
t o t l e  is doing in the C a teg o r ies  in l i g h t  o f  what he is doing in the  
Metaphys i c s . I f  sense is to  be made o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  substance,  
then i t  must be made by c o n s id e r in g  p a r t s  o f  t h a t  d o c t r i n e  in l i g h t  o f  
the whole ,  f u l l y  developed form o f  the d o c t r i n e .  Thus the account o f  
inherence w i l l  be taken up in l i g h t  o f  what A r i s t o t l e  does in the Meta­
physics w i t h  substance.
As mentioned e a r l i e r , ^  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  substance is an
^Su p ra , pp. 21- 2 3 .
2por a c l e a r  s ta tem ent  o f  one view consu lt  Chung-Hwan Chen, op . 
c i t . ,  and " A r i s t o t l e ' s  C a te g o r ia e  as the  Link Between the S o c r a t i c -  
p 1 a to n ic  D i a l e c t i c  and His Own Theory o f  Substance in Books Z and H o f  
the M e tap h ys ics ,"  A t t i  del X I I  Congresso I n t e r n a z i o n a l le  di F i l o s o f i a , 
IX ,  i 9 6 0 , pp. 3 5 - 4 0 .
^Cfo Owens, o p . c i t . ,  pp. 9 2 -1 0 6 .
^Su p ra , pp. 25- 33.
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a t tem pt  to  overcome what  he cons iders  to  be the P l a t o n i c  problem, the  
view t h a t  a t h in g  is sep ara ted  from i t s  essence.  In doing t h i s  he s t a t e s  
t h a t  a t h in g  is  the same as i t s  essence and t h a t  the p a r t i c u l a r i t y  o f  the  
n a t u r a l  k inds is accounted f o r  by form. His two c r i t e r i a  f o r  something 
being a substance are s e p a r a b i l i t y  and th i s n e s s .  He needs these c r i t e r i a  
in o rd er  f o r  knowledge t o  be p o s s ib le  as shown in the e ig h th  a p o r ia ,  (M„ B 4.  
999^ 24-b  2 5 ) in t h a t  a p o r i a  he s t a t e s  t h a t  f o r  knowledge to be p o ss ib le  
th e  th ings  known must have u n i t y ,  i d e n t i t y ,  and must have a t  l e a s t  one u n i ­
ve r s a l  a t t r i b u t e .  Thus when in the Metaphysics A r i s t o t l e  sets up h is  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  substance ,  i t  conforms to  the co n d i t io n s  se t  f o r t h  in t h i s  
a p o r i a .  What he c a l l e d  i d e n t i t y  he r e f e r s  to  in Book Z as t h is n e s s ,  the 
having o f  a d e te r m in a te  c h a r a c t e r .  And a t h in g  is s e p a r a b le ,  co n ce p tu a l ly  
o r  s p a t i a l l y ,  o n ly  i f  i t  is one t h in g ;  t h i s  gives the u n i t y  to a t h in g ,  
A r i s t o t l e  than handles the u n i v e r s a l i t y  by making h is  c r i t e r i o n  o f  separ ­
a b i l i t y  an equ ivoca l  one.  Seen in one way, th ings are  con ce p tua l ly  
sep ara b le  I f  they  a re  s i m i l a r  and d i f f e r e n t  ( t h i s  provides f o r  the p a r t i ­
c u l a r i t y )  and seen in another  way,  they a re  s p a t i a l l y  separab le  given  
t h a t  they are  d e te rm in a te  ( t h i s  accounts f o r  the i n d i v id u a t i o n  o f  p a r t i ­
c u l a r s ) .  The r e l a t i o n a l  f ramework makes the d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  
d o c t r in e s  o f  substance In the Metaphysics  and In the C ategor ies  p o s s ib le .
In the  C ateg o r ies  A r i s t o t l e  is c o n s id e r in g  on ly  one kind o f  s e p a r a b i l i t y  
as a c r i t e r i o n  f o r  su bstance ,  w h i l e  in the Metaphysics he is cons id er in g  
the c r i t e r i o n  t o  be an equ ivoca l  one. Seen in t h i s  way, hi s d o c t r i n e  in 
the C ategor ies  is an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  his  d o c t r i n e  in the M etaphys ic s , 
or  i t  is  a t  l e a s t  an a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h a t  d o c t r i n e .
CHAPTER IV
ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF INHERENCE
In a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  the category  o f  substance Is p r i o r  ( in  the  
pr im ary  sense) in being capab le  o f  independent b e in g ,  A r i s t o t l e  Is 
c o r r e l a t i v e l y  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  non-substance c a te g o r ie s  must be p o s t e r i o r  
in being capable  o f  independent be in g .  Thus non-substance ca teg o r ies  
depend on the  ca teg o ry  o f  substance f o r  t h e i r  being.  A r i s t o t l e ' s  most 
e x p l i c i t  t r e a tm e n t  o f  the  dependency o f  non-substance ca te g o r ie s  upon 
the category  o f  substance is  found in the C ategor ies  where he at tempts  
to  account f o r  t h i s  dependence w i t h  h is  n o t io n  o f  inherence.  The locus 
o f  these d iscuss io ns  is Chapter  2 ,  a l though A r i s t o t l e  mentions t h i s  doc­
t r i n e  in o t h e r  p laces as w e l l , '  His move is  an at tempt  to  a sse r t  the  
p r i o r i t y  o f  the being o f  substance (hence the ca tegory  o f  substance)  by 
arguin g  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  in non-substance c a te g o r ie s  depend f o r  t h e i r  
being on i n d i v i d u a l s  in the category  o f  substance.
In Chapter  2 A r i s t o t l e  is concerned w i th  two sets  o f  d i s t i n c ­
t i o n s ,  the  f i r s t  o f  which is the d i s t i n c t i o n  between forms o f  speech 
which are combined and forms o f  speech which are uncombined,^ The second 
d i s t i n c t i o n  is between th in g s  which are "said o f  a su b je c t  and th ings
GoEoLo Owen in " I n h e r e n c e , "  P h r o n e s is , X (January,  1965 ) ,  p, 97,  
gives the f o l l o w i n g  lo c a t io n s  f o r  A r i s t o t l e ' s  discuss ion o f  the inherence-  
"sa id o f  d i s t i n c t i o n :  Ca tegor ie s  1^ 20-^  9 , 2^ 11 -14 ,  2^ 2?-^ 6 , 2^ 15-17:  
3^ 7 - 3 2 ,  9^ 2 2 - 2 4 ,  1 lb 38- 12  ̂ 17 , 14^ 16-18 ;  Topics 127^ 1-4,
^S u p ra , pp. 6- 7 .
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which are ' i n '  a s u b j e c t .  By c o n s id e r in g  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  A r i s t o t l e  is 
a b le  to  d i v i d e  " t h e  th in g s  t h e r e  a re "  (C. 2.  1^ 20) in t o  fou r  d i f f e r e n t  
groups,  and i t  is in the course o f  making t h i s  d i v i s i o n  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  
g ives  a s u c c in c t  sta tem en t  o f  the c o n d i t io n s  under which something may 
be s a id  to be ' i n '  a s u b j e c t .  (C. 2 .  1^ 2 2 -2 4 )  "By ' i n  a s u b je c t '  I 
mean what is in something not  as a p a r t ,  and cannot e x i s t  s e p a r a t e ly
from what i t  is i n . " '
Proceeding ,  th e n ,  to  the  f i r s t  group,  i t  is apparent  t h a t  A r i s ­
t o t l e  has in mind th in g s  which are ' s a i d  o f  more than one s u b je c t .  In
t h i s  group f a l l  those th ing s  which a re  ' s a i d  o f  a s u b je c t  but  which are
never  ' i n '  a s u b j e c t ;  e . g . ,  A r i s t o t l e  s t a t e s  t h a t  man is ' s a i d  o f  the  
i n d iv i d u a l  man but  is never ' i n '  an i n d i v i d u a l  man. The second group is 
composed o f  th in g s  which a re  never ' s a i d  o f  a s u b je c t  but which are ' i n '  
a s u b j e c t .  In t h i s  group A r i s t o t l e  p laces such th in gs  as " the  in d iv i d u a l  
knowledge o f  grammar" and " t h e  in d iv i d u a l  w h i te n e s s ." ^  In the t h i r d  
group are  th in gs  which may be both ' s a i d  o f  a su b je c t  and ' i n '  a sub­
j e c t ,  such as knowledge o f  grammar. F i n a l l y ,  the f o u r t h  group cons is ts  
o f  th in g s  which are n e i t h e r  ' s a i d  o f  any s u b je c t  nor ' i n '  any s u b je c t .  
The i n d i v i d u a l  man and the i n d i v i d u a l  horse serve as A r i s t o t l e ' s  examples 
f o r  t h i s  group.  T h i s ,  then is the co n tex t  in which A r i s t o t l e  d i s t i n ­
guishes the in heren ce  r e l a t i o n  from the  ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n .
But t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  must a ls o  be understood in l i g h t  o f  the  
f i r s t  d i s t i n c t i o n  made in Chapter  2 ,  the d i s t i n c t i o n  between combined 
and uncombined forms o f  speech.  As mentioned e a r l i e r ,  the combined
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  C a teg o r ie s  2 .  1^ 2 2 - 2 4 ,  t r a n s .  J . L .  A c k r i l l  
2 | b i d . , 2 . lb 25 - 2 8 .
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d i s t i n c t i o n  serves to  mark o f f  those forms o f  speech which name things  
t h a t  a re  w i t h o u t  d e f i n i n g  those t h i n g s .  But in d i v i d i n g  forms o f  speech 
i n t o  these  two groups,  A r i s t o t l e  is a ls o  aware t h a t  the name o f  some 
t h i n g  may be the name o f  e i t h e r  an in d iv i d u a l  o r  the  name o f  a group or  
s p e c ie s .  A c c o r d in g l y ,  A r i s t o t l e  fo l lo w s  h is  d i s t i n c t i o n  between combined 
and uncombined forms o f  speech w i t h  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between i n d iv id u a l s  and 
t h e i r  species  and g enera ,  both in the  category  o f  substance and in the  
o t h e r  c a t e g o r ie s  as w e l l .  He does t h i s  by in t ro d u c in g  both the r e l a t i o n  
o f  inherence and the r e l a t i o n  in which something may be ' s a i d  o f  a sub­
j e c t .  Thus in n o t in g  the ways in which names o f  th ings  may be the names 
o f  e i t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  o r  names o f  t h e i r  species and genera ,  A r i s t o t l e  is 
a ls o  marking out  the r e l a t i o n s  which hold between the  th in gs  which a r e .
However, t h e r e  is a l s o  one o t h e r  r e l a t i o n  which is c r u c ia l  f o r  
A r i s t o t l e ' s  purposes which he discusses  in the Categories  ; t h i s  is the  
r e l a t i o n  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n .  T h is  r e l a t i o n  is a ls o  co n t ras ted  w i t h  in h e r ­
ence as discussed below.  But in o rd er  to  understand what A r i s t o t l e  is  
doing in the C ateg o r ies  i t  is necessary to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between the r e l a ­
t io n s  i n d i c a t e d  by ' s a i d  o f  and ' p r e d i c a t e d ' ,  both o f  which a r e ,  a t  one 
t ime o r  a n o t h e r ,  c o n t r a s te d  w i t h  th e  r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence.  To c l e a r l y  
mark out  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  in h e re n c e ,  i t  w i l l  be usefu l  to  say a few words 
to  d i s t i n g u i s h  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n  from the ' s a id  o f  r e l a t i o n .  
T h is  w i l l  a l s o  en ab le  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence to be d is t in g u is h e d  from 
the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n .
According to  A c k r i l l ,  the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  is a r e l a t i o n  between 
i n d i v i d u a l s  in a ca tegory  and t h e i r  spec ies  and genera.^ A r i s t o t l e  a ls o
^Ackrill, 0 £o cit., p. 75.
- 4 4 -
makes i t  p l a i n  t h a t  what  is ' s a i d  o f  t h a t  which is p re d ic a te d  o f  a sub­
j e c t  may a ls o  be ' s a i d  o f  t h a t  s u b j e c t ,  (C. 3, 1^ 10-11)  For example,  
i f  r a t i o n a l  animal is p r e d ic a t e d  o f  Socrates  as in the sentence ,  "Socr ates  
is [a]  r a t i o n a l  an im a l"  and man is ' s a i d  o f  r a t i o n a l  animal as in the  
s e n t e n c e , " [ a ] r a t i o n a l  animal  is  [a]  man" then i t  f o l lo w s  t h a t  man may 
be ' s a i d  o f  S o c ra te s .  T h i s ,  o f  course ,  o n ly  holds f o r  a s p e c i f i c  sense 
o f  p r e d i c a t i o n .  I t  does not  hold in a case in which,  say,  Socrates is 
sa id  to  be w h i t e  and w h i t e  is s a id  to  be a c o l o r .  I f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  d id  
hold in such a case ,  then i t  would be c o r r e c t  to say t h a t  Socrates is a 
c o l o r .  The r e l a t i o n  which A r i s t o t l e  has In mind, then ,  as r e l a t i n g  the  
' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  to  p r e d i c a t i o n  holds on ly  f o r  some sp ec ia l  sense o f  
p r e d i c a t i o n .  As argued be low,  t h i s  s p e c ia l  sense o f  p r e d i c a t io n  is the  
p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  as opposed t o  the p r e d ic a t i o n  o f  the name,
A r i s t o t l e  h in t s  a t  d i f f e r e n t  senses o f  p r e d ic a t io n  in Chapter  5 
o f  the C a t e g o r i e s . (C, 5, 2^ 19-26 )  Here A r i s t o t l e  s t a t e s  t h a t  i f  some­
th in g  is ' s a i d  o f  something e l s e ,  then the name and d e f i n i t i o n  o f  what  
was ' s a i d  o f  the s u b je c t  must a ls o  be p re d ic a b l e  o f  the s u b j e c t .  On 
A c k r i l l ' s  account t h i s  is s e n s i b l e ,  f o r  i f  the genus or  species is ' s a id  
o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  then i t  would f o l l o w  t h a t  both the name and the d e f i ­
n i t i o n  o f  the spec ies o r  genus in q u es t io n  is p re d ic a te d  o f  the i n d i v i d u a l .  
The f a c t  t h a t  C l a s s ic a l  Greek has no i n d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e  throws f u r t h e r  
l i g h t  on what A r i s t o t l e  sought in t a l k i n g  about p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  names and 
p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  d e f i n i t i o n s , '  W ithout  the  i n d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e ,  sentences
I t  a ls o  serves t o  i n d i c a t e  why some o f  the o t h e r  schools o f  
Greek ph i losophy had some o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which they had. The lack  
o f  t h i s  p a r t  o f  speech accompanied by the  consequent f a i l u r e  to  d i s t i n ­
guish the  ' i s '  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n  from the ' i s '  o f  i d e n t i t y  may have accounted 
f o r  some o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  Megarians as mentioned in M etaphys ics , H, 
3 - 4 ,  C f .  W.D. Ross, A r i s t o t l e ' s  M e tap h ys ics , Vo l .  I I (Oxford;  Clarendon  
P r e s s , 1 9 2 4 ) ,  p. 2 4 4 ,
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such as "Socra tes  is [a ]  man" and "Socra tes  Is w h i t e "  have the same su r ­
face  grammar, a l though  the ' i s '  in each sentence fu n c t io n s  d i f f e r e n t l y .
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between these two uses o f  ' i s '  seems to be what A r i s t o t l e  
is concerned w i t h  in d isc u ss in g  the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the name and the p r e d i ­
c a t io n  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n .
U s u a l l y ,  however,  when A r i s t o t l e  t a l k s  about p r e d ic a t i o n  in the  
C ateg o r ies  he is t a l k i n g  about the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n .  Thus 
when he speaks o f  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  p r e d i c a t i o n  from inherence (being p r e d i ­
cated o f  a s u b je c t  as opposed to being ' i n '  a s u b j e c t ) ,  he s ta t e s  t h a t  
the  name o f  the in h e r e n t  may be p r e d ic a t e d  but t h a t  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the  
in h e re n t  cannot be p r e d i c a t e d ,  t h i s  being the  q u a l i t y  which d is t in g u is h e s  
being p r e d ic a t e d  o f  a s u b je c t  f rom being ' i n '  a s u b j e c t .  (C. 5 .  2^ 2 6 -33 )  
He must a ls o  be r e f e r r i n g  to  the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  when he 
discusses the r e l a t i o n s  which hold between the ' s a id  o f  r e l a t i o n  and 
p r e d i c a t i o n .  His account o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  simply does not  f i t  i f  he is  
r e f e r r i n g  to  the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the  name.
P r e d i c a t i o n ,  t h e n ,  seems to  be a r e l a t i o n  which is understood  
p r i m a r i l y  in terms o f  the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  although i t  may 
a ls o  be the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the name and perhaps o t h e r  sor ts  o f  p r e d i c a ­
t i o n  as w e l l .  A r i s t o t l e  probab ly  regarded p r e d i c a t i o n  as a r e l a t i o n  
which he ld  some form between the  noun phrase and the  verb phrase o f
ÿ'
sentences when th ese phrases a re  j o i n e d  by some form o f  and a lso
between the t h in g s  spoken o f  in such sentences .  Given t h i s ,  the ' s a id  
o f  r e l a t i o n  becomes a s p e c ia l  case o f  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n .  The 
' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  holds between the i n d i v i d u a l  and i t s  species or  genus.  
The p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  is then a more e x p l i c i t  form o f  the ' s a id
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o f  r e l a t i o n ,  the  d e f i n i t i o n  being the w h a t - i s  o f  the p a r t i c u l a r . ^  The 
' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  is then a p a r t i a l  d e f i n i t i o n  which holds between a 
spec ies or  a genus and an in d i v i d u a l  which f a l l s  under the species or  
genus but  which does not  g iv e  a complete i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  the p a r t i c u l a r ,  
as does a d e f i n i t i o n .  The p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  a name then becomes the  r e l a ­
t i o n  which holds between a s u b je c t  and anyth in g  which i t  is sa id  to  be.  
And t h i s  r e l a t i o n  seems to  then be merely  a r e l a t i o n  which holds between 
p a r t s  o f  speech;  in terms o f  the  th in gs  which are spoken about ,  the p r e d i ­
c a t io n  o f  a name sometimes in d i c a t e s  one r e l a t i o n  ( e . g . ,  in h e re n c e ) ,  
sometimes another  ( e . g . ,  the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n ) .
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  making sense o f  what A r i s t o t l e  is doing here  
are  enormous. I f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account is approached from a p o s i t i o n  which 
considers subsequent p h i l o s o p h i c a l  developments,  he seems to  be suggest­
ing t h a t  the g e n e r ic  sense o f  p r e d i c a t i o n  is the r e l a t i o n  which holds 
between the s u b j e c t  and the  p r e d i c a t e  o f  s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e  sentences.  
Modern ph i losophers  would con s id er  t h i s  to  be a d i s t i n c t i v e l y  l i n g u i s t i c  
r e l a t i o n .  But the species  senses o f  t h i s  a t  l e a s t  inc lude  the p r e d i c a ­
t i o n  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  and the  p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the name. The p r e d i c a t io n  
o f  the  name again  seems t o  be a d i s t i n c t i v e l y  l i n g u i s t i c  r e l a t i o n .  How­
e v e r ,  when A r i s t o t l e  t a l k s  about the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the  d e f i n i t i o n ,  the  
r e l a t i o n  to  which he is r e f e r r i n g  does not  seem to be d i s t i n c t l y  l i n g u i s ­
t i c .  Modern ph i lo sophers  would again say t h a t  such a r e l a t i o n  was onto­
l o g i c a l .  But the f a c t  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  does not d i s t i n g u i s h  the o n t o l o g i ­
cal  and the l i n g u i s t i c  en a b le  him to  t r e a t  p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  
and p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the name as spec ies  senses under a ge n er ic  sense o f
^S u p ra , pp. 6 - 7 .
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p r e d i c a t i o n .
Having now d i s t in g u i s h e d  p r e d i c a t i o n  from the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n ,  
i t  w i l l  be p o s s i b l e  to  e x p l a i n  the  way in which A r i s t o t l e  sets p r e d i c a t i o n  
in o p p o s i t io n  to  inherence .  A r i s t o t l e  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e s  t h a t  pr imary sub­
stances a re  the  e n t i t i e s  which u n d e r l i e  a l l  o t h e r  t h i n g s ,  and t h a t  a l l  o f  
these o t h e r  th in g s  a re  e i t h e r  p r e d ic a t e d  o f  o r  inherent  in pr imary  sub­
s tance .^  F u r t h e r ,  i t  is  because the  pr im ary  substances a re  su b jec ts  f o r
a l l  the o t h e r  th in gs  and a l l  o t h e r  th in gs  are p r e d ic a te d  o f  them o r  ' i n '
2
them, t h a t  they a re  c a l l e d  substances most o f  a l l .
A r i s t o t l e  makes i t  p l a i n  t h a t  the ' o r '  in the above q u o ta t io n  is 
an e x c l u s i v e  one. The d e f i n i t i o n  o f  an in h eren t  is never p r e d ic a b le  o f  
the s u b je c t  which the in h e re n t  is ' i n ' .  (C. 5.  2® 29 -30)  The ' s a id  o f  
r e l a t i o n  is a r e l a t i o n  between the genus and species and the in d i v id u a l  
which f a l l s  under them. Prime examples o f  genera and species are found 
in the  category  o f  substance where they  a re  c a l l e d  secondary substance.
And A r i s t o t l e  makes e x p l i c i t  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a secondary substance can never  
be ' i n '  a s u b j e c t .  (C. 5 .  3^ 10) A r i s t o t l e  does not  mention whether the  
species and genera in non-substance c a t e g o r ie s  may be both ' s a i d  o f  and 
' i n ' ,  but  h is  t r e a tm e n t  o f  pr im ary  substances in d ic a te s  t h a t  he would 
not regard them as being ' i n '  t h a t  which they  are ' s a i d  o f .  Th is  does 
n o t ,  o f  course ,  mean t h a t  a spec ies  or  genus in a non-substance category  
can be both ' i n '  a s u b je c t  and ' s a i d  o f  a s u b j e c t .  I t  does mean t h a t  a 
species  or  genus can be ' s a i d  o f  one s u b je c t  and ' i n '  an o ther .  This
) A r i s t o t l e ,  C a t e g o r i e s , 5 .  2^ 1 5 - 1 8 ,  t r a n s .  J . L .  A c k r i l l .
2
S ince  A r i s t o t l e  views the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  as a spec ia l  case 
o f  the r e l a t i o n  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n ,  i t  is a c o r o l l a r y  o f  t h i s  t h a t  a l l  th ings  
o t h e r  than pr im ary  substance are e i t h e r  ' s a i d  o f  pr imary substance or  
' i n '  p r im ary  substance.  (C. 5.  2^ 3 3 -34 )
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passage then shows t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  conceived inherence and p r e d i c a t io n  as 
oppos ites  o r  c o n t r a r i e s  given  t h a t  they both depend in some way on pr imary  
substance.
The c o n t r a r i e t y  which A r i s t o t l e  here has in mind is the c o n t r a r i ­
e t y  between inherence  and the species  sense o f  p r e d i c a t i o n  which has been 
r e f e r r e d  to  as the  p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n .  I t  could not  be the  
p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the  name which he has in mind s ince  the name o f  an inherent  
may be p r e d ic a t e d  o f  a s u b j e c t .  The d e f i n i t i o n  o f  w h i te  cannot be p r e d i ­
ca ted  o f  S o c r a t e s ,  f o r  example ,  a l though the  name c e r t a i n l y  can be,  s ince  
i t  is t r u e  to  say t h a t  Socra tes  is w h i t e .  Th is  co n d i t io n  a ls o  serves to  
d i s t i n g u i s h  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence  from the ‘ s a id  o f  r e l a t i o n ,  f o r  
the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h a t  which is ‘ sa id  o f ‘ a su b je c t  is always p r e d ic a b le  
o f  the s u b j e c t .  Thus the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the genus or  species o f  the sub­
j e c t  is always p r e d ic a b l e  o f  the  s u b j e c t ,  the genus and species being  
those th in gs  which may be ‘ sa id  o f ‘ a s u b j e c t .  Th is  is as expected since  
the ‘ s a id  o f ‘ r e l a t i o n  is mere ly  a s p e c ia l  case o f  the p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the  
d e f i n i t i o n .
Having then subsumed the ‘ s a id  o f ‘ r e l a t i o n  under the p r e d ic a t i o n  
r e l a t i o n ,  the marks used to  d i s t i n g u i s h  inherence from the ‘ sa id  o f ‘ 
r e l a t i o n  a l s o  serve  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  f rom p r e d i c a t i o n .  The f o l l o w i n g  
two co n d i t io n s  d i s t i n g u i s h  inherence from the  ‘ sa id  o f ‘ r e l a t i o n .  What 
inheres in something is ( 1) not  in i t  as a p a r t  nor (2 ) is i t  separab le  
from t h a t  in which i t  in h e re s .  In terms o f  (1)  t h a t  which is ‘ sa id  o f ‘ 
an i n d i v i d u a l ,  namely i t s  genus o r  s p e c ie s ,  is a p a r t  o f  the  t h in g  f o r  i t  
Is a p a r t  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h a t  t h i n g ,  the d e f i n i t i o n  being the  
essence in w o r d s . '  Pa r ts  o f  the  fo rm u la ,  f o r  A r i s t o t l e ,  stand in the
Ichung-Hwan Chen,  P h r o n e s i s  I I , p .  56,
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same r e l a t i o n  to  the fo rm ula  as the p a r ts  o f  the th in g  do to  the t h in g .  
(M, Z .  10. 1034b 20 - 2 3 ) By say in g  t h i s  A r i s t o t l e  seems to  be saying  
t h a t  a p a r t  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  c o n s t i t u t e s  a t h i n g .  A r i s t o t l e  does not  
deal  a t  length  w i t h  r e l a t i o n s  and does not  t a l k  about " w h o le /p a r t "  
r e l a t i o n s  o f  which t h i s  seems t o  be one. Condit ion ( l )  serves to  d i s ­
t i n g u i s h  inherence from the  ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n ,  s ince  what  is ' i n '  some­
t h in g  is not  a p a r t  w h i l e  t h a t  which is ' s a i d  o f  something is a p a r t .
In terms o f  (2 )  the secondary substance,  'man' can be ' s a i d  o f  many men, 
and i t  is s e p ara b le  from any given i n d i v i d u a l  man. Inherence is d i f f e r ­
e n t  f rom the  ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  and t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  is marked o f f  by 
these two c o n d i t i o n s .
Since the  ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  is merely  a s p ec ia l  case o f  the 
p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the  d e f i n i t i o n ,  the  co n d i t io n s  (1)  and (2) above a lso  
serve  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  inherence  and p r e d i c a t i o n  (as a d e f i n i t i o n ) .  For
w h i l e  t h a t  which is ' s a i d  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  is a p a r t  o f  i t ,  t h a t  which
is p r e d ic a t e d  as a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i t  is what i t  is and serves to  i d e n t i f y
i t .  What is p r e d ic a t e d  (as a d e f i n i t i o n )  o f  a t h in g  is what t h a t  th in g
i s .  Thus,  what  the th i n g  is and the t h in g  are one and the same; e . g . ,  
So cra tes  is the same as a r a t i o n a l  animal s in ce  t h a t  is what he i s .  
Consequent ly ,  t h e r e  is no r e l a t i o n  which holds between the th in g  and 
what is p r e d ic a t e d  (as a d e f i n i t i o n )  o f  i t ,  w h i l e  t h a t  which inheres in 
a th in g  is r e l a t e d  to i t ,  but  the r e l a t i o n  is not  a w h o l e /p a r t  r e l a t i o n  
s ince  the i n h e re n t  is not  a p a r t  o f  t h a t  in which i t  in heres .  Accord­
i n g l y ,  t h a t  f a c t  t h a t  c o n d i t io n s  (1 )  and (2) c h a r a c t e r i z e  inherence as 
a r e l a t i o n  a l s o  serves to  d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  f rom p r e d i c a t i o n ,  s ince  p r e d i ­
c a t io n  Is not  a r e l a t i o n .
The o p p o s i t io n  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n  and inherence then is i n t e l l i g i b l e
- 5 0 -
! n terms o f  i d e n t i t y .  That  which Is p re d ic a te d  o f  the t h in g  is what t h a t  
th in g  is and is i d e n t i c a l  to  i t .  On the  o t h e r  hand, t h a t  which inheres is 
r e l a t e d  to a p a r t i c u l a r  and is not  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r ,  A r i s ­
t o t l e  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  by saying t h a t  a l though i t  might be t ru e  
to  say t h a t  a man is b l i n d ,  i t  would never be t r u e  to say t h a t  a man is 
what b l in d n ess  i s .  (C. 10. 12® 3 5 -41 )
In the  p r e d i c a t i o n  o f  the  d e f i n i t i o n  the verb M s '  is always used
e s s e n t i a l l y  and, c o n s eq u en t ly ,  the  s u b je c t  and the p r e d ic a t e  are always 
in the same c a t e g o ry .  In the  r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence ,  however,  the verb  
M s '  is never  used e s s e n t i a l l y  and the  s u b je c t  and the p r e d ic a t e  are not
n e c e s s a r i l y  in the same c a t e g o r y .  I t  remains to  be shown under what con­
d i t i o n s  something does inhere  in another t h i n g .  To do t h i s  a p r e l i m in a r y  
look a t  A c k r i l l ' s  account o f  the  c o n d i t io n s  under which something may be 
s a id  to  inhere  w i l l  be u s e f u l . ^
The second o f  the  c o n d i t io n s  s e t  f o r t h  by A c k r i l l  is the most 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  and can be discussed f i r s t ;  the f i r s t  c o n d i t io n  w i l l  be 
discussed l a s t  s in ce  i t  depends on the  t h i r d ,  A c k r i l l ' s  second c o n d i t io n  
is t h a t  s t a t e d  by A r i s t o t l e  as "by being present  in something not  as a 
p a r t . "  Th is  c o n d i t io n  not  o n ly  serves to  mark o f f  the r e l a t i o n  o f  in h e r ­
ence from the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  and p r e d i c a t i o n ,  but  i t  a ls o  marks o f f  
in heren ts  from p a r t s  o f  the  m a t e r i a l  o f  which the concre te  th in g  is made, 
(M, Z 10. 1035® 18- 2 3 ) Th is  c o n d i t io n  then serves to  exclude c e r t a i n  
o t h e r  th ings  from the group o f  in h e r e n t s .  I t s  fu n c t io n  is c l e a r ,  and 
hence,  what A r i s t o t l e  is say in g  is  c l e a r  given the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  the r e l a ­
t i o n  o f  the w h o l e / p a r t  r e l a t i o n .
- I n f r a , pp. 6 0 - 6 3 .
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  C a teg o r ie s  1. 1^ 2 2 ,  t r a n s .  J . L .  A c k r i l l
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A c k r i l l ' s  t h i r d  c o n d i t i o n ,  however, is less c l e a r .  A r i s t o t l e  
s t a t e s  t h i s  by saying t h a t  what  is ' i n '  a su b je c t  "cannot e x i s t  separ­
a t e l y  from what  i t  is ' in ' A c k r i l l  s t a t e s  t h i s  as "A is inseparab le  
2
from B o "  The obvious q u e s t i o n ,  o f  course ,  is " I n  what way is i t  t h a t  
the in h e re n t  is in s e p a r a b le  from t h a t  which i t  is ' i n ' ? "  This quest ion  
may be answered in two p a r t s .  The f i r s t  p a r t  o f  the answer cons is ts  in 
showing t h a t  the  th in g s  which inhere are i n d i v i d u a l s  and not u n i v e r s a l s .  
The second p a r t  o f  the answer then focuses on the way in which i n d i v i d ­
uals are in se p a rab le  from t h a t  in which they in here ,
A c l e a r  s ta tement  o f  the  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  the answer is given by 
A c k r i l l  who s t a t e s :  "The i n s e p a r a b i l i t y  requirement has the consequence
t h a t  o n ly  i n d i v i d u a l s  in non-substance c a t e g o r ie s  can be ' i n '  in d iv id u a l  
substances ,"^  As an example o f  t h i s ,  A c k r i l l  suggests t h a t  w h i l e  th e re  
could be g e n e r o s i t y  w i t h o u t  t h e i r  being C a l l i a s ,  Cal l  las '  g e n ero s i ty  
would not  and could not  be w i t h o u t  C a l l i a s .  A c k r i l l  then concludes 
t h a t  " t h e  inherence  o f  a p r o p e r t y  in a kind o f  substance is to be a n a l ­
yzed in terms o f  the  inherence o f  i n d i v i d u a l  instances o f  the pro p er ty  
in i n d i v i d u a l  substances o f  t h a t  k i n d , " ^
This  a n a ly s i s  is supported in two ways by the t e x t .  I t  is 
supported by the s t r u c t u r e  o f  Chapter  2 o f  the Categories  when A r i s t o t l e  
i n d ic a t e s  t h a t  he wants to  draw a d i s t i n c t i o n  between the species and 
genera in the  category  o f  substance and in the non-substance ca te g o r ie s
I b i d ,  , 1. 1^ 23.
^ A c k r i l l ,  op, ci t , , p. 74,  
3 Ibi  d ,
4 | b i d , , p, 7 5 ,
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as w e l l . '  And i t  is a ls o  supported by the manner in which A r i s t o t l e  
makes these d i s t i n c t i o n s .  What A r i s t o t l e  is t r y i n g  to  do by d i s t i n g u i s h ­
ing th ings  which a re  ' s a i d  o f  o t h e r  th in g s  and th ings  inherent  in o th e r  
th in g s  can be seen by comparing Chapter  2 o f  the C ategor ies  wi th Chapter  5.  
in Chapter  5 A r i s t o t l e  makes the  c r u c i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between pr imary and 
secondary substance .  Pr imary substance is t h a t  which is n e i t h e r  ' s a i d  
o f  nor ' i n '  any t h i n g ,  e . g . ,  the i n d i v i d u a l  man o r  the in d iv i d u a l  horse.  
Secondary substance ,  on the o t h e r  hand, is t h a t  which is ' s a i d  o f  i n d i ­
v i d u a l s  but  is  not  p rese n t  ' i n '  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  e . g . ,  man o r  horse;  secondary 
substances a re  the spec ies and genera o f  pr im ary substances.  (C. 5.  2^
11-^ 6 ) T h is  d i s t i n c t i o n  between pr im ary  substances and secondary sub­
stances is the same d i s t i n c t i o n  A r i s t o t l e  makes between the f i r s t  and 
f o u r t h  groups o f  th in g s  in Chapter  2 which is the d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
the in d i v i d u a l  and i t s  spec ies  o r  genera .
The second group is composed o f  th ings  which A r i s t o t l e  s t a t e s  are  
present  ' i n '  a s u b je c t  but  not  ' s a i d  o f  i t ,  l i k e  a c e r t a i n  whiteness  or  
a c e r t a i n  p o i n t  o f  knowledge.  Taking as a general  example o f  t h i s  group 
t h a t  o f  a c e r t a i n  w h i t e n e s s ,  i t  f o l lo w s  t h a t  the p a r t i c u l a r  whiteness can­
not  be used in d e f i n i n g  the t h i n g .  I t  cannot be ' s a i d  o f  the t h i n g ,  
hence i t  is n e i t h e r  i t s  genus nor  species  and consequently  i t  does not  
e n t e r  in to  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h a t  t h i n g .  On the o t h e r  hand, to d e f in e  
the c e r t a i n  w h iteness  i t  is  necessary to d e f i n e  i t  by adding a d e te r m in a n t ,  
namely,  t h a t  in which i t  in h e r e s .  (M. Z 5.  1031^ 1-3)  Of course ,  s t r i c t l y  
sp eak in g ,  the  i n d i v i d u a l  is never  d e f in e d .  When A r i s t o t l e  speaks o f  the  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  an a c c i d e n t i a l  u n i t y  he may have in mind the  d e f i n i t i o n  of
^Su p ra , p. 42.
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a co n cre te  t h in g  t r e a t e d  as a u n i v e r s a l .  (M. Z 10. 1035^ 2 8 -32 )  In 
such a case a d e f i n i t i o n  o f  th e  co nc re te  t r e a t e d  as un ive rsa l  w i l l  have 
the same r e l a t i o n  o f  p a r t s  as the  co n cre te  t h in g  which i t  i s .  Here is 
the  p o i n t :  Whi te  is d e f in e d  by re f e r e n c e  to  t h a t  in which i t  inheres
in the  concre te  as u n i v e r s a l .  I f  i t  were to  be d e f in e d  as ' i n '  the i n d i ­
v id u a l  ( r a t h e r  than the u n i v e r s a l ) ,  then i t  could on ly  be d e f in ed  by 
r e f e r e n c e  to  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l .  Now s ince  the co ncre te  is only t r e a t e d  as 
u n i v e r s a l ,  i t  is the case t h a t  the  con c re te  th in g  is an i n d i v i d u a l .  This  
suggests t h a t  both the  th in g  and i t s  a t t r i b u t e s  are in some sense i n d i ­
v id u a l  .
The t h i r d  group which A r i s t o t l e  discusses comprises those things  
which are both in h e re n t  and which may be ' s a id  o f .  In t h i s  group is 
knowledge. According to  A r i s t o t l e ,  t h i s  knowledge is present  ' i n '  the  
mind and I t  is a ls o  ' s a i d  o f  grammar s in ce  grammar is a kind o f  know­
l e d g e . '  In t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  case the c e r t a i n  p iece  o f  knowledge is ' i n '  
the human mind and i n s e p a r a b le  from i t .  On the o t h e r  hand, i t  is a 
p a r t  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a k ind  o f  knowledge,  knowledge o f  grammar.
As such i t  may be ' s a i d  o f  grammar. A r i s t o t l e ' s  p o in t  in saying t h i s  
is t h a t  knowledge cannot be w i t h o u t  being ' i n '  some mind which e n t a i l s  
t h a t  i t  be ' i n '  some p a r t i c u l a r  mind.^  On the o t h e r  hand knowledge as 
p a r t i c u l a r  Is always some kind o f  knowledge; hence,  knowledge is a genus 
under which c e r t a i n  spec ies and i n d i v i d u a l s  f a l l .  The t h i r d  group is 
then composed o f  th in g s  which inhere  ' i n '  secondary substances (some­
t h i n g  which they can do o n ly  i f  they  inhere  ' i n '  some pr imary substances)
' t „  Z 5o 142^ 31- 3 5 , t r a n s .  F o r s t e r .  
^Supra , pp. I 7 n .
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and which a ls o  d e f in e  those i n d i v i d u a l s  which do inhere  in pr imary  sub­
s t a n c e s ,  Th is  group is then composed o f  species and genera in non­
substance c a t e g o r i e s ,
A r i s t o t l e ' s  manner o f  f ram ing these d i s t i n c t i o n s  thus suggests,  
a t  l e a s t ,  t h a t  he is making a d i s t i n c t i o n  between p a r t i c u l a r s  and t h e i r  
spec ies and genera both in the  c a tegory  o f  substance and in o t h e r  c a t e ­
g o r i e s  as w e l l .  Th is  is a l s o  supported by the f a c t  t h a t  in the f i r s t  
paragraph o f  Chapter  2 A r i s t o t l e  is  concerned w i th  marking o f f  those  
express ions  which i n d i c a t e  th in g s  which a re  enumerated under the d i f f e r ­
e n t  c a t e g o r i e s .  His a n a l y s is  is then geared to  show t h a t  these expres­
sions may i n d i c a t e  e i t h e r  an i n d i v i d u a l  o r  i t s  species or  genus. In addi 
t i o n  J .R .  Jones o f f e r s  o t h e r  arguments in support  o f  t h i s  p o s i t i o n . ^  
Jones'  f i r s t  argument is p h i l o l o g i c a l .  When A r i s t o t l e  t a l k s  about sec­
ondary substance ,  such as man and h o rs e ,  he uses the  d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e ,  
the phrases f o r  man and horse then being o^vô-paj-nos  and o  .
As A r i s t o t l e  l a t e r  remarks ,  however,  these express ions  suggest t h a t  what  
is being discussed is the in d i v i d u a l  horse o r  man, r a t h e r  than the  
spec ies horse o r  man, (C, 5. 3*̂  12 -17)  Having used the d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e  
t o  i n d i c a t e  the species  o r  genera and not  having an i n d e f i n i t e  a r t i c l e ,  
A r i s t o t l e  must f i n d  another  way o f  making p l a i n  when he is t a l k i n g  o f  
the In d iv i d u a l  and when he is t a l k i n g  about the genus or  s p ec ies .  To do 
t h i s  he imports the i n d e f i n i t e  pronoun and combines i t  w i t h  the  
phrases he uses to  i n d i c a t e  the secondary substance.  Thus when he t a l k s  
o f  the i n d iv i d u a l  horse the e xp ress io n  he uses is o  f t s  [ t t t t o j . But not  
on ly  does A r i s t o t l e  use the i n d e f i n i t e  pronoun tis  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  the
^JoRo Jones,  "Are the Q u a l i t i e s  o f  P a r t i c u l a r  Things U n iversa l  
o r  P a r t i c u l a r ? "  P h i lo s o p h ic a l  Review L V I I I  (March, 1 949 ) ,  pp. 154-156,
"55“
p rimary  substance from the secondary substance where i t  is c l e a r  t h a t  
the p r imary  substance is the i n d i v i d u a l  and the secondary substance is 
e i t h e r  the genus o r  the s p e c ie s ;  he a ls o  uses i t  to d i s t i n g u i s h  d i f f e r ­
en t  k inds o f  w h i ten e ss .  Thus when he t a l k s  o f  the inherence o f  a c e r ­
t a i n  w h iteness  he uses the exp ress ion  to  tc. Aeoitov to  in d i c a t e  t h a t  
w h i te n e s s .  By analogy then i t  seems t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is making the d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  between i n d i v i d u a l s  and t h e i r  species and genera in both of  
these c a s e s . '
The second argument is more p h i l o s o p h i c a l .  A r i s t o t l e  s t a t e s
t h a t  what  is one in number and i n d i v i d u a l  may be present  ' i n '  a su b je c t
as is the case w i t h  grammatical  knowledge. (C. 2 .  1^ 5“9)  This is sa id
In the co n te x t  o f  saying  t h a t  th in g s  which are in d i v id u a l  and one are
never  ' s a i d  o f  a s u b j e c t .  Given the o p p o s i t io n  o f  inherence and the
' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n ,  i t  f o l lo w s  t h a t  th ings  which are i n d iv id u a l  and
one,  l i k e  a c e r t a i n  p o in t  o f  grammatical  knowledge,  q u a l i f y  as in herents ,
2
This  in d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  non-substance i n d i v i d u a l s .
in the t h i r d  argument Jones again notes the Greek exp ress io n .  
When in the t h i r d  group A r i s t o t l e  is t a l k i n g  o f  the inherence o f  know­
ledge in the  mind and the  f a c t  t h a t  i t  can be ' s a id  o f  grammar, A r i s ­
t o t l e  is c a r e f u l  to  omit  the i n d e f i n i t e  pronoun This is e s s e n t i a l ,
f o r  the r e l a t i o n  between knowledge and grammar is one between the genus 
and i t s  s p e c ie s ,  and not  a r e l a t i o n  between the i n d iv i d u a l  and i t s  spe­
c ies  o r  genus. The r e l a t i o n  between the i n d iv i d u a l  to i t s  genus or  
species is one o f  in s tan ce  to  u n i v e r s a l .  t o  c i  Atujcov |s then an 
in s tan ce  o f  -t-o . Now i t  would o r d i n a r i l y  be supposed t h a t  a
' i b i d . , pp. 154-155.  
2 | b i d . , p. 155.
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w h i t e  th i n g  would be a p a r t i c u l a r  in s tance  o f  wh it en es s .  However, f o r
A r i s t o t l e  w h i t e  th ings  a re  substances and cannot be instances o f  w h i t e .
\ \ . /
The o n ly  way o f  read ing t h i s  passage is then to  take  t o  t c  
t o  mean a p a r t i c u l a r  w h i t e . '
According to  these arguments and the s t r u c t u r e  o f  the passage,  
i t  would seem t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  does want to make a d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
i n d i v i d u a l s  and t h e i r  spec ies  and genera in non-substance c a t e g o r i e s .
To do t h i s  he must t a l k  about p a r t i c u l a r  and in d i v id u a l  non-substances.  
Thus when A r i s t o t l e  says t h a t  an in h eren t  is ' i n '  a s u b je c t  (sub jec ts  
being  in d i v i d u a l  s u b s t a n c e s ) ,  he is in e f f e c t  saying t h a t  an in d iv i d u a l  
non-substance is  i n s e p a r a b le  from the  i n d i v id u a l  substance which i t  is  
' i n ' .  But In o r d e r  t o  see what  t h i s  i n s e p a r a b i l i t y  e n t a i l s ,  i t  is 
necessary to  look a t  what  in h e re n ts  a re  p r i m a r i l y  ' i n ' .
Summing up the prev ious  account o f  substance,  i t  can be sa id  
t h a t  pr im ary substance as form is what is o c c u r r a b le ;  i t  can occur many 
t im e s .  On the  o t h e r  hand,  pr im ary  substances as the concrete o b je c t  
is t h a t  which occurs and does not  r e c u r .  I t  is a c o n s t i t u e n t  in a world  
o r d e r  in which substances change in a non-random fa s h io n .  Given t h i s  
account o f  pr imary  substance ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  to  t a l k  o f  something as 
in h e ren t  in a substance is  to  t a l k  o f  something which occurs w i t h  a p r i ­
mary substance ,  but which is in se p a r a b le  from t h a t  in which i t  in h e re s .  
This  I n s e p a r a b i l i t y  then means t h a t  the in h e re n t  occurs o r  is o cc ur rab le  
w i t h  and o n ly  w i t h  t h a t  in which i t  in h e r e s ,  and t h a t  i t  does not and 
cannot occur a p a r t  f rom or w i t h o u t  t h a t  in which i t  in heres .  This
' i b i d . ,  pp. 155- 156. 
^Supra , pp. 25 - 3 3 .
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i n s e p a r a b i l i t y  f rom p r im ary  substance is then a dependence on pf imary  
substance.  An account o f  t h i s  dependence can be approached by a cons id­
e r a t i o n  o f  A c k r i l l ' s  f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  the inherence o f  a non-substan ce .*  
A r i s t o t l e  c l e a r l y  wants to  d e sc r ib e  the r e l a t i o n  between substances 
and non-substances by say in g  t h a t  non-substances are  ' i n '  substances.  
According to  A c k r i l l ,  what  A r i s t o t l e  probably had in mind in f o rm u la t in g  
the r e l a t i o n  in t h i s  way was a number o f  cases in Greek in which i t  would 
be normal t o  d e s c r ib e  non-substances as in substance.  For example,  i t  
would be common to  say th in g s  l i k e ,  "hea t  in the w a te r "  and "courage in 
S o c r a t e s . "2 But as A c k r i l l  is aware,  t h i s  is not  a n a t u r a l  way o f  d e s c r ib ­
ing a l l  non-substances.  Reasoning in t h i s  way,  he suggests t h a t  the r e l a ­
t i o n  o f  inheren ce  might  be spoken o f  in ways o t h e r  than saying t h a t  a 
non-substance was ' i n '  a substance.  He then form ula tes  the f i r s t  condi ­
t i o n  f o r  a non-substance in h e r in g  in a substance as
A is ' i n '  B ( i n  a t e c h n ic a l  sense) i f  and o n ly  i f  (a)  one could  
n a t u r a l l y  say in o r d i n a r y  language e i t h e r  A is in 8 o r  t h a t  A is  
o f  B o r  t h a t  A belongs to  B o r  t h a t  B has A (or  t h a t
In c r i t i c i s m  o f  A c k r i l l ,  Moravcsik has s t a t e d  t h a t  the above c o n d i t io n  
is  merely a verba l  c o n d i t i o n ;  what  is needed,  he suggests ,  is an onto ­
lo g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n  to  match the verba l  c o n d i t i o n . ^  As w i l l  be shown 
l a t e r ,  M o r a v c s ik 's  s ta tem ent  o f  t h i s  is in ad equ ate .^  What needs to  be 
shown is how and why A r i s t o t l e  would regard substance as p r i o r  so t h a t
* A c k r i l l ,  0£_. c i t . ,  p. 74.  
2|bid.
3 | b i d .
4j .M.E„  M o rav cs ik ,  " A r i s t o t l e  on P r e d i c a t i o n , "  Ph i losophi  c a 1 
Review LXXVI , ( January ,  1 9 6 7 ) ,  pp. 8 7 -8 8 .
5 I n f r a ,  pp. 6 9 - 7 0 .
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non-substances depend on substan ce .  Once t h i s  has been done i t  is merely  
a m a t te r  o f  convenience to  d e s cr ib e  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  by using a tec h n ic a l  
sense o f  ' i n ' .  To d e sc r ib e  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  by using ' i n '  is perhaps the  
primary  way o f  d e s c r i b in g  t h i s  r e l a t i o n ,  but  i t  need not be the o n ly  way.  
This  A c k r i l l  accounts f o r  by le a v in g  an e l l i p s i s  a f t e r  his  l a s t  way o f  
speaking o f  the  inherence r e l a t i o n .  But because o f  t h i s  e l l i p s i s  t h i s  
c o n d i t io n  does not  serve  to  mark o f f  inherence  from any o th e r  r e l a t i o n .
I t  merely  s t a t e s  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  must be a b le  to  speak about the terms 
o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  in such a way as to  e x h i b i t  t h a t  they are r e l a t e d .
Given A r i s t o t l e ' s  v iew t h a t  the  w or ld  is i n t e l l i g i b l e  as i t  is taken up 
in language,  t h i s  is  o f  course t r u e .  Consequently,  the o n t o l o g ic a l  
c o n d i t i o n , w h ic h  Moravcsik  suggests must match the  l i n g u i s t i c  c o n d i t i o n ,  
is not  so c l o s e l y  a s s o c ia te d  w i t h  t h i s  c o n d i t io n  as i t  is w i th  the insep­
a r a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n .  Non-substances a re  not  sep arab le  from the sub­
stances which they a re  ' i n '  because substance is p r i o r  and i f  i t  d id not  
have b e in g ,  then noth in g  e l s e  would have b e ing .  Approaching the s u b je c t  
in t h i s  way i t  is p l a i n  t h a t  the suggested o n t o lo g i c a l  c o n d i t io n  which 
must match A c k r i l l ' s  f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  is concerned w i t h  the p r i o r i t y  o f  
substance,
A r i s t o t l e  has accounted f o r  the p a r t i c u l a r i t y  o f  substance by 
I t s  form and has i n d iv i d u a t e d  d i f f e r e n t  instances o f  the same form 
using his n o t io n  o f  m a t t e r .  However,  such an account is s u f f i c i e n t  
o n ly  f o r  su bstances ,  s in c e  o n ly  substances (c on cre te  in d i v i d u a l s )  are  
composed o f  m a t t e r .  Thus h is  account o f  the p a r t i c u l a r i t y  and i n d i ­
v i d u a t i o n  o f  non-substances w i l l  have to  be d i f f e r e n t .  Of course,  w i th  
his  e x p la n a t i o n  o f  form he w i l l  be a b le  to  say t h a t  each ins tance  o f  
some p a r t i c u l a r  non-substance is the same as i t s  essence. But t h i s
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leaves unsaid how some p a r t i c u l a r  t h in g  can be in many places a t  the same 
t im e .  I f  he is unable to  have the same t h in g  in many places a t  the same 
t im e ,  he w i l l  be fo rced  in t o  the f o l l o w i n g  dilemma: e i t h e r  he w i l l  have
to  make what he cons iders  the  P l a t o n i c  assumption and a s s e r t  t h a t  a th ing  
and i t s  essence a re  severed o r  he w i l l  have to  a s s e r t  t h a t  the same th in g  
can be separated  from i t s e l f .  In o r d e r  t o  overcome these d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  
A r i s t o t l e  makes non-substances dependent on substances;  t h i s  gives  sub­
stance  p r i o r i t y  in being capable  o f  independent b e i n g . '  Consequently,  
non-substances a re  dependent on substances;  A r i s t o t l e  accounts f o r  t h i s  by 
making non-substances inhere  in substances.
Given t h i s ,  A r i s t o t l e  is a b le  to  say t h a t  a non-substance is what 
i t  is by using the com para t ive  r e l a t i o n s  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e .
Th is  accounts f o r  the  p a r t i c u l a r i t y  o f  non-substance .  Non-substances are  
i n d iv id u a t e d  by the m a t t e r  on which they depend f o r  t h e i r  be in g .  They 
are ' i n '  the c o n cre te  t h in g  which is form and m a t t e r .  Thus even though 
non-substances a re  not  composed o f  m a t t e r ,  they are o f  o r  ' i n '  the con­
c r e t e  t h i n g .  I t  is by using the  r e l a t i o n a l  c r i t e r i a  which m a t te r  br ings  
to  the c r i t e r i a  f o r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  form t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is ab le  to  g ive  
his non-substances i n d i v i d u a l i t y .  Forms a re  a l i k e  or  d i f f e r e n t .  I n d i ­
v i d u a l s  having the same form a re  one o r  many, depending on whether or  not  
they a re  s e p a r a b le .  But non-substance  i n d i v i d u a l s  can on ly  be separab le  
i f  they are ' i n '  t h a t  which is sep a rab le  in a pr imary sense:  substance.
A r i s t o t l e  is t h e r e f o r e  a b le  t o  i n d i v i d u a t e  non-substances by having them 
depend on m a t t e r  f o r  t h e i r  b e ing .  Thus the i n d iv id u a l  non-substance is 
' I n '  the in d i v i d u a l  su b stan ce ,  meaning t h a t  the in d iv id u a l  non-substance
^S u pra , pp. 33 -40 .
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Is not  a p a r t  o f  the  substance ,  but  is In sep ara b le  from the substance  
which i t  is ' i n '  and cannot be w i t h o u t  t h i s  substance.  This is a r e l a ­
t i o n  between i n d i v i d u a l s  in substance and non-substance c a t e g o r i e s .
Since  the i n d i v i d u a l s  in these two c a t e g o r i e s  a re  not  in d i v id u a ls  but  
p a r t i c u l a r s ,  when d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by the comparat ive r e l a t i o n s ,  then as 
p a r t i c u l a r s  non-substances a l s o  inhere  in substances.  Non^substances 
could not  f a i l  to  in h e re  in the p a r t i c u l a r  when they must inhere in the  
i n d i v i d u a l .  A r i s t o t l e ,  th e n ,  draws the same d i s t i n c t i o n s  in substance  
and non-substance c a t e g o r i e s  and he e x p l a in s  essences the same in sub­
stance  and non-substance  c a t e g o r i e s .  The form provides the p a r t i c u l a r i t y  
w h i l e  the m a t t e r  p rov ides  the p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a t i o n .  He r e l a t e s  
substance and non-substance c a t e g o r ie s  w i t h  the r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence  
acco rd ing  to  which a non-substance is not  a p a r t  o f  a substance but  is 
in s e p a ra b le  from substance in the sense t h a t  i t  d e r iv es  i t s  being from 
the  substance w i t h  which i t  is a s s o c ia t e d .  Thus as an essence a non­
substance is i n h e re n t  in a secondary substance ,  and as an in d i v i d u a l  a 
non-substance  is in h e re n t  in a p a r t i c u l a r  substance.  I t  is w i th  t h i s  
account t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  endeavors to  understand the wor ld  as a wor ld  in 
which a th in g  is the  same as i t s  essence.
CHAPTER V 
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF INHERENCE
This  th e s is  is not  the  o n ly  recent  d iscuss ion o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  
d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence .  The th re e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  discussions  o f  t h i s  
t o p i c  have been advanced by J . L ,  A c k r i l l ,  G .E .L .  Owen, and J.M .E .  
M o r a v c s i k . '  A c k r i l l ^  a t tem pts  t o  b r i e f l y  s t a t e  the c o nd it io ns  under  
which something may be sa id  to  be ' i n '  something e l s e .  A c k r i l l ' s  
account is  c r i t i c i z e d  by Owen3 ,  and t h i s  debate is a r b i t r a t e d  by Morav­
c s i k . ^  Moravcsik a lso  o f f e r s  some suggest ions  on the problems to be 
faced in any a t tem pt  to  come to  terms w i t h  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r i n e  o f  in h e r ­
ence.  Th is  ch ap te r  w i l l  ta k e  up the  p o in ts  argued by these th ree  
commentators.
A c k r i l l ' s  book, A r i s t o t l e ' s  C ategor ies  and De I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e , 
is s u b t i t l e d  A T r a n s l a t i o n  w i t h  N o te s . S l i g h t l y  less than h a l f  o f  t h i s  
book is taken by the t r a n s l a t i o n ,  w h i l e  the remainder conta ins A c k r i l l ' s  
notes on these two works.  I t  is in these notes t h a t  A c k r i l l  o f f e r s  his  
account o f  inherence .  Discussions o f  inherence are found in the notes 
on paragraphs beg inn ing  w i t h  l i n e s  2^ 34 and 11^ 20.  The main d i s c u s s i o n .
Minor d iscuss ions  o f  t h i s  t o p i c  occur in Anscombe and Geach, op . 
c i t . and in J .R .  Jones,  op . c i t . These d iscuss ions a re  not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  from those o f  A c k r i l l ,  Owen, o r  Moravcsik to  w arran t  d iscussion  
h ere .
^ A c k r i 11, o£, c i t .
^G.E .L .  Owen, Phrones is X, pp. 9 7 -105 .  
4M oravcs ik ,  op . c i t .
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o f  co u rse ,  occurs in connect ion w i t h  A c k r i l l ' s  remarks on Chapter 2 o f
the  C ategories  where A r i s t o t l e  g ives  h is  most e x p l i c i t  f o rm u la t io n  o f
t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .  Here A c k r i l l  s p e l l s  out  the th re e  co nd it io ns  under
which something may be sa id  t o  in here :
A is ' i n '  B ( in  the  t e c h n ic a l  sense) i f  and on ly  i f  (a)  one could  
n a t u r a l l y  say in o r d i n a r y  language e i t h e r  A is in B o r  t h a t  A 
is o f  B o r  t h a t  A belongs to  B o r  t h a t  B has A (or  t h a t  . , . ) .  
and (b) A is not  a p a r t  o f  B, and (c) A is insep a rab le  from B . '
What A c k r i l l  has sa id  is  c o r r e c t ,  but  his account is h a rd ly  com­
p l e t e .  His s ta tem ent  o f  the  inherence c o n d i t io n s  is most ly  a res ta tement  
o f  the  c o n d i t io n s  which A r i s t o t l e  s t a t e s .  A c k r i l l  on ly  adds the f i r s t  
c o n d i t i o n ,  which serves mere ly  to  p o i n t  out  t h a t  the r e l a t i o n  can be 
spoken o f .  Thus the  work o f  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  the inherence r e l a t i o n  from 
o t h e r  r e l a t i o n s  is c a r r i e d  by A c k r i l l ' s  res ta tement o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  co nd i­
t i o n s  f o r  inherence .  Such an account leaves c e r t a i n  quest ions unanswered. 
For example,  why does he in c lu de  the c o n d i t io n  concerning o r d in a r y  la n ­
guage? What does i t  mean to  say t h a t  A is in s eparab le  from B? A c k r i l l ' s  
account must be judged a f a i l u r e  in s o f a r  as he has f a i l e d  to  answer 
these qu es t io n s .
Aside from b r e v i t y ,  t h e r e  is one o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t y  w i t h  A c k r i l l ' s  
comments. T h is  occurs in conn ect ion  w i t h  the comments on Chapter  5 o f  
the C a t e g o r i e s .  ̂ Here A r i s t o t l e  makes the  c la im  t h a t  e v e ry th in g  which 
is not  a s u b je c t  (pr im ary  substance)  is e i t h e r  present  ' i n '  a su b je c t  or  
is ' s a i d  o f  a s u b j e c t .  (C. 5 .  2^ 3 3 - 3 4 )  On the basis o f  t h i s  c la im  he 
is a b le  to a s s e r t  t h a t  " c o l o r  is in a body and t h e r e f o r e  a ls o  in an
A c k r i l l ,  0£_. c i t . ,  p . 74.  
^Supra , pp. 56- 5 7 . 
^ A c k r i l l ,  o£.  c i t . ,  p. 8 3 .
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i n d i v i d u a l  body; f o r  were i t  not  in some in d i v id u a l  body i t  would not  be 
in body a t  a l l . " '  T h is  f o l lo w s  because e v e r y t h in g  which is not a pr imary  
substance (concre te  i n d i v i d u a l )  must e i t h e r  be ' s a i d  o f  a pr imary  sub­
stance  o f  ' i n '  a p r im ary  substance.  So i f  c o lo r  is ' i n '  a body (any 
d e te rm in a te  p h ys ica l  t h i n g )  then i t  must be ' i n '  some pr imary substance 
since  e v e r y t h in g  must be ' i n '  o r  ' s a i d  o f  a pr imary  substance.  Anything  
which was not  a p r im ary  substance and d id  not  q u a l i f y  f o r  e i t h e r  o f  these  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  pr im ary  substance could not  e x i s t .  According to  A c k r i l l ,  
however,  A r i s t o t l e ' s  comment here is "compressed and c a r e l e s s . What 
A r i s t o t l e  should have s a i d ,  accord ing  t o  A c k r i l l ,  is t h a t  i t  would not  
be ' i n '  a body a t  a l l  i f  some ins tance  o f  i t  were not  ' i n '  some in d iv i d u a l  
body. Th is  comment, however,  ignores the s u b t l e t y  o f  the  too ls  which 
A r i s t o t l e  is using .
A r i s t o t l e ' s  view o f  substance as mentioned b e f o r e , 3 can be seen 
in two ways. These two views a re  consequent ly present  in his account o f  
inherence .  Thus a c o l o r  is ' i n '  a body as what i t  i s ;  t h a t  i s ,  a c o lo r  
' i n '  a body is the  same as i t s  essence.  So every o ccu r r in g  o f  t h a t  c o lo r  
is the  same as i t s  essence and,  con seq u en t ly ,  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  every  o th e r  
o c c u r r in g  o f  the c o l o r .  In t h i s  case t h e r e  is on ly  one th in g :  the essence
o f  the  c o l o r .  Taking up w i t h  the o t h e r  view o f  substance,  a th i n g  is the  
same as what  i t  is in terms o f  s i m i l a r i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e ,  but i t  is not  
the same as i t s e l f  i n s o f a r  as i t  is ' i n '  d i f f e r e n t  in d i v id u a l  substances.  
Here t h e r e  a re  many, as determined  by the  s p a t i a l  r e l a t i o n  o f  s e p a r a b i l i t y .
' A r i s t o t l e ,  C a t e g o r i e s , 5 .  2*̂  1 - 4 ,  t r a n s .  A c k r i l l  
^ A c k r i l l ,  o£_. c i t . ,  p. 8 3 .
3Supra,  pp. 25- 3 3 .
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Thus by saying t h a t  a c o l o r  must ' i n '  an i n d i v i d u a l  body, A r i s t o t l e  
is saying t h a t  c o l o r ,  as what  i t  i s ,  must be ' i n '  some i n d i v i d u a l .  And 
i t  is t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  body which prov id es  the i n d i v i d u a t i o n  o f  the  
o c c u r r in g s  o f  the  c o l o r  in q u e s t io n .  These occurr in gs  a re  in d iv id u a te d  
by being s e p a ra b le ;  they a r e  sep ara b le  because each o ccu r r in g  is ' i n '  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  p ie c e  o f  m a t t e r ,  these p ieces  being s e p a ra b le .  Thus A r i s t o t l e  
is saying  t h a t  a c o l o r  would not  have being i f  i t  were not  ' i n '  a t  le a s t  
one i n d i v i d u a l  substance as what  i t  i s .  I t  may, o f  course ,  be ' i n '  many 
i n d iv i d u a l  substances as what i t  i s .  Since the i n d i v id u a l  substances  
which a p a r t i c u l a r  non-substance  is  ' i n '  a re  s e p a ra b le ,  i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  
the o ccu r r in g s  o f  the p a r t i c u l a r  non-substance are a ls o  sep arab le .  Contra  
A c k r i l l ,  the n ,  A r i s t o t l e  is not  being c a r e le s s  by saying t h a t  i t  is the  
in s tan ce  o f  the  c o l o r  which is ' i n '  an i n d iv id u a l  substance.  Rather he 
is d e f i n i n g  the  in s tance  o r  o c c u r r in g  o f  t h a t  c o l o r  as the same as i t s  
essence but  ' i n '  some in d i v i d u a l  substance and consequently in d iv id u a te d  
as an o c c u r r in g  o f  t h a t  c o l o r .
Owen's a r t i c l e  w i l l  now be d iscu ssed .  T h is  a r t i c l e  is a con­
fessed a t tem pt  to  " n a i l "  a dogma which accompanies the i n h e r e n c e / ' s a id  o f  
d i s t i n c t i o n .  Before  s t a t i n g  t h i s  dogma, Owen o u t l i n e s  h is  own p o s i t i o n  
on inherence in an a n a l y s i s  o f  Chapter  2 o f  the C a t e g o r ie s . In t h i s  
a n a l y s i s  Owen agrees t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between in d i v i d u a l s  
and t h e i r  spec ies  and genera in the ca tegory  o f  substance as w el l  as in 
non-substance c a t e g o r i e s .  His account o f  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  however,  is 
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom any r e c e n t l y  advocated view.
According to  Owen the i n d i v i d u a l i t y  o f  the in d iv i d u a l  substance  
is j u s t  t h a t  i t  is w h o l ly  d e te rm in a te  and not  p r e d ic a b le  o f  anything less  
g e n e r a l .  P a r a l l e l i n g  the i n d i v i d u a l i t y  o f  substances is the i n d i v i d u a l i t y
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o f  non-substances « They a re  i n d i v i d u a l s  p r e c i s e l y  because,  says Owen, 
they  are  not  p r e d i c a b l e  o f  any less general  th in g  in the same ca tegory .  
Taking c o l o r  as an example ,  an i n d i v i d u a l  c o l o r  l i k e  s t e e l  blue is an 
i n d i v i d u a l  in t h a t  i t  cannot be p r e d ic a t e d  o f  any less general  c o l o r ,  
al though as an a d j e c t i v e  i t  can be p re d ic a t e d  o f  many th i n g s .  Gwen is 
t a k i n g  the  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  an in d i v i d u a l  c o lo r  is a p a r t i c u l a r  shade o f  
c o l o r  and not  a p a r t i c u l a r  o c c u r r in g  o f  a shade o f  c o l o r .  In o t h e r  
words Owen is say ing  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  c o l o r  is not in d i v id u a l  because 
i t  is s p a t i a l l y  sep a rab le  (as dependent on m a t te r )  from o t h e r  instances  
o f  the same c o l o r .  Rather Owen is say ing t h a t  a c o l o r  is an i n d iv id u a l  
because i t  is one o f  a f i n i t e  number o f  d is c r i m i n a t e  c o l o r s .  Thus i t  
is an in d i v i d u a l  not  as s p a t i a l l y  s e p a r a b l e ,  but  as co n c ep tu a l ly  s e p a r a b l e . '
Having s e t  f o r t h  his  account o f  inherence ,  Owen s t a t e s  what he 
takes t o  be the dogma concerning inherence .  This dogma asser ts  t h a t  an 
i n d i v i d u a l  in a non-substance ca tegory  cannot be present  ' i n '  more than 
one in d i v i d u a l  substance .^  Owen a ls o  c i t e s  Ross,^ Jones,^ Anscombe,5 
and A c k r i l l ^  as the  advocates o f  t h i s  view.  Owen's a r t i c l e ,  then ,  rep re ­
sents a c r i t i c i s m  o f  the  views o f f e r e d  in these sources as w e l l  as the  
view adopted in t h i s  t h e s i s .
There a r e ,  however,  problems w i t h  Owen's p o s i t i o n  regard ing the
'owen,  Phrones is X, pp. 9 7 - 9 8 .
 ̂i b i d . , p. 99.
^WoD. Ross, A r i s t o t l e  (London: Methuen & Co. L t d . ,  1923) ,  p. 24n.
^*Jones , o p . c i t .
^Anscombe and Geach, op. ci t .
^ A c k r i l l ,  op. c i t .
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i n d i v i d u a l i t y  o f  substance and non-substance  i n d i v i d u a l s .  I t  is in f a c t  
t r u e  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  in the  ca tegory  o f  substance are not  p r e d ic a b le  of  
an y th in g  less general  s in c e  t h e r e  is n o th ing  less general  in the category  
o f  substance.  However,  Owen f a i l s  to  note A r i s t o t l e ' s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i ­
v i d u a t i o n .  I f  A r i s t o t l e  is to  have i n d i v i d u a l s  then he must be ab le  to  
i n d i v i d u a t e  them. Since Owen holds t h a t  an in d iv id u a l  in a non-substance  
category  is a p a r t i c u l a r  o f  which t h e r e  may be many in s tan ce s ,  he must 
hold t h a t  non-substance  i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  i n d iv id u a t e d  by t h e i r  s i m i l a r i t i e s  
and d i f f e r e n c e s .  But A r i s t o t l e  uses these  r e l a t i o n s  to  d is t i n g u i s h  
essences;  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  i n d i v i d u a l s  he uses h is  not io n  o f  m a t te r .  (M. Z 
8.  1034  ̂ 5 - 8 )  Thus as e x p l a i n e d '  Socrates  and C a l l i a s  a re  the same as 
form s in ce  th ey  a re  both men, but  d i f f e r e n t  as m at te r  s ince  they are  
s e p a r a b le .  T h is  s e p a r a b i l i t y  i n d i v i d u a t e s  them. D e r i v a t i v e l y ,  Socrates '  
w h i t e  ( the  o c c u r r i n g  o f  w h i t e  ' i n '  Socra tes )  is in d iv id u a t e d  from C a l l i a s '  
w h i t e  ( the  o c c u r r i n g  o f  w h i t e  ' i n '  C a l l i a s )  by being s ep a rab le .  In t h i s  
way A r i s t o t l e  is a b le  to  e x p l a i n  how t h e re  can be many occurr in gs  o f  one 
t h i n g .
On Owen's account ,  however,  i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to  see how A r i s t o t l e  
could account f o r  one th i n g  o c c u r r in g  many t im es .  Thus w h i l e  he s t a t e s  
c o r r e c t l y  t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  cannot be p r e d ic a te d  o f  anyth ing  less g e n e r a l ,  
t h i s  is not  a means by which i n d i v i d u a l s  can be i n d i v i d u a t e d .  To get  
t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a t i o n ,  Owen would have to  tu rn  to  A r i s t o t l e ' s  
n o t io n  o f  m a t t e r ,  s in ce  t h i s  is the p r i n c i p l e  A r i s t o t l e  mentions. Were 
he to  do t h i s  he would have d i f f e r e n t  instances  o f  whiteness  i n d iv id u a te d  
as s e p a r a b le .  By c la im in g  t h i s  Owen is p la c in g  h im s e l f  in the f o l lo w in g  
p o s i t i o n .  He is choosing to  reserv e  the word ' i n d i v i d u a l '  f o r  in d i c a t i n g
' Supra, p. 59-60.
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a s p e c i f i c  essence; in the case o f  colors a set of  such essences would 
have a f i n i t e  number o f  members. Thus Owen would be able to say that  
each member o f  th is  set  could be ' i n '  many ind iv idua l  substances at  the 
same t ime. He would account f o r  the fa c t  tha t  p a r t i c u l a r  non-substances 
could be one and in many places a t  the same time by saying that each 
instance o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  non-substance would be separable from every 
other  instance.  Thus he would ih d iv idua te  instances by having them be 
separable.  His account o f  what A r i s t o t l e  is saying is then no d i f f e r e n t  
from the account given in th is  th e s is .  Owen merely has chosen to use 
the word ' i n d i v i d u a l '  in one way w h i le  in the present thesis a d i f f e r e n t  
use has been chosen. His c r i t i c i s m s  then in no way a f f e c t  the substan­
t i v e  port ion o f  the view taken here.  Most o f  his c r i t ic is m s  are based 
on misunderstandings of  th is  p o s i t io n .
These misunderstandings come out q u i te  c le a r l y  in his f i r s t  
argument. Owen contends th a t  i t  can be said and is true  to say that  
pink is ' i n '  a body, but since pink is not an in d iv id u a l ,  pink can be 
in no given p a r t i c u l a r  body.'  This c r i t i c i s m  f a i l s .  I t  is true  to say 
tha t  pink is ' i n *  an ind iv idua l  body; but th is  is merely to say that  
pink is ' i n '  a separable and th is  i s ,  o f  course,  what i t  means to be an 
instance of  pink .  For th a t  c o lo r  which is ' i n '  an indiv idual  body is 
the same as i t s  essence and th is  is pink .  This gives one side of  A r is ­
t o t l e ' s  doc tr ine .  Looking a t  th is  from the other  s ide,  what i t  is to 
be pink may be in many places at  the same time. This individuates the 
occurrings of  pink .
Owen's second c r i t i c i s m  is also based on a misunderstanding.
' o w e n ,  P h r o n e s i s  X,  p .  100.
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He takes up A r i s t o t l e ' s  example t h a t  knowledge is p re d ic a te d  o f  grammar
(s in c e  grammar is a k ind o f  knowledge)  and ' i n '  the soul:
Some [ t h i n g s ]  a re  both s a id  o f  a s u b je c t  and in a s u b je c t .  For
example,  knowledge is in a s u b j e c t ,  the  s o u l ,  and i t  is a lso  
sa id  o f  a s u b j e c t ,  knowledge o f  grammar. '
A r i s t o t l e ' s  f a i l u r e  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  the kinds o f  knowledge which inhere in
the s o u l ,  Owen t h i n k s ,  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  d id  not  d i s t i n g u i s h  the
i n d i v id u a l  knowledge as t h a t  which is  o n ly  ' i n '  one in d iv id u a l  so u l .  Had
he,  he would have been c e r t a i n  t o  p o in t  out  t h a t  in one case the knowledge
he is d iscuss in g  is ' i n '  a p a r t i c u l a r  soul and in the o t h e r  case knowledge
is ' s a i d  o f  many so u ls .  Owen a ls o  makes the  s t ro n g er  c la im  t h a t  t h i s
passage is not  open to  a read ing  which would e n t a i l  t h a t  knowledge must be
' i n '  a p a r t i c u l a r  soul f o r  i t  to have be ing a t  a l l .  Presumably,  A r i s t o t l e
would not  be a b le  to  say t h a t  knowledge is  or  may be ' s a i d  o f  grammar as
a kind o f  knowledge, i f  knowledge depended f o r  i t s  being on any p a r t i c u l a r  
2
s o u l .  But t h i s  argument a l s o  f a i l s .  A r i s t o t l e  is here t a l k i n g  about  
the species and genus in a non-substance ca teg o ry .  Thus he is t a l k i n g  
about knowledge as what i t  i s ,  be ing ' i n '  o r  depending on substance.  This  
knowledge which is ' i n '  a substance is a genus under which th e r e  are many 
s p e c ie s .  Knowledge is a ls o  used in d e f i n i n g  these s p e c ie s ,  s ince i t  is 
the genus o f  which t h e r e  are many s p e c ie s ,  as is the case in knowledge 
o f  grammar. The p o i n t  here is  t h a t  i f  t h e re  is to  be knowledge, then 
t h e r e  must be instances o f  knowledge.  And these instances must be occur ­
r ings  o f  knowledge which occur  w i t h  and not  w i th o u t  pr imary substance.  
Knowledge as form is dependent on substance s ince  i t  could not  have being
^ A r i s t o t l e ,  C a te g o r ie s  2 .  1^ 29-^  2 ,  t r a n s .  A c k r i l l .  
2-Owen, Ph rones i s X, p. 100.
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i f  t h e r e  was no substance .  On the  o t h e r  hand,  each o cc u r r in g  o f  know­
ledge occurs w i t h  and not  w i t h o u t  some pr im ary  substance,  i t  is  a lso  
p l a i n  t h a t  the o c c u r r in g s  o f  what  occurs in the o ccurr ings  a r e ,  on A r i s ­
t o t l e ' s  account,  m u t u a l ly  dependent.  Seen in t h i s  way, Owen's o b je c t i o n  
f a i l s  in t h a t  the  view which he is c r i t i c i z i n g  e n t a i l s  t h a t  i f  knowledge 
is to  be,  i t  must be ' i n '  some i n d i v i d u a l .
Owen's next  argument is  a c r i t i c i s m  o f  A c k r i l l ' s  account o f  A r i s ­
t o t l e ' s  statement concern ing c o l o r  ' i n '  an i n d i v i d u a l .  (C. 5 .  2® 36-^ 3) 
T h is  passage, however,  has a l r e a d y  been e x p la in e d  in connect ion w i t h  
A c k r i l l  and need not  be d e a l t  w i t h  h e r e . '
Another argument which Owen br in gs  to  bear on t h i s  s u b jec t  is the  
f o l l o w i  n g :
Then th e re  is the paradox o f  the breakdown o f  c a t e g o r ie s .  The 
dogma says t h a t  each p a r t i c u l a r  i tem in ca te g o r ie s  o th e r  than sub­
stance  must be i d e n t i f i e d  as the such-and-such q u a l i t y  (or  q u a n t i t y ,  
o r  whatever )  o f  s o - a n d - s o . The consequence o f  t h i s  is t h a t  mem­
bers o f  su b o rd in a te  c a t e g o r ie s  a re  seconded in one sweep to  the  
category  o f  r e l a t i v e  terms.  At  any r a t e  they s a t i s f y  A r i s t o t l e ' s  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  r e l a t i v e s ,  i n c lu d in g  the l a s t  and s t r o n g e s t ,  q u i t e  as 
w e l l  as h is  own examples.  (8^ 35"8*^ 15)^
This argument,  however,  is v i t i a t e d  by A r i s t o t l e ' s  d i s c l a i m e r  in the pre ­
ceding l i n e :  " t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a t h in g  is e x p la in e d  w i t h  re fe ren ce  to  some­
th in g  e l s e  does not  make i t  e s s e n t i a l l y  a r e l a t i v e , "  (C, 7. 8^ 34) Such 
a d i s c l a i m e r  does not  a id  in c l a r i f y i n g  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  r e l a t i v e s ,  
but i t  does show t h a t  th e  dogma would not  "second" e v e r y t h in g  in t o  the  
r e l a t i v e  c a te g o r y .
Owen's f i n a l  argument is what  he c a l l s  the paradox o f  im p l i c a ­
t i o n .  Owen s t a t e s  t h i s  as " i f  X is an i n d i v i d u a l ,  the s ta tement t h a t  a
^Su p ra , pp. 6 2 - 6 4 .
^Owen, Phronesis X, p.  101.
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p a r t i c u l a r  Y (say a p a r t i c u l a r  c o l o r )  w i l l  not  e n t a i l ,  but  a c t u a l l y  p re ­
c lude say ing t h a t  Y is w i t h o u t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  in X."^ I t  soon becomes 
e v i d e n t  what  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  Owen has in mind. According to  Owen, the  
dogma e n t a i l s  t h a t  t o  p r e d i c a t e  o f  an y th in g  requ ires  t h a t  the p r e d ic a t e  
be i d e n t i f i e d  by means o f  t h a t  in which i t  in heres .  Thus i f  Socrates  
is p ink  (Owen's word f o r  Ac o k o v ) ,  then i t  is in c o r r e c t  to say in an 
u n q u a l i f i e d  way, "S ocra tes  is p i n k . "  What is c o r r e c t  to  say i s ,  "Soc­
r a t e s  is So cra tes '  p i n k . "  Th is  c r i t i c i s m ,  o f  course,  misses the p o i n t .  
Socrates  is  p in k  i n s o f a r  as what i t  is to  be the c o lo r  o f  Socrates is 
what i t  is to  be p in k .  Thus the  c o lo r  o f  Socrates is  p ink  and t h a t  is 
what i t  is to  be p i n k ,  but  as the p in k  which inheres in S o cra tes ,  i t  is 
an o c c u r r i n g  o f  p in k .
Thus Owen has advanced a number o f  p o in ts  a g a in s t  the view t h a t  
in h eren ts  cannot be ' i n '  more than one i n d i v i d u a l .  His o b je c t io n s  to  
the a l i e d g e d  dogma, however,  f a i l ,  f o r  Owen misunderstands the view 
which he is  c r i t i c i z i n g .  His c r i t i c i s m s  are based on the r e s t r i c t i o n s  
which he places  on h is  use o f  ' i n d i v i d u a l ' ;  he on ly  a p p l ies  ' in d iv id u a l '  
to  p a r t i c u l a r  essences which a re  the  l e a s t  general  in t h e i r  resp ect iv e  
c a t e g o r i e s .  Thus h is  arguments a g a in s t  the present  view are based on 
his  account o f  the  view which would e n t a i l  t h a t  an i n d i v id u a l  is a 
p a r t i c u l a r  essence.  Thus Owen is c r i t i c i z i n g  the p o s i t i o n  which would 
hold t h a t  these are essences which can o n ly  be ' i n '  one in d iv i d u a l  sub­
s tan ce .  Owen's arguments a g a in s t  such a p o s i t io n  are o f  course j u s t i ­
f i e d ,  but  he takes these arguments to  be c r i t i c i s m s  o f  the view which 
in f a c t  holds t h a t  o cc ur r in g s  can o n ly  be ' i n '  one in d iv id u a l  substance.
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His c r i t ic is m s  are consequently based on a misunderstanding.
The dispute  between A c k r i l l  and Owen is a r b i t r a t e d  by J.M.E.  
Moravcsik.  Moravcsik gives a p a r t i a l  review of A c k r i l l ' s  notes on the  
Categories wi th a few suggestions fo r  fu r t h e r  examination.  By r e s t r i c t ­
ing his discussion to the r e la t io n s  'sa id  o f ,  inherence,  and p re d ica t io n ,  
Moravcsik is a lso able to discuss the s u b t le t ie s  of  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account 
o f  these re la t io n s  as we l l  as ind ica te  the problems which any prospec­
t i v e  commentator must f a c e . '
Moravcsik begins by d is t in g u ish in g  the three c ruc ia l  re la t ions  
with  which A r i s t o t l e  is deal ing in the opening chapters o f  the Categor ies . 
The f i r s t  r e la t io n  which Moravcsik discusses is pred ica tion  (which he 
c a l l s  p r e d i c a t i o n ' ) .  This is the l i n g u i s t i c  r e la t io n  as understood in 
the ord inary  sense. I t  has two on to log ica l  re la t io n s  underlying i t .
These two re la t io n s  are the 'sa id  o f  re la t io n  and inherence (which 
Moravcsik r e f e r  to  as p re d ic a t io n "  and inherence,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ) .^  I t  
is in th is  framework which Moravcsik proceeds to inves t iga te  his top ic .
His formulat ion of  the d i f fe re n ce s  between these re la t ions  in 
terms o f  the o n t o l o g i c a l / l i n g u i s t i c  d is t i n c t io n  i s ,  however, open to 
quest ion.  Moravcsik gives no r a t io n a le  fo r  viewing A r i s t o t l e  as a 
philosopher  who could make the o n t o l o g i c a l / l i n g u i s t i c  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  but 
co n f id e n t ly  posits  his account o f  these re la t io n s .  The main thing  
which Moravcsik overlooks is A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  being.  A r i s t o t l e  
does not have the problem o f  exp la in in g  the r e la t io n  between words and 
th ings .  This enables him to  use l i n g u i s t i c  evidence to substant ia te
' Moravcsik,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 8O-9 6 .
2 I b i d . , 83- 8 5 .
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what modern p h i lo sophers  might c a l l  o n t o lo g ic a l  c la im s .  This is l a r g e l y  
because,  as a modern p h i lo s o p h e r  might express i t ,  he views the wor ld  as 
i n t e l l i g i b l e  as taken up in language.  Thus f o r  A r i s t o t l e  the problem  
concerning the r e l a t i o n  between language and the w orld  does not a r i s e . ^
To put  f o r t h  a view based on the assumption t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is ab le  to  
t ake  up t h i s  q u es t io n  and y e t  f a i l  to  p ro v id e  any j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
t a k in g  t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  is to  miss the p o in t  o f  what A r i s t o t l e  is 
doing in the f i r s t  chapters  o f  the C a t e g o r i e s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  having e s t a b l i s h e d  t h i s  account o f  the d i s t i n c t i o n s  
which A r i s t o t l e  employs,  Moravcsik  plunges ahead to  defend A c k r i l l  
a g a in s t  the "sh arp "  c r i t i c i s m  o f  G .E .L .  Owen.^ As A c k r i l l ' s  p o s i t i o n  
has a l r e a d y  been defended a g a i n s t  Owen, Moravcs ik 's  at tempts  to  do t h i s  
need not  be d e a l t  w i t h  h e re .
This accomplished,  Moravcsik  cont inues  by p o in t i n g  out some d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s  in the manner in which A r i s t o t l e  fo rm u la ted  his  account o f  
inherence .  The f i r s t  d i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  in connect ion w i t h  sentences  
which seem to  i n d i c a t e  the inherence o f  non-substances in o th e r  non-  
substances.  M o ra v c s ik 's  example o f  t h i s  is "sound has p i t c h . "  This  
would seem to  f u l f i l l  the c o n d i t io n s  necessary f o r  spmething to  inhere  
in something e l s e ,  but  a l though i t  is not  c e r t a i n  how A r i s t o t l e  would 
handle such a case ,  the o u t l i n e s  o f  h is  t rea tm en t  are c l e a r .  A r i s t o t l e  
would probably  have ana lyzed  sound as motion in a i r . ^  Thus sound would
^Supra , pp. 23- 2 4 . 
2 | b i d .
3 | b i d .
i . , pp. 83 -87
V r i s t o t l e  ( p s e u d . ) .  Problems A H .  899^ 33 * 3 6 ,  t r a n s .  E . S . F o r s t e r ,
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be a c e r t a i n  b e i n g - a f f e c t e d  o f  a i r ;  o cc u r r in g s  o f  sound would be ' i n '  
a i r  as i n d i v i d u a l s  in the  c a te g o ry  o f  b e i n g - a f f e c t e d .  Sound being  
dependent on a i r ,  i t  would f o l l o w  t h a t  p i t c h  would a ls o  be dependent  
on a i r ,  a l though  whether o r  not  A r i s t o t l e  would have sa id  t h a t  p i t c h  
inheres in the sound o r  in the a i r  remains u n c e r t a in .  G en e ra l i z in g  
from t h i s  case ,  i t  may be s a id  t h a t  inh eren ts  which seem to  be ' i n '  
non-substances are dependent on the same i n d i v id u a l  substances as those  
th in g s  in which they seem to  inhere  depend. Which way A r i s t o t l e  would 
choose t o  d e s c r ib e  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  remains u n c e r t a i n ,  a l though i t  seems 
p l a i n  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is  concerned p r i m a r i l y  w i t h  things which are ' i n '  
substances .
The second p o in t  which Moravcsik  develops concerns the way in
which A r i s t o t l e  would deal  w i t h  s i z e  and shape. Moravcsik quest ions
whether they would p r o p e r l y  be c a l l e d  in h ere n ts .^  I t  would be p o s s ib le
f o r  A r i s t o t l e  to  argue t h a t  s i z e  and shape are not  in h e re n ts ,  a l though
w hether  he would have done so again remains in doubt. As mentioned
e a r l i e r ,  A r i s t o t l e  u t i l i z e s  a n o t ion  o f  m a t t e r  to  o b ta in  a p r i n c i p l e  o f  
2
i n d i v i d u a t i o n .  And as a p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i v i d u a t i o n ,  m a t te r  employs 
the r e l a t i o n  o f  s e p a r a b i l i t y .  But f o r  something to  be s p a t i a l l y  sep­
a r a t e  e n t a i l s  t h a t  i t  have s i z e  and shape. Thus where s i z e  and shape 
are not  a p a r t  o f  the  essence o f  something,  they would be in m a t te r  as 
the co n d i t io n s  under which something may be s p a t i a l l y  s e p ara te .  This  
is the p o s i t i o n  which A r i s t o t l e  could  take  on the quest io n  of  s i z e  and 
shape. He probab ly  would not  have done so,  f o r  to  do so would have
1|
' S u p ra , pp. 25- 33.
'M orav cs ik ,  0£_. c i t . ,  p. 90.
2c
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engaged him in a more e x p l i c i t  t re a tm e n t  o f  r e l a t i o n s  than he was capable ,  
given  the t ime in which he l i v e d .  I t  would have a ls o  forced him to  see 
t h a t  h is  account o f  substance depends on the comparat ive r e l a t i o n s  and 
the s p a t i a l  r e l a t i o n .  These could not w e l l  inhere  in substance or  be 
' s a i d  o f  substance as the  account o f  substance depends on these r e l a ­
t i o n s .  However, A r i s t o t l e  does not  deal  a t  length w i t h  r e l a t i o n s  and 
does not  d is c o v e r  these problems.
The f i n a l  d i f f i c u l t y  which Moravcs ik br ings out  concerns the  
f o r m /m a t t e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  the i n h e r e n c e / ' s a i d  o f  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n . '  Moravcsik wonders why A r i s t o t l e  does not  e x p l a i n  the r e l a ­
t i o n  between these two d i s t i n c t i o n s .  I t  is t r u e ,  as Moravcsik suggests,  
t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  may not  have fo rm u la ted  the  fo rm /m a t te r  d i s t i n c t i o n  when
he w ro te  the Categor i  es ; n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  is apparent  how he could have
2
handled such a d i s t i n c t i o n .
Leaving in h eren ce ,  Moravcsik a ls o  has a few th in gs  to  say about  
the ' s a i d  o f '  r e l a t i o n .  He takes  t h i s  to  be one o f  the o n t o lo g ic a l  
c o n f ig u r a t i o n s  which u n d e r l i e s  p r e d i c a t i o n ,  p r e d i c a t io n  being a l i n ­
g u i s t i c  r e l a t i o n .  According to  Moravcsik  t h i s  has the consequence t h a t  
A r i s t o t l e  is c o r r e c t  in s t a t i n g  t h a t  the ' s a id  o f  r e l a t i o n  is t r a n s i ­
t i v e .  He is a ls o  c o r r e c t  in t h a t  t h i s  e n t a i l s  t h a t  the o r d in a r y  l i n ­
g u i s t i c  r e l a t i o n  is not  t r a n s i t i v e . 3 The in co r rec tn ess  o f  t h i s  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  these  two r e l a t i o n s  has been shown. But i t  is a ls o  in doubt  
as to  whether the  o r d i n a r y  l i n g u i s t i c  r e l a t i o n  o f  p r e d i c a t i o n  is not
' M o r a v c s ik ,  l o c . c i t . 
^Su p ra , pp. 3 8 -4 0 .
3 I b i d . ,  pp. 91- 9 2 .
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t r a n s i t i v e . ^  I t  is e s p e c i a l l y  s t ran g e  t h a t  Moravcsik should make such
claims about p r e d i c a t i o n  when he admits t h a t  no adequate account o f
2
p r e d i c a t i o n  has been g iv e n .
Fo l low ing  t h i s ,  Moravcsik  o f f e r s  a few c r i t i c i s m s  o f  A c k r i l l ' s  
account o f  the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n .  On the  basis  o f  an example o f  his  
own choosing Moravcsik  argues t h a t  the  ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  may not  be 
equated  w i t h  e s s e n t i a l  p r e d i c a t i o n .  As has been shown above t h i s  c la im  
i t  t r u e ,  but  o n ly  because th e  ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  is a shortened form 
o f  the  r e l a t i o n  o f  e s s e n t i a l  p r e d i c a t i o n  o r  the p r e d i c a t io n  o f  the  d e f i -
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n i t i o n .  Thus the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  is not  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
f rom e s s e n t i a l  p r e d i c a t i o n .  Turn ing  to  M ora vcs ik 's  example,  h is  mis­
take  is ap p aren t .  In h is  example ,  Moravcsik takes th re e  sentences:  
Socrates  is a man. Man is a sp ec ies .  Socrates is a spec ies .  He then 
argues t h a t  i f  the  ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  is  e q u i v a le n t  to  e s s e n t i a l  p r e d i ­
c a t i o n  i t  w i l l  f o l l o w  t h a t  the  t h i r d  sentence is t r u e .  The mistake  
here is t h a t  man in the f i r s t  sentence is a c lass  o f  beings.  In the  
second sentence  i t  is the name o f  a s p e c ie s .  Thus man is used d i f f e r ­
e n t l y  in the two sentences which Moravcsik uses as examples, and t h i s  
m istake  v i t i a t e s  his c o n te n t io n  t h a t  the ' s a i d  o f  r e l a t i o n  is not  
e q u a ta b le  w i t h  e s s e n t i a l  p r e d i c a t i o n .
Moravcs ik concludes h is  a r t i c l e  by p o in t in g  out  the re levance  
o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  p r i o r i t y  to  h is  account o f  inherence.  He 
does n o t ,  however,  see t h a t  the s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  p r i o r i t y  f o r  t h i s
^Cf. Fred Sommers, " P r e d i c a b i 1 i t y , "  Phi losophy in America ed.  
Max Black ( I t h a c a ,  New York:  C o rn e l l  U n i v e r s i t y  Press ,  1 964 ) ,  pp. 262-
281.
^Moravcs ik ,  og_. c i t . ,  pp. 8 0 - 0 2 .
3s u p r a , pp. 4 5 -4 6 .
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d o c t r i n e  is found in connect ion w i t h  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d iscu ss ion  o f  essences.  
Rather  he a s s e r ts  t h a t  more w i l l  be known about A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r in e  o f  
p r i o r i t y  when h is  account o f  m o d a l i t i e s  is more f u l l y  e x p l i c a t e d .  Cer­
t a i n l y  t h i s  would be i l l u m i n a t i n g ,  but  i t  would not  show how A r i s t o t l e ' s  
d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence f i t s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  h is  account o f  essences.  In 
t h i s  conc lud in g  d is cuss io n  Moravcsik o f f e r s  no s u b s ta n t iv e  t h e s e s . '
Th is  concludes the c r i t i c i s m s  o f  commentators who have discussed  
the  quest ion  o f  inherence .  A l l  o f  them have t r i e d  to  consider  t h i s  doc­
t r i n e  a p a r t  f rom the mainstream o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  ph i losophy.  In s o f a r  as 
they  have done t h i s  they have f a i l e d  to  make e x p l i c i t  what A r i s t o t l e  
sought in h is  d is cuss ion  o f  inherence and why he made such a seemingly  
obtuse d i s t i n c t i o n .
I M o r a v c s i k ,  o^.  c i t . ,  pp.  9 3 - 9 6 .
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
T h is  concludes the prese n t  t h e s i s ,  i t  has been shown t h a t  on a t  
l e a s t  one read in g  A r i s t o t l e ' s  sc ience  o f  being qua being is the science  
o f  substance in which substance is understood to  be capable o f  being
independent w h i l e  a l l  o t h e r  th in g s  depend f o r  t h e i r  being on substance.
But in o r d e r  to  have such a sc ie nce  A r i s t o t l e  needed a way o f  express ing  
the  r e l a t i o n  between independent substance and dependent non-substance.  
For t h i s  A r i s t o t l e  in t roduced  the n o t io n  o f  inherence .  Thus i t  is 
through the r e l a t i o n  o f  inherence t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  is a b le  to  inc lu de  non­
substances in h is  sc ie nce  o f  substance w i t h o u t  in t ro d u c in g  a g e n e r ic  
sense o f  be ing .
To do t h i s ,  o f  course ,  A r i s t o t l e  needed to  be ab le  to overcome 
what he considered  to  be the P l a t o n i c  problem, t h a t  o f  s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t
substances.  T h is  was performed by his th e o ry  o f  substance.  According
to  t h i s  t h e o r y ,  substance may be understood in th re e  ways: as m a t t e r ,
as fo rm , and as the  c oncre te  th i n g  which is both form and m a t te r .  Using 
t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  A r i s t o t l e  was a b le  to  say t h a t  any given concrete i n d i ­
v id u a l  is the same as what  i t  is  to  be t h a t  concrete  i n d i v i d u a l ;  e . g . ,  
Socrates is i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  what i t  is to  be a man. He is the same as 
his  essence.  Viewed in t h i s  way Socrates is the same as h is  essence and 
C a l l i a s  is the  same as h is  essence .  Thus Socrates  and C a l i i a s  are iden­
t i c a l  t o  the same t h i n g .  T h is  being the case they are  i d e n t i c a l  to
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each o t h e r .  A c c o rd in g ly  as form they  a re  one r a t h e r  than two, s ince  
they a re  both i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  the form o f  man.
However, look in g  a t  t h i s  in an o th er  way, Socrates and C a l l i a s  
a re  two and not  one,  f o r  each is in h is  own m a t t e r .  What A r i s t o t l e  is 
doing here is  p o s i t i n g  two d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  re la tedness  f o r  d e t e r ­
mining oneness and manyness. The form o f  man which is Socrates is 
i d e n t i c a l  to  the form o f  man which is C a l l i a s .  Thus t h e re  is on ly  
one form, the form o f  man. Seen as the  concrete  ( form and m at te r )  
Socrates  is i n d i v i d u a t e d  from C a l l i a s ,  s in ce  Socrates and C a l l i a s  are  
s e p a ra b le .  As s e p a r a b l e ,  they  a re  two and not  one. Thus Socrates and 
C a l l i a s  are one in t h a t  they  have an i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  form. They are  
many in t h a t  they a re  s e p a r a b le .  By using t h i s  theory  o f  substance
o u t l i n e d  above,  A r i s t o t l e  is  a b le  to  have knowledge which is of^ the u n i ­
v e r s a l ,  w h i l e  having t h i s  knowledge apply  to  each p a r t i c u l a r .  In t h i s  
way he does not  need s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t  forms in o r d e r  to  have knowledge.
This account,  o f  course ,  is the one which a p p l ie s  to  substance.
A r i s t o t l e  extends such an account to  the  o t h e r  c a t e g o r ie s  by having
i n d i v i d u a l s  in th ese c a t e g o r i e s  depend on substance.  Thus he accounts 
f o r  knowledge o f  p a r t i c u l a r  non-substances in the same way t h a t  he ac ­
counts f o r  the knowledge o f  p a r t i c u l a r  substances.  A non-substance,  
say y e l l o w ,  is the  same as i t s  essence.  Take two y e l l o w s ,  the y e l lo w  
o f  Socrates ( c a l l e d  y e l l o w ^  and the  y e l l o w  o f  C a l l i a s  ( c a l l e d  y e l lo w 2 ) ,  
which are  the same shade o f  y e l l o w .  Then y e l lo w ]  is id e n t i c a l  w i t h  the  
essence o f  what  i t  is to  be y e l lo w  as is ye 11ow^. Since they are iden­
t i c a l  t o  the  same t h i n g ,  seen in terms o f  the r e l a t i o n s  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  
and d i f f e r e n c e  they  a re  the  same c o l o r .  In t h i s  respect  they are one.  
Now A r i s t o t l e  needs to  account f o r  t h e i r  manyness. He does t h i s  by
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making a l l  non-substance  i n d i v i d u a l s  depend on substance i n d i v i d u a l s .  
Thus yel low^ and y e l I 0W2 a re  one as fo rm, but  many as sep arab le .  And 
they  are sep ara b le  simply because they  are ' i n '  sep arab le  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  
Socrates and C a l l i a s .  Using t h i s  n o t io n  o f  inherence ,  then ,  A r i s t o t l e  
is ab le  to  have knowledge o f  non-substances on ly  because he is ab le  to  
have knowledge o f  substances.
One problem which might  be mentioned w i t h  such an account as 
A r i s t o t l e  has given  is h is  d i f f i c u l t y  in d e a l in g  w i t h  r e l a t i o n s .  A r i s ­
t o t l e  has a ca teg o ry  o f  r e l a t i v e s ,  but  these tu rn  out  to  be th ings  l i k e  
doub le ,  h a l f ,  and g r e a t e r ,  (C. 4 .  1  ̂ 30 ) He never discusses r e l a t i o n s  
l i k e  space and t i m e ,  though h is  account o f  s e p a r a b i l i t y  presupposes 
s p a t i a l  r e l a t i o n s .  Thus he could not  account f o r  such r e l a t i o n s  as 
being dependent on substance even i f  he were to  e x p l i c i t l y  deal w i t h  
these r e l a t i o n s .  Th is  suggests t h a t  i f  a ph i lo so p her  were to at tem pt  
t o  deal  w i t h  r e l a t i o n s  another  account o f  essences would be necessary.
A r i s t o t l e ,  however,  does not make the i n h e r e n c e / ' s a i d  o f  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  in h is  l a t e r  works .  But as J . L .  A c k r i l l  has s a i d ,  even 
though A r i s t o t l e  o n ly  makes e x p l i c i t  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  in the C a t e g o r i e s , 
" t h e  ideas they  [ th e  terms o f  the  d i s t i n c t i o n ]  express p lay  a lead ing  
r o le  in n e a r ly  a l l  A r i s t o t l e ' s  w r i t i n g s . " '  This is e v i d e n t  in many 
places and on d i f f e r e n t  t o p i c s .  For example,  even though in the Meta­
physics A r i s t o t l e  does not  r e l y  on an e x p l i c i t  fo r m u la t io n  o f  the d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  to show t h a t  non-substance  i n d i v i d u a l s  are dependent on sub­
stance  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  he s t i l l  s t a t e s  t h a t  non-substance i n d i v i d u a l s  do 
so depend. But he does not  discuss  the r e l a t i o n  between them. What
'Ackrill, op. cit., p. 74.
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A r i s t o t l e  says on t h i s  t o p i c  in the Metaphysics is t h a t  the being o f  sub­
stance is the  c e n t r a l  re f e r e n c e  f o r  a l l  o t h e r  k inds o f  being and,  conse­
q u e n t l y ,  the being o f  a l l  o t h e r  t h i n g s .  Thus substance is p r i o r  and non­
substances depend f o r  t h e i r  being  on substance ,  a l though  w i t h i n  the  
Metaphysics A r i s t o t l e  g iv es  no r a t i o n a l e  f o r  ho ld ing  such a p o s i t i o n .  I t  
is in the  C ateg o r ies  t h a t  h is  d o c t r i n e  o f  inherence g ives  some h i n t  a t  
what he may have had in mind. He a ls o  uses s i m i l a r  concepts t o  d e f in e  the  
realm o f  s c ie n ce .  There can be a sc ience  o f  beings which are u n i t i e s  in 
v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  own n a t u r e  r a t h e r  than a c t u a l  o r  a c c id e n t a l  u n i t i e s .  This  
leads A r i s t o t l e  i n t o  the q u es t io n  o f  how some th ings  can be more dependent  
on c e r t a i n  kinds o f  substance than o t h e r s .  For example, both h e a l th  and 
red are a t t r i b u t e s  o f  men and n e i t h e r  is a substance.  But th e r e  is  a 
sc ience  o f  h e a l t h :  m ed ic in e .  There is not  a science  o f  redness in men.
Th is  t o p i c  is c l o s e l y  connected w i t h  inherence f o r  A r i s t o t l e  must be ab le  
t o  account f o r  how non-substances are  dependent on substances. The d i f f e r ­
e n t  ways in which these substances have non-substances dependent on them 
is  c r u c i a l  f o r  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  the  realm o f  s c i e n t i f i c  i n q u i r y .  To 
mark out  t h i s  realm o f  i n q u i r y ,  he needs to  e x p l a i n  how a non-substance  
can be dependent on a substance.  A r i s t o t l e ' s  d o c t r in e  o f  inherence is 
an approach to  t h i s  t o p i c .  T h is  is a ls o  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  the e s s e n t i a l /  
a c c id e n t a l  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  A r i s t o t l e  needs to  have some way o f  e x p l a i n i n g  
the r e l a t i o n  which holds between a substance and i t s  accidents  o r  a t t r i ­
b u te s .  For example,  how is i t  t h a t  one man can be t a l l  and another  
short?  How is i t  t h a t  an a c c id e n t  a t ta c h e s  t o  a substance? These are  
c r u c i a l  q u e s t io n s .  A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  inherence is perhaps a f i r s t  
approach to  such problems; t h i s  account g ives  some o f  the ways in which  
a non-substance is a t ta c h e d  to  a substance.  In these ways,  th en .
" 8 1 “
A r i s t o t l e ' s  account o f  inherence Is c lo se ly  re la ted  to questions which 
run throughout the core o f  his phi losophy.
Thus w h i l e  i t  is t r u e  t h a t  A r i s t o t l e  d id  not  e x p l i c i t l y  make 
the i n h e r e n c e / ' s a i d  o f  d i s t i n c t i o n  in h is  l a t e r  works,  the d i s t i n c t i o n  
may serve as an i n t r o d u c t i o n  to  A r i s t o t l e ' s  ph i losophy.  I t  leads n a t u r ­
a l l y  to  the  qu est io n s  o u t l i n e d  above which are a t  the  h e a r t  o f  what  
A r i s t o t l e  is d e a l in g  w i t h  in h is  ph i lo so p h y .  Seen in t h i s  way the  
i n h e r e n c e / ' s a i d  o f  d i s t i n c t i o n  made in the  l i m i t e d  context  o f  the Cate ­
g o r ie s  prov ides  a focus narrow enough f o r  f r u i t f u l  s tudy ,  and c e n t r a l  
enough t o  f u r n i s h  leads i n t o  the  h e a r t  o f  A r i s t o t l e ' s  metaphysics.
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